Intuitive cognition in the Latin medieval tradition

ABSTRACT This paper explores some key features of Medieval accounts of intuition, focusing on Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–1274), on the one hand, and on Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308), Peter Auriol (c. 1280–1322), and William Ockham (c. 1287-1347), on the other hand. The first section is devoted to the type of intuitive cognition which is accepted by all these authors, namely, the immediate and direct grasp of some present material object by the senses. It is from this basic sensory intuition – they agree – that human cognition starts. The second section turns to intuitive intellectual cognition and to the much greater disagreements which divide these philosophers. Notwithstanding these important differences, the paper’s conclusion draws attention to the similarities in the conception of intuition which cut across the otherwise significantly different accounts of the authors discussed. I end with an invitation to recover their older way of thinking of intuition.

by the mind, 2 much in the same way in which Augustine employs the term visio (vision) for both sense-perceptual sight and thought.
In brief, for Medieval authors, intuition is an immediate and direct grasp or vision of some object of cognition by a cognitive subject, afforded either by the senses or by the intellect. Or, in the even briefer words penned by Gerard of Bologna in 1306, "intuitive cognition is the immediate cognition of a thing [cognitio intuitiva est cognitio rei immediata]". 3 Yet, despite this underlying consensus, Medieval writers would give significantly different accounts of how this immediate cognition works. Most importantly, the two intellectual powerhouses of the Middle Ages, the Thomists and the Franciscans, would vehemently disagree on whether, down here on earth, human beings can have an intuitive intellectual cognition of individuals. 4 To put it another way: while authors in these traditions agree that perceptual acts of cognition provide a direct cognitive contact with 'what is' (that is, with reality, including material individuals), they disagree on whether not only the senses but also the intellect is capable of directly grasping individuals or particulars. 5 This paper explores some key features of Medieval accounts of intuition, focusing on Thomas Aquinas (1224Aquinas ( /5-1274, on the one hand, and on Duns Scotus (c. 1266Scotus (c. -1308, Peter Auriol (c. 1280Auriol (c. -1322, and William Ockham (c. 1287Ockham (c. -1347, on the other hand. The first section is devoted to the type of intuitive cognition which is accepted by all these authors, namely, the immediate and direct grasp of some present material object by the senses. It is from this basic sensory intuitionthey agreethat human cognition starts. The second section turns to intuitive intellectual cognition and to the much greater disagreements which divide these philosophers. Notwithstanding these important differences, the paper's conclusion draws attention to the similarities in the conception of intuition which cut across the otherwise significantly different accounts of the 2 Auriol, I Sent., Pars Prima, Prologi Quaestio 2 (Sarnano ed., 25b F): "nomen intuitivae notitiae derivatum est a sensu ad intellectum". 3 It is worth quoting the entire passage by Gerard of Bologna (c. 1240Bologna (c. /50-1317 in which this definition is found: "dicendum quod de cognitione intuitiva possumus loqui communiter et extenso nomine vel proprie et stricte. Si primo modo, sic omnis intellectio potest dici intuitio, quia 'intueri' idem est quod 'inspicere', ut grammatici dicunt, et omnis intellectio est quaedam inspectio eius quod intelligitur. Si autem loquamur de cognitione intuitiva proprie et stricte, posset videri alicui quod cognitio intuitiva est cognitio rei immediata". Quod. 2.6 (1306); Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS lat. 17485, fols. 121rb-22vb (qtd. in Dumont, "Theology as a Science", 395). 4 In this paper, I focus on Latin Medieval traditions in which discussion of intuitive cognition has been most explicit. It would be very interesting to explore other traditions, not least that of the Masters of Arts at the University of Paris. I note, however, that the most famous representative of this tradition, John Buridan (c. 1300Buridan (c. -c. 1358), does not seem fond of the notion or terminology of intuitive cognition (he appears to use the expression "intuitive cognition" only once, in the Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam; see Klima, Buridan, 70 note 65, and 74). 5 As it will be discussed below in detail, the issue is whether intellectual cognition is only of universals or whether the intellect can also directly grasp individuals or particulars. For a classic monographic study on the cognition of individuals in the Middle Ages see Bérubé, La connaissance de l'individuel au Moyen Âge.
authors discussed. I end with an invitation to recover their older way of thinking of intuition.

Sensory intuition
Thomists and Franciscans typically agree that we experience intuitive cognition of the senses. 6 More specifically, authors in the two traditions are (typically) good enough Aristotelians as to think that cognition has an empirical starting point: in our cognitive journey, we grasp, first of all, extra-mental material individuals through the senses. For Aquinas, it is indeed only through the senses that human beings directly connect with the mind-independent individuals which populate the corporeal world. 7 We see present material objects through the sense of sight; we hear present sounds and noises through the sense of hearing, and so on. As in Aristotle, the immediate and direct sensory grasp of present particulars provided by the five external senses is integrated by internal senses. The internal senses allow complex perceptual activities which are not simply reducible to the operation of each sense, as well as the preservation of sensory data in the absence of the object from which they originated. According to Aquinas, there are four such senses: 1) the 'common sense' (koine aesthesis, sensus communis), a sort of perceptual capacity to coordinate the senses; 2) the imagination (phantasia, imaginatio), which preserves and elaborates the sensible forms or sensory data which have been received through the external senses; 3) the aestimativa (in nonrational animals) / cogitativa (in human beings), a cognitive power of discrimination between the beneficial and the harmful which does not yet involve universals; and, 4) sensitive memory, through which animals are able to remember past experiences. 8 What all these sensory powers have in common is their being limited to particulars which are originally grasped hic et nunc by the external senses through their accidental features. In order to discover the stable essential 6 Here and below, I use the labels 'Thomists' and 'Franciscans' as shorthand. 7 I cannot enter here into the exceedingly complex Medieval doctrine of species. I will only note that species are id quo (something is known) and not id quod (is known). They have a causal role and not a representative or a cognitive role. In particular, sensory species are the causal vehicle through which a sensible object can be present to a cognitive subject, or that through which the senses access some sensible aspect of a particular object. core of these individualstheir quiddity or 'whatness'the intellect is needed. 9 But the prize of this great discovery is, according to Aquinas, the indirectness by which these individuals are grasped by the intellect. The intellect knows what a particular individual is (say, a dog, as opposed to a cat, or a horse) only through the formation of universals which, as such, can be predicated of a plurality of individuals. That is, the intellect knows individuals only by abstracting from the very singularity with which they exist as extra-mental, concrete entities (see Aquinas, ST I, q. 86, a. 1). In scholastic formulae, for Aquinas and the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, sensus est particularium, intellectus est universalium; therefore, intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. 10 The senses may well be inferior, as cognitive powers, to the intellect but they are the only way the homo viator has to be in direct cognitive contact with the extra-mental corporeal things which surround us.
As far as granting a direct grasp of present material individuals to the senses, Duns Scotus agrees. In fact, for Scotus, the external senses are capable only of intuitive cognition, that is, they can only perceive an object hic et nunc "under the aspect of existence", without being able to abstract from hic et nunc and the actual presence of the object: 11 The intellect can cognize an object not as 'here and now' because it cognizes it under the aspect of absolute quiddity. Sense, however, cannot cognize an object in this way due to its being a power limited to cognizing the object under the aspect of existence. 12 (Scotus,Quodl,q. 13 (Vivès,vol. 25,522a)) The qualification 'external' is important: in the case of internal senses (notably, the imagination), Scotus admits abstractive cognition (that is, as we shall see, cognition which abstracts from the actual presence and existence of the object of cognition) also at the level of sensory cognition. 13 Indeed, the most innovative feature of Scotus's theory of cognition is arguably his rejection of the Aristotelian distinction between sense and intellect in terms of cognition of particulars versus cognition of universals: as regards material individuals, both sensory cognition and intellectual cognition have for him a perceptual and an abstractive component. 14 What is important to stress here, however, is that, for Scotus, intuitive acts of cognition are perceptual states typically exemplified by sense-perceptual states such as seeing a colour (Pini,"Scotus",348). "Sensory cognition", Scotus writes, "has this perfection as a cognitive mode, that it can be in contact with the object itself, as existing, and as it is present in real existence" (Scotus,Quodl. q. 6,n. 8;Vivès,vol. 25,244a), as opposed to arriving at the object only in a diminished way, as in the case of the diminished perfection of representation (see Scotus,Quodl. q. 6,n. 8;Vivès,vol. 25,244a). Thus, there is an "act of cognizing" which "is precisely of a present object, as present, and of an existent object, as existent". This act of intuitive cognition acquaints the cognitive subject with a really existing, present individual. 15 Crucially, it can occur only when a thing is actually present (praesens actualiter), 16 that is, it "requires the presence of the object" which is cognized "as present" (Cross,Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,(49)(50). So, I see a colour if and only if the colour exists and is present to me. I can of course imagine a colour, or believe I am seeing a colour which is not actually there, but these would be cognitive acts with a different nature than the act of perceiving an actually present colour. Only the latter will count as an intuitive act characterized by a "relation of contact" (relatio attingentiae). 17 What this means, however, is not that intuitive acts are about the existence of an object. One could in fact consider the existence of an object even when the object is not present (and indeed, we routinely think about existing objects as existing even when they are not actually present to us). The distinctive feature of intuitive cognition is that it is the very presence and actual existence of the object which causes the cognition in the first place (e.g. the actual presence of a red colour is what causes my seeing a red colour). And this causality is also the reason why an intuitive cognition can only be of an actually present and existing object. In technical terms, the difference between a cognitive act grasping a present object, and a cognitive act imagining or thinking of an absent object which may or may not exist, is to be found in their different rationes formales motivae, that is, in the different motive factor which moves the two types of cognition. 18 The second type is what Scotus labels abstractive cognition, that is, a kind of cognition which is indifferent to the existence or non-existence of the object, as well as indifferent to its real presence or absence. This is something which we experience often, Scotus adds. Its typical expression is an apprehension of 15 Scotus, Quodl. q. 6 nn. 7-8 (Vivès, vol. 25, 243b-4a; Wadding, xii. 145); trans. by Cross in Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition, 43; see also Cross, Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition, 43-5. 16 Scotus, Reportatio I-B, Prol., q. 3 (Rodler ed., 88): "duplex est intellectio viatoris: una per speciem de re absente, alia quando res est praesens actualiter. Prima dicitur abstractiva eo quod abstrahit ab esse, fuisse et fore, alia dicitur intuitiva." 17 See Scotus,Quodl.,q. 13,n. 11 (Vivès,vol. 25,525) and Pini, "Scotus". 18 See Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, n. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25, 522b); Day, Intuitive Cognition, 62-64; Pini, "Scotus", sect. 1.1. universals or of the 'whatness' of things ("universalia sive quidditates rerum") which abstracts from the existence and non-existence, presence and absence of things (Scotus,Quodl. q. 6 n. 7;Vivès,vol. 25,243b). More generally, any cognition which is not intuitive is abstractive (Pini, "Scotus", sect. 1.2). Auriol too starts his account of intuitive cognition (notitia intuitiva) from an analysis of the features of sense-perceptual intuitive cognition of particulars. His definition of intuitive cognition is as follows: "Direct cognition, exhibiting presentiality of that over which it transits, objectively actuative, and positive, as it were, of existence [Cognitio directa, praesentialis eius super quod transit, obiective actuativa, 19 et quasi positiva existentiae]" (Auriol, I Sent., Pars Prima, Prologi Quaestio 2; Sarnano ed., 27a C-D). To explain this rather cryptic definition, Auriol relies on paradigmatic intuitive sensory cognition, namely, visual intuitive cognition (notitia ocularis), contrasting it with the imagination (notitia imaginaria). 20 For Auriol, the first thing to be noted is that visual intuitive cognition is not distinct from the imagination by its object (all that is seen can also be imagined) but by its mode of cognition. Now, an intuitive mode of cognition must have four key features. First, directness and immediacy (that is, as Auriol puts it, rectitudo). By contrast, the imagination does not go over (transit) a thing's existence with the same directness and immediacy as an intuitive act does (e.g. the act of seeing). Second, presentiality: a characteristic feature of visual cognition (and of intuitive cognition more generally) is that it "presents" the object to the cognitive subject. Third, visual intuitive cognition exhibits an "actuation of the object" (actuatio obiecti): that is, it presents the object in its actuality. Fourth, visual intuitive cognition is positiva existentiae, that is, it posits the existence of the object, while imagination is neutral as regards the existence of its object. 21 In brief, according to Auriol, the difference between intuitive and abstractive sensory cognition is found not in their object but in their different nature as cognitive modes. As a consequence of this account, Auriol also admits an intuitive cognition of non-existents (e.g. the non-existent things that we see in dreams): 22 since what distinguishes intuitive cognition from abstractive cognition is not the existence of its object (imagination too can be of present and existing objects) but the way in which intuitive cognition presents its objecti.e. directly, and as present, actual, and existingthere is intuitive cognition as long as there is this mode of presentation, even if the object does not actually exist. 23 (Scotus would of course strongly disagree given that, for him, a cognition is intuitive if and only if it is caused by a present and actually existing object).
Finally, for Ockham too, there is sensory intuitive cognition by which we apprehend material particulars: for instance, when we look at Socrates, we have a sensory intuitive cognition (notitia intuitiva) of his shape and colour. By Ockham's lights, however, this sensory intuition is insufficient for a complex cognitive apprehension such as 'Socrates is white'. A fortiori, it is insufficient for the purpose of passing any judgement about it (i.e. is it true that Socrates is white?). Thus, although in our embodied state sensory intuitive cognitions are a necessary condition of our apprehension of material particulars, any knowledge of the existence of material particulars, and/or any knowledge of contingent propositions about them, also requires intellectual intuitive cognitions. 24 Let us then turn to the issue of intellectual intuition.

Intuitive cognition of principles; Thomist versus Scotist abstraction
The literature on Medieval accounts of intuitive intellectual cognition does not always sufficiently stress that Aquinas too (or, for that matter, Aristotle) admits a type of intuitive intellectual cognition, namely, the immediate grasp of first principles. To put it another way: the Medieval dispute between Thomists and Franciscans over the way in which we know individuals should not obscure the existence of another, and indeed crucial, domain of intuitive cognition by the intellect, namely, the intellectus principiorum (intellection of principles) which constitutes the very foundation of demonstrative knowledge or scientia. For Aquinas, the intellectus principiorum is a non-discursive, immediate intellectual apprehension of first principles such as the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction, or the principle that the whole is greater than its proper part. These are truths which are known by virtue of themselves (per se nota), namely, "immediate propositions" in which the connection between logical subject and predicate is immediately evident (i.e. it is immediately manifest that the predicate belongs to the nature of the subject). There would be no systematic, demonstrative knowledge (or scientia) without this intuition of first principles, much as for Aristotle there would be no epistēmē or "judgement about things which 23  are universal and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration" without the immediate intellection (or nous) which "grasps the first principles". 25 This intuitive grasp is more accurate (akribesteron) than demonstrative knowledge (Aristotle,Posterior Analytics,Book II,chap. 19,100b), given that (for Aristotle as for Aquinas) error does not originate in simple apprehension but in the process of combining or dividing simple objects of thought (see Aristotle,De Anima,Book III,chap. 6,430b). For Scotus, however, the understanding of principles qualifies as abstractive cognition (Scotus,Quodl. q. 6,n. 7). Why? Because the notion of abstraction with which Scotus is operating is different from Aquinas' notion of abstraction. Thomist abstraction should not be confused, therefore, with Scotist abstraction. A clear grasp of why and how they are different is essential, I suggest, to a proper understanding of why Aquinas and Scotus then take different directions regarding their conception of intuitive intellectual cognition.
In short, the difference between Aquinas and Scotus' theories of abstraction is ultimately grounded in their different theories of universals. 26 According to Aquinas, the intellect abstracts from the singular mode of existence that things have in their extra-mental reality. This is the abstraction which leads to universals. For Aquinas, universals are not already there, embedded in individual things as universals albeit incapable of existing on their own. It is the intellect which 'makes' (or 'actualizes') universality and universals. 27 That is, there is a mode of being of individual things as thought or conceived which is the product of the intellect. By forming universals which abstract from the singularity of extra-mental individuals, the intellect can grasp what these individuals are (i.e. it grasps their 'whatness' or quiddity) but without being able to grasp their singularity (e.g. my intellect can grasp that this object in front of me is a tree, or an oak tree, or a sessile oak tree, but cannot grasp the unique singularity of the individual sessile oak tree which is in front of me).
For Scotus, the object of cognition is the natura communis of individual things (e.g. humanity in human beings; equinity in horses, and so on) apart from the individuating conditions or haecceitas which uniquely contracts, as it were, this natura communis in each individual. In our current state (pro statu isto), neither the senses nor the intellect can grasp the individual's haecceitas but both can cognize an individual in virtue of the common features which are expression of their natura communis. 28 25  So far, Aquinas and Scotus both affirm in their own way that, at least in our current embodied state of homo viator, we are unable to grasp individuals in their unique singularity (i.e. qua individuals). The crucial difference is that Scotus's natura communis is not a universal which is formed by the intellect, and for the formation of which the intellectual operation of universalization and abstraction from singularity is needed. Prior to any operation of the intellect, the natura communis is already distinct a parte rei from the individuating conditions of an individual thing (in Scotus's technical terms, the distinction between natura communis and haecceitas is a distinctio formalis a parte rei). Accordingly, the key role of abstraction is no longer that of abstracting from singularity to form universals. Rather, its task is to abstract from the presence or absence, existence or non-existence of individual things.
The consequences of this shift are far-reaching. Not only is this a type of abstraction of which the senses, as well as the intellect, are capable (e.g. in imagination). The intellection of first principles, which counted in Aquinas as intuitive intellectual cognition on account of its immediacy and non-discursivity, is now reclassified by Scotus as abstractive cognition on account of its abstracting from the existence or non-existence, presence or absence of the object of cognition (Scotus, Quodl. q. 6, n. 7).

Intuitive intellectual cognition of individuals
So much for the intellectual grasp of principles. What about the cognition of individuals? Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, and William Ockham agree that, for human beings, it is at least possible to have intuitive intellectual cognition of individuals. On the other hand, their accounts of this type of intellectual cognition significantly diverge on important points, giving rise to different original theories.
The Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta (c. 1237-1302), seems to have been the first to use the verb intueri and the adverb intuitive in a technical way in relation to cognitio singularis. Yet another Franciscan, Vital du Four (c. 1260-1327), uses the term intuitive but stops short of calling intuitive our intellectual cognition of material singulars, continuing to hold the received view that only the senses 'experience' material individuals (the intellect knows therefore these individuals 'in the senses'). 29 It is, however, the work of Duns Scotus which firmly establishes the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition as a staple of fourteenth-century discussion.
Scotus's original motivation for defending the possibility of intuitive intellectual cognition of individuals is theological: in the beatifical vision, the created human intellect will finally see God face-to-face. This "facial vision", Scotus reasons, is certainly not an abstractive cognition indifferent to the existence or non-existence of its object. On the contrary: as a type of vision which can only be intellectual, it is a paradigmatic case of intellectual intuitive cognition of an individual in which there is an immediate cognitive contact with a present and existing object of cognition. 30 Auriol uses a similar argument, contrasting the vision face-to-face of intuitive cognition with the blurred mirror-like reflection of the imagination. 31 Their conclusion is that it is at least possible for the human intellect to have this type of cognition, if not down here at least in the next life.
Scotus and Auriol are in fact less certain that we can point to examples of intuitive intellectual cognition of individuals in our current earthly state. 32 And if it were indeed the case that intellectual intuitive cognition is reserved to the blessed in the afterlife, then the distance between Scotus, Auriol, and Aquinas would be significantly shortened (if not eliminated altogether), given that Aquinas too would happily grant a visio Dei in the life to come. As far as I can see, the crucial point is whether also the homo viator can have some intellectual notitia intuitiva of singulars.
On balance, it appears that Scotus's answer is yes. He offers in fact four arguments in support of intuitive intellectual cognition. 33 To start with, he tries to establish the possibility of intellectual intuitive cognition by noting that, as a higher cognitive power, the intellect must be capable of at least as much cognitive perfection as the senses are capable of. Now, Scotus maintains, intuitive cognition is the most perfect type of cognition since it involves a direct cognitive contact with the thing itself. 34 Given that the senses are undoubtedly capable of it (that is, they grasp a present object as present, and an existent object, as existent), the intellect must also be capable of intuitive cognition. 35 The same kind of argument for the possibility of human intellectual intuitive cognition is advanced by Auriol, who stresses the 30 Scotus,Quodl,q. 6. n. 8 (Vivès,vol. 25,244a and b) superiority of intuitive cognition qua direct experiential acquaintance with the object of cognition, and hence its being proper not only of the senses but also of our superior cognitive power, the intellect. 36 As others have also noted, however, this is not a strong argument: why should we assume that the intellect is capable of doing what the senses do, instead of holding that intellectual cognition achieves something altogether different but still superior to merely sensory intuition of the hic et nunc? Be that as it may, Scotus has in store a further argument, aimed this time at establishing not only that intuitive intellectual cognition is possible, but also that we do actually experience it. His argument hinges on our knowledge of the truth-value of contingent propositions or truths of fact. 37 Unlike necessary propositions, the truth of which is grounded in the necessary connection between subject and predicate, and is therefore known by grasping the subject and predicate's meaning, the truth of contingent proposition can be known only by seeing that subject and predicate are actually joined in reality (e.g. by seeing that Socrates is actually eating an apple). Now, to form propositions (such as 'Socrates is eating an apple') and to syllogize (that is, draw inferences from propositions) is proper to the intellect. In the case of contingent propositions, however, their truth concerns objects which can only be known intuitively, that is, "under their existential aspect". In other words, contingent propositions, and knowledge of their truth, imply cognitive acts which cognize a present object as present, and an existent object, as existent. In our present embodied condition, however, intellectual intuitions are caused by prior sensory intuitions, and any intellectual intuition of an extra-mental particular requires therefore a sensory intuition (see Pini,"Scotus",359). Furthermore, it seems that in the case of extramental particulars, what the intellect intuits is their common nature. 38 To be certain of a proper intellectual intuition of singulars, we should rather look at our own cognitive and volitional acts, such as thinking and loving. These are "intrinsic acts" which we grasp both as our own acts and as singulars. Since this "interior vision" of our own acts can only be intellectual, it proves the actual existence of some intellectual intuitive cognition 36 See Auriol, I Sent., Pars Prima (Sarnano ed., 28b). Auriol is careful to distinguish the possibility of intellectual intuitive cognition from its actuality in our current state of homo viator. 37 Scotus,Ord. III,d. 14,; Ord. IV,d. 45,q. 3,n. 17 (Wolter and Adams ed.,205; trans. p. 223): "the intellect knows contingently true propositions and draws inferences from them, for to form propositions and to syllogize is proper to the intellect. But the truth of these concerns objects known intuitively, that is to say, under their existential aspect, which is something known by sense [illarum autem veritas est de obiectis ut intuitive cognitis, sub ratione scilicet exsistentiae sub qua cognoscuntur a sensu]" (my emphasis). Cross, Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition, 46 translates the last part of the sentence as follows: "the truth of those things is about the objects as intuitively cognized, namely, as existentthe same way in which they are known by the sense" (my emphasis). Depending on how one reads "sub qua cognoscuntur a sensu", Scotus can be interpreted as attributing here intuitive cognition to the senses or to the intellect. 38 Scotus,Quaestiones in Metaphysicam VII,q. 13,n. 158 (OPh IV,271 of singulars also in our embodied state. 39 Finally, Scotus notes that we have "intellectual memory", that is, memory of intellectual acts we have performed in the past. As a sort of acquaintance with the relevant past intellectual act, such a memory is also proof that we do have some intellectual intuitions. 40 On his part, Auriol is more pessimistic about the actual existence of intellectual intuitive cognition in our earthly state. Notwithstanding its possibility (shown by the beatifical vision), the homo viator does not experience it since s/he depends on the senses for the direct cognition of particulars. Thus, although "each of these cognitions [intuitive and abstractive] should be posited within intellect … we do not experience intuitive cognition in this life because of its conjunction with sensory intuition". 41 In brief, for Auriol, in our current condition, all human intellectual cognition is characterized by the discursivity of abstractive cognition as opposed to the directness and immediacy of intuition. 42 At the opposite end of the spectrum, Ockham has no doubt that there is also down here on earth an intellectual notitia intuitiva of extra-mental individuals. Indeed, for him, knowledge of the existence of particulars, as well as knowledge of contingent propositions about individuals, can only be intellectual and intuitive. 43 He distinguishes between two main types of mental acts: acts of apprehension, which can be both sensory and intellectual, and acts of judgement, which are only intellectual. 44 Acts of apprehension are mental acts of awareness of objects. They divide, in turn, into non-complex and complex cognitions. Non-complex cognitions are sub-propositional: they are acts of apprehending one or more terms which do not yet form a proposition but which can be terms of a mental proposition (e.g. 'Socrates' or 'white man'). Complex cognitions are apprehensions of propositions (e.g. 'Socrates is a white man').
Acts of judgement are mental acts of assenting to (or dissenting from) a proposition (Ockham, Ordinatio I, Prologus, q. 1, a. 1). One can merely entertain (i.e. in Ockham's vocabulary, apprehend) the terms of a proposition and/or the proposition itself without assenting to or dissenting from it. In order to have knowledge, however, there must also be an act of judgement, that is, an intellectual act by which one assents to the proposition. So, acts of judgement always presuppose acts of apprehension (at least logically), 45 and knowledge requires an actual judgement, not merely an apprehension (see Adams,William Ockham,[497][498][499][500][501]. Finally, Ockham defines evident cognition as cognition of any propositional truth that is sufficiently caused, mediately or immediately, by simple cognition of the terms. That is to say, in evident cognition, the noncomplex apprehension of the terms of a proposition is sufficient to give evident knowledge of the proposition itself (as it is the case, for instance, in simple analytic propositions). 46 With these elements in place, we can now tackle Ockham's account of intuitive and abstractive cognition. According to him, "Intuitive cognition of a thing is cognition that enables us to know whether the thing exists or does not exist, in such a way that, if the thing exists, then the intellect immediately judges that it exists and evidently knows that it exists" (Ockham,Ordinatio I,Prologus,q. 1,a. 1;in Philosophical Writings,23). Most importantly, it is only in virtue of intuitive cognition that we can know whether a contingent proposition about the present is true. 47 Unlike analytic propositions, for which a grasp of the meaning of the terms of the proposition is sufficient to have evident knowledge of the truth of the proposition, the truth of a contingent proposition about the present can only be established by a notitia intuitiva of the terms of the proposition. This is the kind of apprehension in which the mind is immediately aware of the existence or non-existence of the relevant things (e.g. 'Socrates' and 'whiteness'), and on this basis immediately judges whether the relevant contingent proposition is true ('Socrates is white').
To put it another way: no amount of understanding of, say, 'dressing gown' and 'red' can give evident knowledge of the truth-value of the contingent proposition 'the dressing gown is red': in order to know its truth, one has to see that, as a matter of fact, the dressing gown is red. Now, Ockham argues, this amounts to an act of judgement by which one assents to a proposition ('the dressing gown is red'). As such, it can only be an intellectual mental act. In turn, this judgement presupposes a complex cognition by which one apprehends the proposition, on the basis of non-complex cognitions by which one apprehends the terms of the proposition ('dressing gown' and 'red'). Once again, apprehending a proposition and its terms can only be 45 There may be an act of apprehension which is not psychologically distinct from an act of judgement: i.e. assent is given in the same psychological act of apprehension. 46  intellectual mental acts, although these mental acts require sensory intuitions by which one is aware of shapes and colours. In short, we have knowledge of the existence of material particulars (Socrates, dressing gowns, and the like), as well as knowledge of contingent truths about them, in virtue of intellectual intuitive cognitions. Contrasted with intuitive cognition, abstractive cognition is a non-complex apprehension of terms which does not enable us to have evident knowledge of whether a thing exists or does not exist, or of whether a contingent proposition about the present is true. 48 Like Auriol, Ockham also admits the possibility of the intuition of non-existents but, unlike Auriol, does not admit that we can ever be mistaken in such an intuition. If through the omnipotent intervention of God, we were given an intuition of the non-existent, we would judge that the intuited object is indeed non-existent. 49 There would be therefore no cognitive mistake and no danger of sliding into scepticism. 50 In sum, Ockham regards intuitive cognition as the first and fundamental kind of cognition, thanks to which we have evident knowledge of the existence or non-existence of the object, as opposed to being a kind of cognition which can have only existent beings as its object (as maintained by Scotus).

Conclusion
In discussions of Medieval accounts of intuitive cognition, it is usual to stress the differences which divide the Thomist and the Franciscan traditions. Yet, these undisputable differences should not obscure the deeper similarities which unite them. Noting these similarities is, in my view, very important because it leads to the core of how Medieval thinkers understood intuition.
To start with, as we have seen, for the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, the direct sense-perceptual grasp of individuals of which the senses are capable does not stretch to the 'whatness' of that individual. Intellectual apprehension achieves this grasp but at the cost of knowing individuals only indirectly through universals. By contrast, for the Medieval Franciscan tradition, individuals can be intuitively apprehended not only by the senses but also by the intellect. It should be noted, however, that for Scotus too this intuitive apprehension is not an apprehension of the haecceitas of individuals. That is to say, at least in our present embodied condition, for Aquinas as for Scotus (and Auriol) we are incapable of intellectually grasping individuals qua individuals, i.e. in their unique singularity.
Moreover, one should not lose sight of the fact that, in their accounts of abstractive cognition, Thomists and Franciscans are really talking about different things: Thomists are after a cognition which abstracts from singularity; Franciscans are after a cognition which abstracts from existence. Thus, Scotus can count as intuitive an intellectual cognition which has as its object the natura communis of an individual, as long as this is an act of cognizing which "is precisely of a present object, as present, and of an existent object, as existent". By contrast, for Aquinas, as long as an individual is cognized through a quiddity predicable of a plurality of individuals, this is a case of abstraction. So, the intellect is incapable of intuitive cognition of material particulars not because it is incapable of cognizing "a present object, as present, and … an existent object, as existent", but because it does not cognize this present and existing object in its singularity but through universals. In fact, these two different senses of abstraction are explicitly acknowledged by Ockham. When abstractive cognition is taken in the sense of abstraction from singularity, Ockham notes, "intuitive and abstractive are not contrasted" since "a universal can be intuitively known". Indeed, according to this sense of abstraction, "the same knowledge is intuitive and also abstractive" (Ockham,Ordinatio I,Prologus,q. 1;in Philosophical Writings,22). In sum, if one takes fully into account that, in talking of abstraction, Thomists and Franciscans are looking at different things, the distance in their conception of intuition will turn out to be not as great as it may appear at first blush.
This point leads me to the importance of distinguishing between the intuitive abilities which are being attributed to human beings in their state of glory, and those which are specifically attributed to the homo viator. From the point of view of a more strictly philosophical inquiry into natural human cognition, the homo viator rather than the blessed is the focus of attention. Likewise, from this perspective, a consideration of what perfect human cognition would be like (i.e. a consideration of the beatifical vision) is chiefly a way to throw into relief the limitations of present human cognition, rather than a way to adjudicate what human beings are capable of. 51 Now, as regards the homo viator, the distance between Scotus and, especially, Auriol, on the one hand, and Aquinas, on the other hand, is, once again, not as great as it may appear at first blush.
Finally and most importantly, I would like to draw attention to the similar way in which the acts of cognition are structured across these different traditions. At a deeper level, what joins Thomists and Franciscans is the view that human cognition starts from an immediate grasp or apprehension of what is present, first of all, to the senses. Furthermore, for both traditions, intuitive cognition is an immediate grasp which puts a subject in direct cognitive contact with 'what is'. Authors may then differ on whether this is only the sensory grasp of an existing material particular by the senses, or also an intellectual apprehension of particulars, or an immediate intellectual vision of principles, or on whether it is, or it is not, infalliblebut the key point of agreement is that it constitutes the paradigmatic type of cognition because the aim of cognition is to be in touch with reality, and this is precisely what intuitive cognition achieves (no matter how imperfectly or partially it may do so down here on earth). 52 What the Scholastics call the 'second operation' of the mind, namely, judgement, is grounded in this primitive grasp or apprehension; in its most basic instances (e.g. at least in some basic judgements of existence) it may even be merely logically distinct from the 'first operation' of the mind, that is, the apprehension of a present object. 53 This is a conception of intuition which is different toto caelo (as the Scholastics would say) from some present-day views of intuition as a hunch, or as common sense which points to broadly held opinions and beliefs. There is a lot to be said, in my view, for recovering the older conception of the Latin Medieval tradition.