Investigating the Influence of Islamic State’s Discourse in Jordan

Abstract Guided by the general investigation of the “discursive assault” launched by Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East and beyond, this paper examines the resonance of IS’ use of language in grassroots populations living in Jordan. Representing IS’ communication campaign as a sender-message-receiver continuum, this research aims to give primary importance to the message and its audience. Frame theory is used as the general framework to understand the formation and reception of IS’ discourse on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The analysis reveals that, while IS’ rhetoric on the perceived “crisis of the Ummah” and its solution seems to resonate inside Jordan, the social practices this solution entails failed to convince. In that sense, if IS succeeded to echo the grievances and resentment of its audiences in Jordan, the group was unable to attract generalized support for its caliphate. Nonetheless, this apparent rejection of IS’ project must be nuanced at the regional and state levels. After years of war in Iraq and Syria, the conditions that initially gave rise to IS remain. So, do the dynamics that nurtured the popular grievances against perceived illegitimate rulers.


The "Discursive Offensive" of Islamic State
When violence broke out in Iraq and Syria in 2011, the complexity of the situations gave birth to a multitude of interpretations of the conflicts' dynamics.This intricate understanding of the conflicts was further impeded by the myriad of state and non-state actors involved, each trying to portray the conflicts according to its interests and objectives.All protagonists took part in the discursive fight for the meaning of the conflicts, thereby competing for power, legitimacy, and recognition.Yet, among all the belligerents, one seems to have put unprecedented resources and hope in the construction of a discourse that might eventually offer a crucial strategic advantage in its struggle: Islamic State (IS).On 5 July 2014, in Mosul, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself the Caliph of the newly established Islamic state caliphate.By self-declaring itself a new "state" actor, the group entered into direct competition for power and legitimacy over territories and populations with the existing Middle Eastern states.
Although it was initiated by rapid military conquests in Iraq and Syria, the birth of the caliphate was made official through a public statement by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the former spokesperson of IS.From that moment then, the group became engaged in fighting two interrelated but distinct wars: a military war on the ground to control territory and impose its rule over its embryonic state and an ideological war to win the hearts and minds of the populations living in those territories -to gain legitimacy and popularity.
Even though IS struggled on the military frontline from 2015, it remained a fierce opponent on the ideological battlefield.The group developed a highly effective use of language and discourse as a tool to portray, carry and circulate its ideology in societies around the world, thereby waging an intensive and extensive communications campaign aimed at both friendly and hostile audiences.IS' effort to coin a discourse in the context of the wars in Iraq and Syria is referred to in this paper as a "discursive offensive" or a "discursive assault."Both terms denote the fact that the discourse and the militancy on the ground should be regarded as the two faces of the same coin, essentially aimed at winning the battle against the enemies of the caliphate.They also account for IS' awareness that articulating and promoting its worldview in a distinct discourse was an integral component of its war for the establishment of a global Islamic state.It follows that this paper does not only investigate IS' discourse from a rhetorical perspective but also the group's worldview which is rooted in a form of knowledge-practice, or the group's analysis.Such worldview is analyzed in relation to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, which served as the contextual settings used by IS to articulate its vision for new politico-social structures and a new global order built on its ideological foundations.Besides, those two conflicts were and in part continue to be major preoccupations at a political, economic, and societal level in the Middle East and beyond.They arguably catalyzed broader regional dynamics such as the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Sunni/Shi'a divide and the effects of Western military interventions.
Using Jordan as a case study -the kingdom produced the second largest poll of fighters for the ranks of the caliphate -this paper raises the question of the resonance of IS' far-reaching discursive campaign.It analyzes to which extent the frames used by IS in its message are present in the way Jordanian audiences expressed their understanding of conflict dynamics in Iraq and Syria between 2016 and 2019.This paper refers to the "audience(s)" of IS' message as any resident of the Hashemite Kingdom who was potentially exposed to the said message, whether by choice or via discourses disseminated by close circles, media, religious or political figures.It is argued that similarity of interpretations provides a partial but important explanation to the unprecedented danger posed by a Salafi-jihadi group to the Middle East.To do so, this research uses framing analysis to examine each set of discourse -that of the sender, IS, and that of the receiver, the Jordanian population -and bridge them through the concept of "resonance" to investigate the power of influence of IS' message.

The Pitfalls of a Vested Interest in IS' Message
IS' communication is often treated as homogeneous and the majority of existing studies underscore the diversity of the message over different audiences, spaces, sources and over more than 10 languages the group used to disseminate information thereby offering a partial and reductionist analysis. 1For example, these studies focus on IS' English materials that are issued toward western audiences, especially the magazine Dabiq. 2 A short survey of the literature available on IS' message across multiple languages shows that barely 25% of the analyzes recorded investigate the group's Arabic content.Arabic, though, was used in 97% of IS' videos and communiqués released daily. 3Regrettably, there exists no thorough exploration of al-Naba', the weekly Arabic-language newsletter issued by IS and distributed both online and directly to the populations living in the territories once controlled by the group.
Another shortcoming identified in the literature on IS' communication is that it simplifies the messaging scheme by treating it as mere propaganda, a rhetorical device only. 4The assumption here is that this propaganda -and in fine, the Salafi-jihadi group -can be fought either by being physically removed or by outpacing it by a more powerful counter-message.This argument assumes that audiences are passive actors who assimilate the message as it is, without filtering it through their cognition.Based on contributions of Barry Buzan and colleagues 5 and Ole Waever 6 to the securitization literature, who see the passive role of the audience as intrinsic to moving strategic threats above and beyond politics, this paper recognizes that IS may have capitalized on the passivity of its audiences to advance its revolutionary project.Besides, a message may influence audiences by suggesting how to interpret a particular issue. 7owever, this study argues that the influence is not straightforward, building upon several academic contributions that emphasize the active role of audiences both in the selection of the information and in its interpretation. 8imilarly, the appeal of IS' message has largely been explained by the group's slick, highly professional production, graphic violence and esthetic, and effective use of social media. 9This stance undermines the question of IS' "discursive power," that is, if the message effectively succeeds in resonating or shaping its audience's perceptions of its environment in line with the group's interests.This paper argues that the potential power of a message arguably consists in its ability to first convey an ideology or representation of the world, second be disseminated widely to reach its audience and third effectively resonate in its audience.Hence, if a message cannot be accessed, albeit well-coined, it will have little chance to be known and, a fortiori, to influence anyone.While it is clear that IS mastered the production of its communication and put tremendous efforts in distributing it with the help of the internet and worldwide media, it is far less evident that IS' message resonated among its audience.To put it more simply, the success of IS' discourse cannot be assumed on the basis that a great number of individuals joined its ranks or carried out attacks in the name of the caliphate.As demonstrated by several studies, the causes of engagement in violent jihadi groups are multiple and cannot be reduced to mere adherence to an ideology. 10inally, despite the centrality of IS' discourse in strategic communication approaches to counterterrorism, and while a plethora of studies sought to understand the rise and spread of IS, fewer have investigated the group's message and its "discursive power" as defined above.Discourse is a rhetorical technique of persuasion in the traditional sense.In this traditional sense, it can be more or less powerful.However, discourse is not purely technical but includes the Foucauldian element, which is the power to influence actions, mobilize and generate beliefs. 11Discourse is about the formation and shaping of one subject in the attempt to foster a certain understanding of one's environment.The notion of discourse is given a central place in this paper, which builds upon Hall's interpretation of the Foucauldian concept of discourse.Hence, it is primarily concerned with "[the] group of statements which provide a language for talking about -i.e. a way of representing-a particular kind of knowledge about a topic." 12In an attempt to suggest an alternative approach to the existing research that examines IS' communication campaign, this paper makes a case for the analysis of the group's message along a sender-message-receiver continuum.This paper highlights the central role of the recipients of IS' message and offers a comparative study between IS' and its audience's discourses on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.Doing so, it presents a multi-disciplinary and innovative approach that combines an interest in both IS' message and the recipients of this message.

Theoretical Positioning -Framing as a Discursive Strategy
This paper utilizes frame theory, which accounts for the fact that "frames" enable individuals to "locate, perceive, identify and label" occurrences or information. 13For Goffman, frames are essential to all kinds of perceptions of the world and, thus, to everyday interaction and communication. 14In the same vein, Entman argues that "[t] o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." 15n the words of Gamson and Modigliani, news frame is "a central [organizing] idea or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them." 16One could argue that IS used framing process to select some aspects of news events, privilege some over others, define and assesses the problem, point out the causes and propose solutions to the problem.This operation refers to "frame building" due to its analogy with the better-known process of agenda building. 17his triadic relationship -problem, solution, action -is addressed under the heading of "resonance." 18As explained by Lindekilde, "the idea is to [analyze] how movement actors […] attempt to strike [cords] of existing cultural experiences, narratives, and knowledge within the cognitive landscape of targeted audiences." 19In other words, "resonance" measures and discusses the degree to which framing succeeds in generating responsiveness in the targeted group of the message or the audience at large.Ingram asserts that "[r]esonance is the key to ensuring that [information operation] is not just an information tool but a mechanism of influence." 20In this paper, frame analysis and "resonance" are employed to bridge IS' discourse (news production) and the Jordanian population's discourse (public perceptions) 21 on the one hand, and to scrutinize the presence and potential influence of IS' frames on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria in the discourse of Jordanian populations on the other.
The wars in Iraq and Syria provoked impassioned struggle by conflict actors to explain why they are fighting. 22This contest over the "nature of the conflict," what Horowitz called the meta-conflict, 23 was put under scrutiny in several investigations on media portrayal of Middle Eastern conflicts such as the two Gulf wars, 24 the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 25 and the so-called Arab Spring. 26This research is the first of its kind to apply frame theory to analyze how a non-state actor, IS, depicted two specific conflicts, that is, why the conflicts exist, which events and actions are important to their development, why other parties act as they do and how one should act in response. 27Said differently, this research examines how IS used frames to conceptualize and interpret events and behaviors, and how the group used frames to convince.Although many types of frames can be constructed to analyze conflicts, this paper focuses on four categories of frames that appear particularly applicable to intractable disputes. 28They are as follow: (1) Issue/problem frames deal with the nature of the conflict, what it is about and its desirable outcome; (2) Identity frames refer to the "self," that is, how parties view themselves in a conflicting situation, their affiliation and interests; (3) Characterization frames refer to how disputants view other parties to the conflict often tend to delegitimize the "others;" (4) Power frames are used to characterize the form of power which is legitimized in the conflict as well as the form of power which is desired.The operationalization of these specific frames paves the way to develop a thorough methodological framework for the case under investigation.

Analytical Design -Corpus Linguistic Techniques as a Tool of Frame Analysis
The first stage of the research analyzes IS' official discourse on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria from the declaration of the Islamic state on 29 June 2014, until 20 July 2017, when IS lost Mosul, its last stronghold in Iraq.It focuses on the statements made by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the official spokesmen of the caliphate, namely Abu Mohammad al-Adnani (from 19 June 2013 to 30 August 2016) and Abu Hassan al-Muhajir (from 30 August 2016, onward).In an attempt to reflect the formation process of the Islamic state and the group's revolutionary agenda, this initial dataset was expanded to include official speeches from the self-declared caliph and IS' spokesman from the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) on 8 April 2013.This first data set -composed of 25 official statements -was completed by the newsletters and magazines issued by IS, namely al-Naba', Dabiq, Dar al-Islam and Rumiyyah.These bring the total number of media outlets in the dataset to 162 across three languages: Arabic, English and French.Given the carefully rehearsed and chosen nature of their content, they undoubtedly articulate an illustrative perspective of the group's discourse and policies.
This research follows Reese's suggestion that frame analysis should try to bridge qualitative and quantitative approaches as well as empirical and interpretative ones. 29o this end, it integrates corpus linguistics software -in this case, MaxQDA -in frame analysis to enable "a more reliable and valid combination of quantitative and qualitative as well as empirical and interpretative examination." 30cross the 162 documents of the dataset, a total of 2713 segments that concern directly the conflicts in Iraq and Syria were selected.Selected segments were subjected to Word (Combination) Frequency and Keywords in Context searches.While the linguistics techniques did not readily reveal frames, they helped "diagnose" and "nominate" central ideas around which frames are constructed.In addition to the empirical extraction of frames through the corpus linguistics software, the researcher's reading was used to get a more complex understanding of the discourse as a whole.Finally, selected segments were coded along with the frame categories described above: issue/problem, identity, characterization, and power frames.To make more sense of the results, the frames were put into a more comprehensive and representative message spectrum consisting of additional IS' media outlets -including news stories, central and provincial videos, nasheeds, radio broadcasts, photo reports, Da'wah literatureand related military and political events between June 2014 and June 2017.The inclusion of additional media outlet and events accounts for the fact that paying attention to IS' core official discourse only is inadequate to understand the extent to which the group is responsive to its enemies' actions.Adopting a comprehensive analysis, this research acknowledges that IS was highly reactive to its environment and had the capacity to quickly adapt its discourse to the course of the conflicts and develop a rhetoric that delegitimized competing actors and their actions.
In a second stage, sixty-four interviews-testimonies were collected through 39 semi-structured in-depth interviews and five focus group discussions (FGD) in Jordan between December 2016 and April 2019 to investigate Jordanian audiences' representations of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.The researcher conducted interviews in Arabic across different governorates, notably Amman, Ajloun, Irbid and Mafraq.The tense context and the sensitive topic under investigation (i.e.IS and Salafi-jihad) at the time of the investigation were insurmountable impediments to the research in southern Jordan, such as cities of al-Karak or Ma'an that are home to an existing Salafi-jihadist infrastructure and the potential for IS supporters was considered likely.Yet, focusing the investigation on the northern region of the Hashemite Kingdom offered interesting stakes.The geographic and cultural proximity of these Jordanian populations with Syria and the presence of a high number of Syrian refugees were crucial elements to investigate the potential influence of IS' discourse in this part of Jordan.Participants were met individually or in small groups of five people at most.It was chosen to conduct semi-structured interviews to lessen the formality of an audio-recorded interview situation and avoid what Labov 31 termed the "observer's paradox", that is, the tendency of interviewed people to change their linguistic behavior while being recorded.On the other hand, taking the role of facilitator rather than interviewer during FGD allowed the researcher to pay closer attention to the interpretative frames used by participants to emphasize specific topics and talk about their perceptions of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.In addition to producing more meaningful results, FGD also promoted the relevance of the project to societies and a greater sense of ownership of publicly funded research.The researcher selected participants following three main methods: (a) random encounters with inhabitants of Jordan (20 persons); (b) planned interviews (20 persons); and (c) collaboration with a local gatekeeper to organize focus-group discussions with pre-selected individuals.This research recognizes that the sample of participants is not representative of the overall Jordanian population, even though it was differentiated by selecting people with different political and religious views and identities, and different socio-demographic profiles.For instance, efforts were made to ensure the representativeness of the population surveyed in terms of gender (25 women out of 64 participants), age (from 18 to 67 years old), national and tribal identity (i.e.Jordanians, Syrians, Palestinians and tribal affiliations based on geographical location of interviews).A number of interviews were organized inside universities (University of Jordan in Amman and Yarmouk University in Irbid), private offices and the premises of local development associations to allow confidentiality, and to help participants feel safe and at ease.Other interviews were conducted in the participants' daily settings which allowed for relatively "protected" discussions, as well as for the integration of the researcher into their normal life.This facilitated the collection of their thoughts and perceptions but also of their behaviors and attitudes.As such, the findings presented in this paper are not the mere results of interviews and FGD stricto sensus, but of a deeper investigation of the wider popular mood in Jordan.The interview guide was elaborated based on the frame categories highlighted to study intractable conflicts, the same that were used to investigate IS' discourse, to provide a solid basis for comparison between the two sets of discourses.Interviews were interpreted through a thematic analysis identical to that described to analyze IS' discourse.
In a final stage, the frames present in IS' discourse and the Jordanian population' discourse were compared.Efforts were made to identify patterns, themes, and regularities as well as contrasts, paradoxes, and irregularities between the discourses. 32This comparison process was designed to uncover whether IS' discourse on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria echoes representations held by the Jordanian population.

Jordan -A Fertile Ground for Salafi-Jihadi Violence?
Jordan offers a promising case for the study of Islamic State's discursive influence.
Although not a direct target of the group's discourse and military strategy, IS and akin Salafi-jihadi groups gained strong support in the Hashemite Kingdom, which provided the largest poll of fighters in the ranks of IS after Tunisia.The attraction of IS in Jordan is surprising.The country has been spared by sectarian conflict and enjoys a good level of stability compared to its neighbors; it has been ruled by the Hashemite regime for almost 100 years.Moreover, the Hashemite rule stands as a strong and legitimate representative of the majority of Arab Sunni Jordanians, while integrating religious and ethnic minorities in its governmental structures.According to Faleh Abdul Jabar, former director of Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies, three objective dynamics render the kingdom particularly vulnerable to IS' discourse: its regional proximity with the stronghold of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, its vulnerable economic situation; and the steady Islamization of its socio-political environment since WWII. 33The last dynamic merit further exploration.As synthesized by Beverley Milton-Edwards, "[modern] Jordan's Islamist trend is historically rooted in the genesis of the state, active in its political structures, and deeply embedded in society." 34Until the 1950s, Jordan's political environment was dominated by secular ideologies; socialism, communism and pan-Arabism.The political settings of Jordan shifted during the Cold War.When the United States (U.S.) substituted the British power in 1956, Jordan adhered to the Eisenhower doctrine that prescribed the limitation of political instability in the Middle East to prevent the development of international communism. 35That same year, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser became increasingly popular when he nationalized the Suez Canal.Nasser threatened the popularity of most of the Arab leaders, especially the monarchs including King Hussein I in Jordan. 36The charisma of Nasser became a threat when few Arab nationalists within the Jordan military carried an unsuccessful coup against their king in 1957.To counter growing Arab "secular" nationalism, King Hussein I imposed martial law and banned all political parties but the Muslim Brotherhood which was registered under the law of charitable clubs and associations.Political Islam became a tool to counter Nassererism and more broadly, regional secular aspirations.The Islamization of the Jordanian society was a systematic and deliberate policy that relied on the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordanian politics. 37The process of Islamization in Jordan accelerated during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) when King Hussein sided with Saddam Hussein who Jordan promoted as "the sword of the Arabs" against the Persian enemy. 38When he invaded Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein directed his wrath at Sunni Muslims Arabs and shifted the politics of the Iraqi Ba'ath party from pan-Arabism to pan-Islamism. 39This, again, increased the pace of Islamization of the Jordanian society.Yet the invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War was eventually won by the West in 1991.The defeat was a hard blow in the face of the Arabs, especially in the streets of Jordan.At the same period, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the victory of the Arab mujāhidīn (holy fighters) in Afghanistan in 1989 led to the return of a large number of fighters to their respective countries.They brought back a recovered pride and new alternative to change their countries by raising arms, imagining the restoration of Islamic governments. 40In Jordan, violent Islamization in the form of Salafi-jihad was brought to the forefront in the mid-1990s when the normalization of Jordanian relations with Israel resulted in the 1994 Peace Treaty.Although the Muslim Brotherhood opposed the king's policy, its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, adopted a strategy of non-confrontation with the kingdom's leaders.In the eyes of the Jordanian masses, who had put confidence in political Islam during the 1989 and 1993 elections, the Ikhwān failed to stand against the Israeli enemy. 41Moreover, the abortive socio-economic transition process of the Jordanian society to modernity led to the further erosion of the government's legitimacy and the rejection of liberalism by a wide range of the population. 42As a result of the youth dissatisfaction with the Jordanian government and the moderate Islamic alternative offered by the Muslim Brotherhood, a few groups stood out as spearheads of radical Islam mixed with armed activity, although they lacked an integrated ideology.Such groups included Jaysh Mohammad, Afghan Jordanian Group and the Sufi-inclined al-Nafīr al-Islāmī.
Salafi-jihad became a single intellectual framework when Afghan veterans Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi formed Jamā'at al-Tawhīd (Organization of Monotheism) in 1992. 43Jamā'at al-Tawhīd endorsed jihad against the Israeli army in Palestine and planned to attack the Hashemite Kingdom, which led them to prison in March 1994.From their cell, al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi trained fellow prisoners and distributed magazines and leaflets that laid the comprehensive foundation for Salafi-jihad locally and globally. 44The two unified the sword and the pen of Jordanian jihad when al-Zarqawi assumed the political leadership of the organization, and al-Maqdisi was designated as the ideological and spiritual leader.Informal networks of connections and loyalties began to develop around the two core leaders, especially in Ma'an, Mafraq, Salt, Irbid, Zarqa and Karak.
Upon his release from prison following a royal amnesty in 1999, al-Zarqawi became involved in the millennium plot and the failed attack against the Radisson SAS hotel in Amman.He escaped to Pakistan, later to Afghanistan, and finally to Iraqi-Kurdistan where he connected with Sunni Kurdish Salafis and founded Jamā' at al-Tawhīd wal-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) in 2003.The group later pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004.The organization overshadowed the national resistance movement and became the major threat to American troops in Iraq.Al-Zarqawi gave a new, "glocal" dimension to jihad that focused on defeating the far and near enemy, a strategy that will be borrowed by IS.While the logistical preparation of the attacks was carried out outside Jordan, violence was imported and hit the Jordanian society on its soil like in November 2005 with the bombing of three hotels in Amman. 45o put it in a nutshell, (violent) Islamism in Jordan is closely linked with social movements.Radical religious ideologies and discourses are not the facts of scattered individuals, but rather the result of a socio-political sustained trend.While easier to spot, this trend is also harder to tackle because it is strongly embedded in the popular regional and national culture of Islamism.This offers a strong hypothesis of the influence of IS' discourse in Jordan, although ideological support does not automatically entail physical engagement in the violent operationalization of the group's discourse.

Issue Frames -Iraq and Syria: The Heart of the Regional Chessboard
In IS' words, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria resulted from and epitomized ancient hatred against Muslims.The Western power, the "Crusaders" -a phrased used 759 times across the surveyed material -and their allies seized the opportunity to wage war on Islam and the Sunni Ummah, pretending to fight so-called "terrorism."As a consequence, IS depicted the two conflicts as one "crusade."Moreover, the group argued it was fighting a multi-layer conflict, the combination between a local struggle against non-state insurgent groups and a global fight against the "Crusaders."This interpretation suggested that IS was involved in a religious war that opposed "the enemies of Allah" to the Muslims.In its attempt to protect the Ummah, IS waged defensive jihad, and offered a twofold justification to its struggle.First, jihad was morally justified by the suffering of Muslims at the hand of illegitimate regimes and invading armies.Second, IS suggested a legal justification to its jihad by drawing a parallel between the conflict in Iraq and Syria and the Afghan jihad in the 1980s against the Soviet Union, which had been authorized -even encouraged -by numerous religious and legal authorities.But IS did not only describe the conflict as a religious struggle; it depicted a sectarian opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims on the one side, and between Sunnis and the Shi'as on the other.This argument is central to IS' framing and sets the stage for the exclusion of Shi'a Muslims from the "shadows of the Islamic state" and identity promoted by the group.
As opposed to IS' discourse, the vast majority of the surveyed Jordanian population identified two different conflicts in Iraq and Syria, while the diversity of insights on their multiple causes accounted for the complexity of the wars' dynamics.Jordanian respondents highlighted internal and mostly secular dynamics, rejecting the idea of a war against the Ummah.In Iraq, they emphasized the role of the "rebellion" against the "occupation" of the American "invaders," as well as sectarian -Shi'a against Sunni -and ethnic -Kurdish against Arabs -tensions.In Syria, respondents unanimously described the beginning of the conflict as a "revolution" or an "uprising" (intifada) against the "tyranny" (al-istibdad) of Bashar al-Assad.This interpretation was particularly present among the Syrian refugees living in the kingdom.All respondents acknowledged and regretted that the revolution quickly became politicized and turned into a war between opposition factions that could have formed a coalition against al-Assad's regime.Sanaa, 46 a middle-school teacher who fled the south of Syria in 2013, recorded: "As opposed to the Iraqi conflict which started with foreign invasion, the Syrian chaos was born from internal dynamics, but it was subsequently internationalized when foreign powers got involved and groups that used jihadi slogans started to fight each other.Now, everyone has forgotten why the resolution started". 47espite drawing a line between the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, participants also underlined multiple similarities.Mainly, they emphasized that the similarity in perpetrators (external state actors) and victims (Sunni Muslims and Arabs) in the two countries.Notably, "Shi'a Iran", Russia and the U.S. were seen as "puppeteers" of the regional turmoil, an analogy often used by IS.Iran -often referred to as the "Shi'a power" or "Shi'a master" -was perceived by the surveyed Jordanian population as the main enemy at the regional level.Some participants even argued that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq as of December 2007 left an unstable and weak Iraq that became "an open door" for Iran to establish its influence and advance toward Syria.The end-goal of this strategy was believed to be the "destruction of the Sunni."Fewer participants identified resources and power-sharing disputes, in addition to the deteriorated relationship between the central government and society as similar causes of the turmoil in Iraq and Syria.These respondents also emphasized the historical sectarian nature of political authority, characterized by a corrupted ruling minority repressing the Sunni majority.In this sense, the conflicts were not only seen as revolutions against illegitimate powers but as rebellions of the oppressed Sunni majority against the Alawi and Shi'a tyrannical ruling elite.Importantly, these participants specified that sectarianism per se did not exist before the conflicts but was used as an instrument of mobilization in both cases.
If the conflicts were not considered as jihad nor described as a religious war between Muslims and their enemies, the Jordanian public recognized the defensive stance initially adopted by Iraqi and Syrian populations.In both cases, the conflicts were deemed "necessary" by most respondents, as they aimed to tackle illegitimate and repressive regimes.This somehow echoes IS' argument about the legitimacy of the wars in Iraq and Syria and the "unholy" power-sharing arrangements in the two countries.It also shows the support of Jordanian respondents for the idea of a radical socio-political change that would reshape the structures and balance of power.
Another common perception among all participants was that the two conflicts lied at the center of a broader scheme for regional hegemony, although they were anchored in national politics.More precisely, the sectarian tensions that laid the foundation of the wars were mirrored at the regional level, where Iran was believed to act against the Sunni populations and where western powers -led by the U.S. -were thought to defend the "Jewish state" of Israel.The U.S. and Russia, along with Iran, were considered as non-Arab powers that instrumentalized the conflicts in Iraq and Syria to weaken Arab states in the hope of imposing their domination and asserting their interests.Hence, if the conflicts in Iraq and Syria were never described, per se, as religious wars, Jordanian respondents argued that the interests of external state actors were incompatible with the existence of a strong and united Sunni Muslim community in the Arab world.It follows that religion and sectarian divides assumed an underlying yet central role in the discourse of the Jordanian participants to explain regional politics and the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

Identity frames -IS: Defensor of the Ummah or Pawn of the Great Powers?
While IS' frames on the causes of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria seemed to echo the perceptions of the surveyed Jordanian populations, the groups' identity and struggle failed to convince.IS' rhetoric between 2014 and 2017 displayed a complex identity construction through assimilation with the Ummah.The group took on the role of a patriarchal and paternalistic figure whose benevolent struggle for its Muslim fellows shall entitle the caliphate to receive their full support.Furthermore, IS presented itself as a standalone defender of the Sunni Muslims, a major actor in the conflict against the Crusaders, their Arab puppets, and the plethora of fighting groups in Syria and Iraq that pretended to deliver the people from tyranny.Finally, and maybe most importantly, IS claimed to be the sole truly and purely Islamic actor in the region that could establish an Islamic state according to Shari'ah law and the will of Allah.The discourse of the Jordanian populations revealed a sharp rejection of IS' narrative, both on its nature and its mission in the context of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.
Strikingly, IS was absent from the discourse of 80% of Jordanian respondents until they were specifically asked about the group.When asked about IS, a great number of respondents simply answered: "it does not exist, it is nothing." A Syrian tribal leader who sought refuge in Mafraq, a city located about 30 kilometers from the Syrian border in the north of Jordan, asked the author: "I was there when Daesh supposedly invaded our lands.I saw the fighting and I fled the violence.Yet, I never saw any signs of Daesh." 48Yet it is difficult to assess the real reason for this repeated omission.Did the participants silence their thoughts due to the sensitivity of the topic, or did their exclusion of IS reflects the general perception of the Jordanian population?At the time interviews were conducted, between December 2016 and April 2019, IS had been officially defeated in Iraq and Syria.Large-scale polls conducted in Jordan and other MENA countries seem to support the first hypothesis.According to a survey conducted with 822 Jordanians in September 2015, at the peak of IS' military domination, 76% of respondents thought that IS was playing a significant role in causing the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. 49The same study found that 65% of the Jordanian population surveyed considered "Daesh" as a serious problem. 50he apparent "non-existence" of IS reflected another common perception among the Jordanian public that made a counterintuitive case that could be assimilated to a conspiracy theory: the group did not exist per se because it was depicted as a "western creation." Opinions about who created IS and for what reason differed among Jordanian respondents.Some argued that the group was obviously funded by the U.S., with the help of Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, to protect Israel from Arab enemy states such as Iraq and Syria.This is the case of Maya, a women's right activists, for whom foreign support only can explain IS' quick military conquest, high-tech weapons, and far-reaching "propaganda." Others hinted that IS was a "security company" involving more than 18 countries.The latter ones were believed to "plot" in the shadows to overthrow current governments and install leaders that would be loyal to the U.S. and its Saudi ally.According to these respondents, IS was also supported by Russia in an attempt to portray Bashar al-Assad as the lesser evil in Syria.The perception of IS as a "tool" of western state actors was widely shared across the Jordanian population surveyed.Only a few highly educated respondents, such as researcher in state anthropology Walid, linked the group to the "conscious political Islamization of the MENA" as a strategy to counter ideologies that threatened political elites, such as socialism and communism in the 1970s and the 1980s.As a result, they argued, IS was contingent on regional circumstances, that is, the fight against a new regional enemy, the Shi'a.Whether put in academic terms or not, the shared perception of Jordanian participants depicted IS as the last development of foreign interests in the MENA region -a mere instrument of western actors.Only one respondent, a sheikh from northern Jordan, thought that IS was the product of the system and the authoritarian regimes.
Importantly, all participants questioned the Islamic nature of the IS.First, they never referred to it as "Islamic State" or "the caliphate."Second, raising the lack of coherence of IS' discourse, numerous Jordanians wondered why the group -while pretending to fight "the U.S., the Jews or the Israeli" -did not focus its military efforts on these "invaders" but civilians and Muslims instead.Nonetheless, these results must be nuanced.On the one hand, one could wonder whether this widespread description accurately represented the sentiments of the Jordanians or whether it was used as a discursive trick to differentiate IS from Islam and, thus, avoid the sensitive debate around the nature of Islam and what social practices it may entail.On the other, few respondents recognized that their opinion, and that of the Jordanian public in general, shifted after the burning of the Jordanian pilot Muadh al-Kasasbeh in February 2015.The gruesome execution deepened opposition to IS, which clearly took on the role of a tormentor in the collective consciousness.The Center for Strategic Studies based at Amman University conducted a poll with 2016 Jordanians a couple of weeks after the video of the murder was released by IS. Results showed that 77% of the participants had watched the video and 95% thought that IS was a terrorist movement, indicating an increase by 33 points from an August 2014 poll and by 23 points from December 2014 poll. 51While the Jordanian public became aware of the strong discrepancy between the group's discourse and its violent practices, the murder triggered strong public reactions from journalists, academics, state and religious officials, as well as a series of state policies aimed at mitigating the influence of IS' discourse and violent project.This public disavowal of IS' rule would explain the waves of military defections the group suffered from late-2014 52 and the spreading disillusionment with the group in the MENA region.The change of the Jordanian mood after the murder of al-Kasasbeh also suggests that adherence to a strong Jordanian state identity still determines the loyalties of Jordanians as a people that ultimately deny agency to the message coined by IS around an overarching identity that goes beyond the nation-state.

Characterization Frames -Iraq and Syria: Lands of Occupation?
IS' discourse on the wars in Iraq and Syria offered a dialectic construction of the world where two camps oppose each other: IS assimilated with the Ummah and the "Others."The latter camp was undeniably depicted as led by the "Crusaders" and their tyrannical (taghut) Arab allies at the international level, and by the Shi'a at the regional level.IS notably pointed to the "Front Stage Cooperation" to refer to the alliance between the U.S., Russia, Iran and Syria.To delegitimize its foes, IS systematically highlighted their hatred against Muslims, poor morale, lack of Islamic faith and pitiable military performances on the battlefield.
Though not termed as such, the "Front Stage Cooperation" was a recurring feature highlighted by the Jordanians interviewed for this research.Specifically, the U.S., Russia and Iran were seen as the major actors that pulled the strings in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.Once again, religion was an underlying feature of discussions on military and political alliances.Jordanian respondents largely believed that Iran was involved for religious reasons -its enmity against Sunnis -while the U.S. supported the "Jewish state of Israel."While not referring to their "hatred" of Muslims, participants pointed to the open "anti-Sunni" and "anti-Arab" policies of these three powers.Notably, the alliance between Russia, Iran and al-Assad was believed to represent the "Shi'a crescent" in the Middle East, which was later joined by the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militias such as the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
These foreign powers were commonly described by Jordanians as "puppeteer, " thereby directly reproducing the language used in IS' discourse.This notion of puppeteers is particularly important because it encapsulates the idea that power or agency is taken from the hands of local populations and leaders.For instance, regional powers, especially Gulf monarchies, were considered to be puppets of western state actors such as the U.S. Finally, the "deal of the century" was and remains a very popular belief in Jordan and was mentioned countless times to explain the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.Mahmud, an employee in a Syrian development organization based in Amman, illustrated the opinion of about half of Jordanian participants: "The whole point of the conflicts is to protect American and Israeli interests not only economically but also politically in order to achieve common projects such as the establishment of a greater State of Israel.This requires wakening Israel's neighbors, so the U.S. triggers internal conflicts to divide and disperse Arabs". 53Amir, a social activist, added: "The conflicts will continue until the United States and Israel divide Syria and Iraq into a new Sykes-Picot agreement", in reference to the secret treaty between France and the United Kingdom that divided the Middle East into spheres of influence during World War I (WWI). 54This widespread representation is a potential leverage for revisionist non-state actors such as IS.It is prone to instill a sense of illegitimacy of political rulers and can foster the wish for radical change to claim power back.
The vast majority of Jordanian participants argued that "foreign powers," especially western countries followed by Israel and Saudi Arabia, benefited the most from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.These actors allegedly gained political and economic influence and increased regional control through access to natural resources and leadership over Arab leaders.A few well-informed respondents mentioned that the U.S. was affiliated with international companies that prospered during the wars.Wahid, a journalist based in Amman argued: "Key international powers and their companies are the main beneficiaries of the conflicts.This is the case of the Halliburton oil company, owned by former U.S. vice-president Dick Cheney, and the American security service company Blackwater". 55This common perception about the growing power of foreign influences contrasts with IS' assertion that the conflicts in Iraq and Syria would reverse the course of history and favor Muslims over foreign state actors in the MENA region.
The U.S. was the source of most of the rancor voiced during interviews with Jordanian individuals.More specifically, they uttered aversion to American military interventions and interferences in regional affairs.While Americans were not imbued with a particular religious identity, they were widely portrayed as "invaders" and one of the main causes of the regional instability.The U.S. recurring interventions were seen as justifications for popular revolt and as a violent mode of action against perceived illegitimate rulers.Moreover, the Jordanians interviewed for this research clearly positioned themselves as victims of foreign occupations.This rhetoric not only strongly echoes IS' discursive delegitimization campaign against the U.S. and other western actors, but it also favored the endorsement of an "Us against Them" framing of the conflicts, where "They" abuse their power against "Us" who lack a spearhead to protect our interests and identity.Eventually, losing control over who rules "Us," through which institutions and via which alliances, equates to losing one's identity as a citizen belonging to the state.When state identity disappears under the egis of a foreign power, it will naturally be supplanted by a stronger, preexisting, and shared identity; even more so if this identity is under threat as it is perceived to be the case of Islam in the MENA region.

Power Frames -Political (il)Legitimacy in an Uncertain Future
In its discourse on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, IS offered a solution to the modern crisis of the Ummah: the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Shari'ah law in accordance with the will of Allah.Accordingly, IS strove for a new social contract -based on religion -for a revised socio-political organization of the people.The Jordanian populations surveyed shared IS' rejection of the current rule and the necessity to reform the structures of power.Leila, who lives in Irbid in the north of Jordan told the author: "At the international level, the United Nations recognizes the Iraqi and Syrian presidents.But after years of conflict, none of them has political legitimacy.Elections are a formality and both presidents have committed atrocities against the Sunnis." 56 Yet, respondents disagreed on the method to tackle illegitimate governments.On the one hand, the shadow of foreign powers on internal affairs in MENA countries remained at the heart of debates.In Iraq and Syria, the two governments that preceded the advent of IS were commonly described by Jordanian participants as illegitimate because they were not chosen by the people, nor did they represent their interests.Corruption was also an obvious bone of contention.This shared sentiment potentially offered strong resonance to IS' populist program and the group's struggle to uplift ordinary Muslims who feel that their concerns and interests have been disregarded by established elites.Despite their support for change and after years of regional turmoil, incommensurable violence and unprecedented destruction, Jordanian respondents still prioritized stability over legitimate and capable rulers.In other words, when this research was conducted in 2016-2019, it seems that the time had come for the wind of political change to leave room for reconstruction and unification.This opinion put IS and its radical revolutionary program out of the political game.Regarding political legitimacy, the vast majority of respondents were divided along two main lines: (1)  the people should be the source of authority, (2) the actor(s) who are able to restore order and rebuilt the region should be de facto accepted ruler.The latter option -that stemmed from a desperate need for peace and stability -is worrying for the future of the MENA region.It could entail a form of totalitarian power that could easily slip toward an absolute rule and, eventually, another form of tyranny.Moreover, most Jordanian participants saw foreign presence in peace processes and future political deals as an insurmountable obstacle to the future of the region.Leila explained: "None of us has chosen the path of violence, yet we have been suffering from it for years; instability, bad economy, the soaring number of refugees in Jordan and all the implication it has for us.Unfortunately, the United States and Israel will not let us live in peace.I expect the conflicts will spread to more countries and remain unsolved due to existing divisions and the absence of dialogue and diplomacy". 57Like Leila, none of the respondents was optimistic and many put their hopes and faith in Allah.
Jordanian prevalent pledge for peace, national unity and allocation of power to the people strongly opposes the core pillars of IS' political philosophy that revolves around the notion of Sayyid Qutb's hakimiyyah, the authority of Allah over the people.In other words, the fact that the majority of the populations surveyed in Jordan located the center of legitimacy in the people apparently entails the radical rejection of IS' state project.This seems to go against a widespread perception among certain observers and the general public outside the MENA region that Arabs and Muslims simply "hate" anything branded as "western" such as human rights and democracy. 58In fact, this research highlights the need to decolonize these essential notions and to adopt a "humanistic" approach instead.

Discussion -Assessing the Influence of IS' Discourse in Jordan
The comparison of frames present in IS' discourse and the Jordanian population' discourse highlighted similarities and differences in interpreting the conflicts in Iraq and Syria (Table 1).IS' frames about the conflicts in Iraq and Syria resonated with expressed grievances against illegitimate rulers and foreign influence in the Middle East region, which nurtured a feeling of a constant threat to the majoritarian Arab and Sunni Muslim communities in Jordan and beyond.Hence, if IS was unable to directly menace the kingdom from its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the group's revolutionary program for a new regional order suggested answers to the regional political and identity crisis depicted by Jordanian participants.During interviews conducted in Jordan, several respondents explained that they initially supported IS' fight against the "occupiers," especially the U.S. and Israel, and the Arab "tyrants."Similarly, by several participants' own admission, the group was seen as finally triggering "the dream of the caliphate" and recovered the dignity of the Arab Muslims after decades of humiliation at the hands of the external state actors.Such confidences may account for the desire of Jordanian wannabe jihadists to join the ranks of IS when the group launched a series of successful military offensives in Iraq and Syria in 2013 and 2014.At that time, the caliphate was nascent and the group did not have the opportunity to implement its revisionist program and make the experience of governance.But when this research was conducted in Jordan, the caliphate had been established, had ruled and had been defeated.IS suffered a loss of support in and outside the territories it controlled and many of its fighters defected to join more "moderate' jihadi groups such as al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra from 2015 on.In Jordan, the analysis reveals that, while IS' rhetoric on the perceived 'crisis of the Ummah' and its theoretical solution resonated inside Jordan, the social practices this solution entails failed to convince.One could wonder whether IS would have been able to increase popular loyalty had it concentrated its military efforts against symbols of the states it was fighting?What does this initial popular support entail for the future of nonviolent Islamist movements that offer an alternative source and exercise of power?The perception of Jordanian participants on IS and the conflicts in Iraq and Syria must be analyzed in the light of the official response of political and religious institutions to IS inside Jordan.As emphasized in this paper, IS' discourse partly preexisted and was embedded in the Jordanian socio-political culture.Even though IS scorned the Muslim Brotherhood as a "devastating cancer," the two organizations shared the same ideology based on the ideas of the late Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb.In a TV interview aired in November 2015, Jordanian intellectual Fehmi Jadaane explained: "Ideologically, [IS] is not that different from other political-religious movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others.The difference is one of degree, not of essence.They share the same original ideology, but their actions differ in degree."The ideological commonality between the Muslim Brotherhood and IS may have accounted for the lack of clear opposition against the jihadi group in the Hashemite Kingdom.One instance of this was the refusal of Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader Hamza Mansour to describe IS as a terrorist organization, while giving a TV interview in February 2015.Altogether, the Muslim Brotherhood, which remains the strongest and most respected religious force in Jordan, was reluctant to produce a strong political and religious counter-discourse.
Nevertheless, there were religious counter-powers to IS inside Jordan, albeit insufficient.For instance, prominent Jordanian Salafi-jihadi leaders, such as Abu Qatada and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, publicly condemned IS through a series of letters published by al-Nusra Front from November 2013. 59In a missive issued on April 28, 2014, Abu Qatada labeled IS "dogs of Hellfire" and slammed the group over the beheading of journalists, which he considered "un-Islamic." 60In May 2014, al-Maqdisi wrote that IS had a "deviant" ideology. 61In February 2014, both leaders formally prohibited Jordanians from fighting with IS in Syria.Yet, after repeatedly rejecting IS' call to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Jordanian scholars refused to further discuss disputes with the jihadi group through official channels such as interviews aired on Jordanian TV shows.Moreover, if Abu Qatada and al-Maqdisi rejected IS, they remain fervent proponents of al-Nusra Front in Syria.Hence, their argumentations did not entail a strong counter-discourse to violent Islamism.
The capture of Jordanian pilot Muadh al-Kasasbeh by IS and his gruesome immolation in January 2015 was a milestone.The press, politicians and religious leaders all strongly reacted to the execution.Jumana Ghunaimat, editor-in-chief of the Jordanian daily al-Ghad wrote: "[his death] has turned this war into a war waged by all Jordanians.
[…] We must give these terrorists a taste of the pain that they caused us." 62In a short video broadcast on Roya TV channel, al-Maqdisi bashed IS for using slaughter and immolation: "[s]uch immolation cannot be justified either by Islamic law or by reason […] These people have distorted the image of the Jihadi movement […] Jihadi Salafism has nothing whatsoever to do with this."In fact, religious leaders such as al-Maqdisi assumed a central role to reach IS' leaders and negotiate an exchange between al-Kasasbeh and IS members held in Jordanian prisons.When the attempt to free the pilot failed, the Jordanian government prompted religious leaders not to express any views on IS or the conflicts in Iraq and Syria in public or on social media.In other words, the state and religious leaders, including those closest to the ideology adopted by IS, did not cooperate to curtail the influence of the jihadi group in the kingdom.As such, al-Maqdisi's interview on Roya TV is a meaningful breach of the limits imposed on religious leaders by the Jordanian state.At the government level, in January 2015, the Ministry of Education distributed a 32-page booklet to high schools entitled "An Open Letter to Ibrahim al-Badri, aka al-[Baghdadi]" and aimed at refuting IS' ideology. 63The Ministry also launched a reform of school curricula to remove extremism content following an expert report "Daesh in Curricula and Textbooks." 64In February 2015, Jordan became militarily involved against IS in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for the murder of the pilot.Finally, the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) attempted to contain radical speeches by its imams and launched a program to train and appoint a new generation of preachers who would spread a culture of peace and tolerance in the kingdom. 65These statements and initiatives resulted in the multiplication of discourses on IS and the conflicts in Iraq and Syria in Jordan and surely account for the progressive loss of support for IS' caliphate project from 2015 on.

Conclusion
This paper analyzed the influence of IS' discourse in Jordan.It showed that Jordanian participants articulated a clear discursive link with IS' depiction of the 'crisis of the Ummah' or the subjugation of the region and the Muslim identity at the hands of foreign western powers, corrupted Middle Eastern rulers and different sects.Yet, while the empirical caliphate initially attracted a great deal of interest and some supportwhether material or ideological -the violence of the enterprise failed to convince Jordanian populations and left IS deprived of people's confidence in the kingdom.In other words, while IS' discourse succeeded to echo Jordanian audiences' grievances and perceptions of the regional dynamics, it failed to reshape their representation of their own identity.Jordanian audiences were not passive because they rejected the method, if not the message of IS.Building on Buzan and Waever's argument, 66 this lack of passivity of Jordanian audiences might provide one explanation for the failure of IS to attract support for its evolutionary agenda and to impose new socio-political institutions in Syria and Iraq.IS was unable to transform the very nature of Islam and what a Muslim can endorse for the sake of religion.This analysis suggests that the bulk of the populations interviewed -while reclaiming its Islamic heritage and identity -rejected the strict application of Shari'ah law that would not be contextualized in space and time.Rather, it appears that a humanistic Islam that recognizes diversity and endorses the living together represents a more faithful image of what the people wish for the Middle East.Nonetheless, this apparent rejection of IS' project must be nuanced at the regional and state levels.After years of conflict in Iraq and Syria, the conditions that initially gave rise to IS remain.So do the dynamics that nurtured popular grievances against perceived illegitimate rulers.Hence, it is crucial that Middle Eastern states and governments embark on a process of structural changes to address the popular need for political legitimacy, representation, inclusion and justice.
From an epistemological point of view, this paper does not postulate that Jordanian populations blindly "reproduced" some of the frames constructed by IS on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.On the one hand, the majority of respondents stated that they accessed the group's discourse on a daily basis via traditional and social media.On the other hand, a similar representation than that given in IS' rhetoric was relayed by a multitude of other non-state and state actors.In other words, the depiction of a Middle East where foreign powers have taken the lead over the local governments and people is widespread in the streets, in the media, and partly at the institutional level.IS did not craft a new representation of the region, it adapted it to its own discourse and objectives.As a result, IS' discourse found attentive and sympathetic ears in its Jordanian audience.Further analysis should investigate not only if but why it succeeded or failed to do so.
This paper suggested multiple ways forward to foster interest in non-state actors' discursive competition for power and introduced a much-needed debate on the ways to measure and analyze the actual power of influence of discourses.The short analysis of IS' discourse presented in this paper did not intend to isolate the impact of IS' message from other discursive influences.IS' discourse -and the discourses promoted by non-state actors in general -are part of a dynamic network of influences constituted by competing messages -conveyed through friends and family circles, media, political representatives and religious figures among others -and personal experiences.Situating IS and other revolutionary non-state actors within such discursive competition would provide deeper insight into IS-like groups and their presumed central role in the political game.

Table 1 .
main findings of the comparative analysis of the of iS' and the Jordanians' framing of the conflicts in iraq and Syria.