‘Shaping hearts and minds: claret operations in Borneo, 1965–1966’

ABSTRACT For Western militaries, the choice between enemy-centric and population-centric approaches to unconventional warfare is really no choice at all. Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrines are clear on the decisive importance of hearts and minds in delivering success: in these conflicts, the population is the prize. As this article identifies, however, context may limit in important ways the relevance of many hearts and minds activities. Despite the scale of Commonwealth military success against Indonesia during Operation Claret in 1965–66, and despite the declared importance of hearts and mind activities in support of this success, the specific context that existed during the campaign limited the extent to which hearts and minds could exert a decisive impact. In particular, the limited nature of Commonwealth objectives, which did not seek to change the political ownership of the border area, meant that the local population could not, in the long term, be protected from the consequences of choosing to side with Commonwealth forces. Therefore, despite often being well disposed to Commonwealth troops, rational concerns for their own well-being limited the willingness of border villagers to provide overt help.

President Sukarno, did not support the creation of the new federation, arguing amongst other things (and with some truth), that the population of Sarawak and North Borneo had not been adequately consulted on their willingness to join it. Sukarno undertook what was, in effect, a hybrid war designed to undermine the new state. Indonesian Konfrontasi was prosecuted against Malaysia through economic actions, international diplomacy, terrorism, subversion, propaganda, and low-level military operations. On Borneo, an important part of this campaign involved cross-border incursions by small groups of Indonesians and Indonesian-supported irregulars.
Claret emerged as a result of changes in Commonwealth strategy to meet Indonesian Confrontation. The conflict occurred in the context of a wider Cold War struggle against Communism. Indonesia, though an adversary during Confrontation, was also seen as an important non-aligned actor, and potential ally, against global communism. Thus, Commonwealth strategy sought to reconcile two competing imperatives: the short-term need to defeat Indonesian attempts to disrupt Malaysia, and the long-term objective of recruiting Indonesia into the West's anti-Communist bloc. Initially, the Commonwealth strategy was defensive. The aim was to defeat Indonesia by demonstrating to Sukarno that he could not win. Over time, it was judged that this was not working and that aspects of the tactical offense would need to be undertaken to increase to Indonesia the costs of protracting the conflict and to sieze the initiative. Operation Claret was a key part of this.
In answer to Indonesian raids into East Malaysia, General Walker argued that Commonwelath forces should no longer regard the Borneo border as inviolate, but should instead begin offensive operations into Kalimantan. Walker had begun agitating for cross-border operations at the end of March 1964. 2 The growing threat posed by Indonesian raids led to official agreement on 1 May 1964 for retaliatory fire and 'hot pursuit' operations, allowing Commonwealth forces to pursue enemy raiders back across the border to a maximum depth of 3000 yards and to return enemy mortar and artillery fire into Kalimantan. Walker continued to push for a further expansion in these operations. On 1 July 1964, it was agreed that Commonwealth forces would be allowed to enter Kalimantan to a depth of 3000 yards in order to conduct 'credibly deniable' offensive operations, including ambushes on Indonesian forces before they had entered East Malaysia. 3 A further expansion in Indonesian activity occurred in the second half of 1964, not least air and naval landings on mainland Malaysia. As a response, agreement was reached on 13 January 1965 to extend British cross-border operations. The depth of attack was increased to 10,000 yards, and the range of permissible targets augmented to include fixed Indonesian military infrastructure, including camps and supply bases. 4 Later, and on an individual basis, some operations were sanctioned up to 20,000 yards into Kalimantan.
Politicians agreed to these operations on the basis that they would remain deniable; deniability being defined in terms that 'the Indonesians could not prove that the border had been crossed. It was one moreover which Soekarno, on the assumption that he does not wish for escalation, could afford without unacceptable loss of face, to treat no more seriously than present activities'. 5 Political sensibilities dictated that these operations were subject to strict oversight. For this, Walker drew up his 'Golden Rules': (1) The Director of Borneo Operations (Walker, and then after March 1965, Major General George Lea) to authorise every operation. (2) Only experienced troops would take part. No soldiers were to cross the border during their first tour of duty in Borneo. (3) Every operation was to be planned and executed with maximum security. Every man must be sworn to secrecy, full cover plans for operations were be made and the details never discussed in detail on telephone or radio. (4) The depth of penetration across the border was limited and attacks must only be made to thwart offensive action by the enemy and must never be in retribution or soley to inflict casualties. (5) Every operation must be planned with aid of a sandtable and thoroughly rehearsed for at least two weeks. (6) No soldier taking part must be captured by the enemy -alive or dead. 6 Overall, as Nick van der Bijl comments, 'Operation Claret was not intended to hold ground but was aimed at creating a sanitized area in which Indonesian forces risked being attacked'. 7 In doing this, Claret appears to have been very successful. Whilst, at the time, many in the military seem to have viewed Claret as the intermediate step towards more substantial undeniable operations, 8 the operations themselves seem to have succeeded in undermining the foundations of Indonesian raiding operations. As such, if they did not, in themselves defeat Indonesia, they did contribute substantially to preventing Indonesian success. This prolonged the conflict long enough that rising internal tensions in Indonesia between the communist PKI and the Indoensian army resulted in an attempted coup in October 1965 and, in the longer term, to the emergence of a pro-Western, anti-Communist regime under General Suharto. 9

The number and types of claret operations
There is a large body of literature that examines the detail of many individual Claret operations. This literature includes regimental histories, first hand accounts, and general overviews of Claret's role within Confrontation. Gurkha and SAS actions are particularly well serviced. 10 Detailed statistical analysis of the operations has been more difficult because of the lack of access to the official records. This uncertainty extends even to basic issues such as the number and breakdown by type of operations. Bob Hall and Andrew Ross identify 40 Claret operations. 11 It is not quite clear; however, how they define a Claret operation: whether, for example, they focus only on those that resulted in enemy casualties, or whether they define Claret in terms of operations involving direct attacks on Indonesian bases. David Charters identifies 200 operations, noting that the majority of them were reconnaissance operations. 12 David Easter, using archive material, notes that between January and September 1965, 79 Claret operations were conducted. 13 Operations reports relating to Claret are now available, however, and this allows us to gain a more accurate picture of the number and type of operations undertaken.
The most important early piece on Operation Claret was written by Raffi Gregorian in 1991. Gregorian's excellent analysis necessarily was written without the benefit of official records because they were not then available. Whereas Gregorian identifies all of the British cross-border activities from May 1964 onwards as Claret operations, Easter notes that it was those sanctioned in January 1965 that were code-named Claret. 14 As the Claret operations reports indicate, Easter is correct. Until January 1965, British crossborder operations seem to have been conducted under the code-name Operation Chromatic. After that date, Claret became the designation under which these activities were conducted. Claret, therefore, was the full gamut of cross-border military operations undertaken after January 1965. The operations reports themselves, however, are not fully comprehensive. For example, they include only a small proportion of the New Zealand and Australian operations. 15 However, by taking the operations reports for infantry units and the SAS and adding in the known numbers of New Zealand and Australian operations, we can deduce a minimum number of 545 Claret operations from January 1965 until the end of the conflict in August 1966. Table 1 breaks this total down according to month and by type. As the operations reports demonstrate, Claret encompassed six activities: reconnaissance; ambushes; psychological operations; fire assaults; and assaults. Reconnaissance ('recce') operations, unsurprisingly, covered a wide range of activities designed to gather information, focusing on active patrolling and/or the establishment of observation posts. The purposes of these recces included such things as determining the position of villages, enemy bases, and tracks; determining patrol routines; verifying information obtained from other sources; identifying the presence and composition of Indonesian garrisons; and identifying approach routes from the border to possible targets. Ambushes were 'shoot and scoot' operations laid along Indonesian track and river lines of communication. Psychological operations included visits to local villages on the Indonesian side of the border, and the distribution of  propaganda material. Fire assaults comprised of attacks on Indonesian bases and positions using remote attack: artillery, machine guns, rockets, grenades, mortars, and/or small arms fire. The purpose of these was to cause casualties and to dent Indonesian morale. Assaults were the rarest of operations and involved direct physical close-quarters attack on Indonesian positions with the intention of temporarily occupying the base and eliminating the garrison. 'Recce Ambushes' were primarily recce operations, but the troops involved had permission to mount a speculative ambush towards the end of the mission. 'Recce Fire Assaults' were similar but troops were permitted a longerranged attack on Indonesian targets. 'Recce Psyops' were recce operations that might also involve a visit to a village or the distribution of propaganda material. 'Fire Assault Ambushes' were a form of induced ambush in which the troops would attack an Indonesian position with longer-range fire and then mount an ambush on tracks likely to be used by Indonesian troops advancing, withdrawing, or reinforcing the targeted base. The 'Other' category includes the small number of harassment operations and prisoner snatches. The former involved long-range sniping and the latter attempts to seize Indonesian personnel as prisoners in order to interrogate them.

Hearts and minds operations
The focus of this article is on what the reports reveal about hearts and minds activities on the Indonesian side of the border. As Table 1 shows, hearts and minds activities constituted a relatively low numbers of Claret operations as a whole, at just 14 operations, or 2.57% of the Claret activities identified.
Of the 14 operations in the hearts and minds category, four were 'recce/ psyops' activities, in which the purpose of contacting and influencing local villagers was combined with a reconnaissance of local tracks and geography. In general, the psyops component of the operations involved the provision of food, medical aid, and the distribution of propaganda materials such as leaflets and newspapers. As an example, the distribution of food and medical aid was the primary aim of one patrol to the village of Sidut in October 1965. As the operations report indicates, the locals were 'friendly and cooperative' and the aid provided to them 'was very well received'. 16 The psyops element of the patrol included leaving 100 copies of the newsletter Peristwa Benar, some containing money inside, on jungle tracks 17 A patrol to the villages of Long Tugul and Ramah Budud at the end of 1965 distributed leaflets in the area of former Indonesian encampments, and provided medical aid to the locals. 18 Another patrol, this time into the Lutut Valley, visited three villages. At each, a medical orderly treated the sick, sweets were given to the children, and psyops leaflets placed on tracks where they could easily be found. 19 Another objective of these operations was to circumvent Indonesian restrictions on cross-border trade, and to help establish a flow of local information, by using the psyops operations to encourage villagers to visit trading posts set up by the security forces just inside the Malaysian border. For example, after setting up such a post at Nibong, a psyops patrol was used to explain to villagers that the Malaysian government wanted their friendship, and that a visit to the new post would allow them to trade for goods and to obtain medical aid. 20 But the small number of operations is particularly interesting given the emphasis that Walker himself placed on the hearts and minds aspects of the campaign. Hearts and minds activities were accorded a high priority on the Malaysian side of the border. Military units provided direct protection to the local population from Indonesian raids. However, they also conducted a much wider range of tasks. These included presence and reassurance patrols, medical support, psychological operations, support to the local police and state authorities, and help in organising an auxiliary force, the Border Scouts, that drew on the expertise of the local frontier population. 21 Moreover, in terms of Claret itself, Walker argued that success was due, amongst other things to a focus on 'hearts and minds'. 22 There were many reasons why building a good relationship with the local population was regarded as important. One obvious advantage of a positive relationship with the villagers in the border areas of Kalimantan was access to information. Information could be provided by questioning villagers in the kampongs (villages) that were visited as part of specific psyops activities and by questioning civilians encountered on other operations. Positive relationships with local villagers could also aid the activities of intelligence gathering organizations such as the Sarawak and Sabah Special Branches. Effective hearts and minds on the Malaysian side of the border also helped Claret operations because of the ability to furnish patrols with willing Iban scouts.
The dearth in hearts and minds activities therefore seems to be at odds with Walker's own priorities and, indeed, with the general importance attached to these activities in British approaches to low intensity operations. In examining the operations reports, however, it is clear that hearts and minds activities were indeed recognised as significant. Instead, as will be seen, the low number of specific hearts and minds Claret operations reflected the impact of important contextual factors.
To begin with, it is evident that specific visits to given villages were only one part of the general hearts and minds approach taken by Commonwealth forces. The importance of shaping positively the attitude of local villagers was reflected in other aspects of the campaign, not least in terms of targeting. Claret operations were shaped in no small part by the desire to avoid civilian casualties. There were 'strict orders' not to target civilians or unarmed people. 23 This focus limited acceptable objectives to those where civilian casualties could be avoided, and also the means of attack, with the use of long-range firepower limited to those targets where civilians were not present. These requirements in themselves placed a premium on developing accurate intelligence on potential targets before operations could be launched. This helps to provide one reason why so many of the Claret operations were reconnaissance focused. These restrictions could also raise the risk to the troops involved. On occasion, what were thought to be civilians turned out to be scouts for following Indonesian units, relinquishing for Commonwealth forces the advantages of surprise. 24 There were still incidences of civilian casualties, not least where Claret operations were attacking Indonesian troops garrisoned in villages. In operation Dharan Bazaar, for example, an assault operation launched in West Brigade in February 1965, the operation was predicated on intelligence that indicated that Indonesian garrison troops slept in a hut separate from local villagers and could thus be attacked safely if only that hut was targeted. In the event, this information was not wholly correct. Whilst no locals were directly killed by Commonwealth fire, local information after the operation, which resulted in an extended firefight with Indonesian forces, indicated that two villagers had died and four were wounded. The operations report argued that these casualties were the result of inaccurate Indonesian fire, including a machine gun that was firing too high and over the heads of British troops. 25 Direct casualties inflicted on villagers by Commonwealth forces seem to have been very few and entirely unintended. In one instance where two locals were ambushed and killed, for example, it was because they had taken to wearing discarded Indonesian military clothing and were mistaken for enemy troops. 26 These targeting restrictions, imposed as part of the focus on 'hearts and minds' were tactically onerous and had a number of ramifications for operations. One important consequence was that Indonesian forces over time came to understand these Commonwealth restraints and sought to exploit them. Indonesian troops thus sometimes based themselves in villages expressly because it reduced the chances of an attack. As an example, one report from September 1965 noted that intelligence indicated that the Indonesian troops at Wai Laya were afraid of being shelled and so were living amongst civilians. 27 Indonesian reconnaissance patrols also dressed themselves as civilians. An ambush on Sengai Koemba noted suspiciously alert civilians in boats scanning the banks of the river and concluded from their bearing that 'It would appear that the S[ungei] Koemba is being patrolled by enemy in civilian clothes passing as locals'. 28 Equally, civilian disguises seem to have been used by the Indonesians to protect logistic runs from attack. Another ambush patrol noted their sighting of a boat containing five men with rice and boxes covered with tarpaulins. The men were quiet and alert, but wore civilian shorts or trousers and cotton shirts. Military packs were half hidden at the bottom of the boat. 29 In some areas it became clear that the normal way for the TNI to go was by boat 'in which they wear civilian clothes. "They wouldn't dare wear uniform"'. 30 In one case, some Indonesian troops even seem to have gone so far as to disguise themselves as women. During November 1965, a Claret patrol spotted a group of 25 men and women near New Lembada longhouse. But by their stature, walk, and hair, the patrol believed that all of them were actually men and that they were Indonesian military personnel. The group were examining tracks and moved in military formation. Whilst the leader was dressed as a woman, when one of the men argued with her, she then punched him and knocked him to the ground. 31 It was also the case that the success of Claret operations also positively shaped hearts and minds across the border. Certainly, the extent to which they led Indonesian troops to withdraw from areas under attack seemed to be something that many villages were glad of. A patrol from early 1966 to Pa Sing noted that the local headman had indicated that no Indonesian forces had been in the area for six weeks. This meant, amongst other things, that the locals no longer had to provide labour for building military positions for the TNI. The locals were 'happy and hospitable' and even asked the patrol to stay overnight. 32 Other patrols also noted instances where the withdrawal of TNI troops seemed to improve the morale of the local villagers. For example, another patrol, this time in September 1965, noted that the local headman 'was glad that the enemy had gone', and that 'The locals were very prosecurity forces'. 33 Indeed, in this vein, in the struggle for the support of the locals Commonwealth forces were also able to benefit from mistakes made by the Indonesians. Though notionally on the same side, the local villagers and Indonesian and irregular forces were often separated by a considerable cultural gap. Indonesian troops, for example, generally being Javanese, often evinced a lack of sympathy and understanding for the Kalimantan border population that they were there to protect and upon whom they relied upon to support their cross-border operations. For example, one measure imposed by Indonesian troops as part of their attempts to undermine Malaysia was to ban cross-border trading. But this cut off villagers in the Kalimantan border area from important sources of supplies and also interrupted their ability to buy rice when there was a poor harvest. 34 In response to some of the evident difficulties caused to locals by the interruption of this trade, Special Branch and Field Information Officers set about clandestinely organising their own trading posts. These posts could be used to question visiting traders and to push Commonwealth hearts and minds messages through the distribution of Malaysian newspapers.
In addition to using the locals as a source of labour, the TNI also imposed other burdens on the local population. A recurrent 'complaint by locals was that the TNI took their food. One patrol reported that villagers were 'very hungry, the soldiers eat all the food'. Asked if they liked the Indonesian soldiers, the reply was 'No, they are not kind to us'. 35 Another local, upon being asked what relations were like between villagers and the TNI replied that 'These were poor. The Indonesian troops stole food and ill treated the locals'. 36 Some, at least, of the Indonesians troops were also unwilling to provide medical help or share medicines with villagers. 37 It is also clear that the Indonesians doled out exemplary violence. The same local said that six in his village, including his brother, had been executed for breaking the restrictions on border trade. 38 Another local, a headman, had been taken by Indonesian-backed irregular forces and held for three weeks, being questioned about why he had not passed on information about the presence of Commonwealth forces. He was warned that he would be killed if he failed to do this again. 39 These sorts of failings naturally helped to create conditions propitious for Commonwealth efforts.
Overall, the hearts and minds approach adopted by Commonwealth forces seemed to deliver many positive benefits. In visits to villages, the welcome received by Commonwealth troops was often positive. In mid-1965, an operation to Long Tugal noted that the villagers were 'delighted' to see them, providing them with some food and allowing them to stay overnight. 40 Another, in August, 1965, commented of the villagers in the Lembada -Pa Urud valley that the 'continued friendliness of the locals in that valley is most gratifying'. 41 Similarly, a hearts and minds operation in West Brigade in late 1965 noted that the villagers were 'delighted' and the welcome 'warm and unqualified' 42 Another to Sidut in March 1966 found that the locals were 'friendly and volunteered info about the area'. 43 In addition to those in villages targeted by hearts and minds operations, the locals encountered by Commonwelath patrols were often friendly. 44 For example, on Operation Fresh Lime in January 1966, a civilian spotted elements of the patrol in their forward base. He then voluntarily approached the force to engage them in conversation and 'His reaction was very friendly'. 45 Civilian traders that crossed the border were also a useful source of information. 46 At a unit level, efforts were made to improve intelligence gathering by establishing intelligence cells of Field Information Officers and interpreters. These were able eventually to recruit paid agents from among the Kalimantan villagers. Special Branch reports from agents in Kalimantan, though infrequent, could also be valuable. 47 These sources might provide information on a variety of topics and could also be helpful in corroborating other sources of information, such as air photography and Signals Intelligence. This information might include, for example, the distribution of enemy forces. Troops on Operation Prince's Arcade in 1966 were able to elicit information on the distribution of Indonesian forces in the local area: there were no troops at Aping; none at Aruk; about a 100 at Gruang; 70 at Berdjongkong. There was an Indonesian camp at Bruang -not in the village but somewhere under the trees -containing about 40 men who patrolled Aping and Aruk. 48 Information from locals could also give indications on enemy patrolling patterns and habits. For example, reports from a patrol in May 1966 indicated which longhouse the enemy used for overnight stays whilst on patrol, how many of them patrolled and where they came from. 49 Since locals were often used as labour by the TNI to build military positions, locals could also provide information on where new bases were being constructed, and what sorts of defensive structures they comprised of. 50 They could also provide information on Indonesian vulnerabilities and potential ambush sites: for example, where TNI troops might go fishing or bathing, and these provided points for ambush. 51 Special Branch reports could provide more detailed information on the composition and intention of enemy forces. For example, a report from early 1966 on the forces opposite 1 Scots Guards in East Brigade gave information on the Indonesian marine and irregular forces, including their dispositions, composition, their intention to cross into Sabah, their expectation that they would be supported by the local population, and the low morale that afflicted portions of the force. 52 For operation Dharan Bazaar in West Brigade in February 1965, intelligence from traders and agents established by the unit FIO gave Commonwealth forces a detailed map of the target village, the numbers and distribution of those living in the huts, the personalities and weapons of members of the garrison, and their patrol routine. 53 Local civilians could also sometimes be used to provide guides for Claret operations. 54 Local information from friendly villagers could also give an indication of the tactical impact of individual Claret operations. After an operation by 2/6 Gurkha Rifles in mid-1965, for example, information from villagers revealed that 'The local reaction to the attack is said to be favourable although some of the locals are digging their own slit trenches'. The Indonesian soldiers told them not to worry since the 'British (sic) are only after them (the soldiers). When asked why they do nothing about it, they reply that the British know where they area and if they (the Indoensians) fire their mortars, they can only hit trees'. 55 Similarly, after an operation in the Lumbis area in July 1965 local sources were able to reveal that the TNI in Lumbis was 'very much afraid' and was digging more trenches. 'They do not want to go out and look for trouble and are only waiting to be relieved so that they can return home to their families'. 56 The TNI had moved their camp behind a ridge to avoid any further contact with Commonwealth forces who might be operating in the area. 57 Intelligence from local villagers could also provide details on Indonesia casualties, including burials and those repatriated, as well as Indonesian claims regarding the losses that they had inflicted. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was evident that the Indonesian troops underreported the former and exaggerated the latter. 58 Closer relations with villagers in Kalimantan therefore had evident utility for Claret operations. Commonwealth forces already exercised restraint, at some operational cost, in recognition of the importance of hearts and minds activities. So why were hearts and minds patrols such a limited part of the repertoire of Claret operations?

The limits of hearts and minds
Despite the advantages that hearts and minds activities could deliver, the relative paucity in the number of specific hearts and minds operations reflected certain basic limits to the impact that such operations could have.
One physical limitation was the very low population density in the border areas. The absence of a native population in most areas therefore limited their utility as a resource. 59 At the same time, since much of the population that was present was illiterate, it is not clear how useful the printed elements were of the Commonwealth psyops activities. 60 Another factor was that, even where information could be obtained, civilian intelligence often tended to be vague and contradictory. 61 As one report commented, even where the local civilians turned out to be'friendly and co-operative', not least because of medical help that had been given to them, the information that they could provide remained 'vague and confusing'. 62 Moreover, even where sources of information existed, they might dry up suddenly. One report, commenting on the situation at Long Pupong village, noted that regular sources of information had ceased and 'very little was known of the up-to-date strengths and location of the enemy'. 63 Even where plenty of information seemed available, the details could be wrong in significant ways. In the Dharan Bazaar operation, for example, the amount of information on the target village seemed very good. However, as the operation report noted 'In the event it proved to be incomplete in many important respects'. 64 Or, the details in the available information might change at short notice. Operation Jelly Baby from March 1966, for example, was initially focused on the Kindu-Babanag area. Just at the point that it was about to be launched, however, new information from an informer indicated that the enemy troops were actually in the Kindu-Kaik area. 65 There was, in any case, often a remarkable level of ignorance amongst the locals about current events and circumstances. For many villagers, Confrontation was an irrelevance, and even issues over who was governing them took second place to more immediate issues such as finding food. On Operation Zebra Crossing in March 1966, for example, Commonwealth troops stopped and questioned a boat of locals. But the information elicited was of marginal utility: 'The men were very amiable', noted the report, but they seemed to lack a knowledge even of the basics of Confrontation itself -'they had not much idea of the political set-up in Indonesia neither did they show much interest in it'. 66 In addition to these issues, the TNI themselves often took steps to try and limit the availability of information. One report noted of the Lutut Valley in Central brigade in October 1965 that: 'There is now a sort of "no man's land" adjacent to the border ridge and the civilians are now under much tighter control'. 67 On another patrol, the villagers of Pa Pirit turned out to be very uncommunicative: 'They were very fightened and it seems likely that they were very much under the influence of the enemy'. 68 The source of this influence often seems to have been coercion and the fear of retribution. The reports also indicate that the Indonesians had some agents amongst the local population. 69 A Central Brigade patrol from October 1965 commented on 'the tight control now exercised over the local people and it will have to be investigated and if possible broken'. 70 Information indicated that Indonesian patrols had seized captives from whom nothing further was heard. Around Basiok and Pa Urud, it was noted during the same period that 'The people on the valley are afraid . . . It was only after considerable persuasion that we could get them to come out and talk to us'. 71 Where the TNI presence was less, the villagers were likely to be more friendly. By early 1966, a prolonged lack of enemy presence seemed to have reassured the locals in some areas, one patrol noting that villagers were 'happy and hospitable' and even invited them to stay the night. 72 In any case, the vast size of the border area meant that some villages had very little contact with the TNI, or indeed the local administration as a whole. For example, a patrol to the village of Lipaha in April 1966 revealed that TNI forces hadn't visited for a year. 73 But it is evident that the degree of control varied from Indonesian unit to unit, probably reflecting the priority and energy that they did, or did not, place on operational security. For example, in September 1965, it was noted that the arrival of a new Indonesian force in the Long Bawan/Wailya area reduced significantly, and sometimes halted completely, the information that could be obtained from the locality. 74 More fundamental, however, was the reality that Commonwealth forces were a transient presence in the border areas, both in the short and the long term. In the short term, by their nature, cross-border operations were limited temporally. The longest that an operation could sustain itself in the Kalimantan jungle was three weeks, and most were shorter than this. In the longer-term, whatever the political outcome of Confrontation, Kalimantan would undoubtedly remain part of Indonesia. In both cases, therefore, villagers were vulnerable to Indonesian reprisals if they had been found to have provided succour to Commonwealth forces. Irrespective of their sympathies, therefore, local villagers were wary of engaging with Commonwealth troops. As a hearts and minds patrol to Old Lembada commented in October 1965, while the troops on the whole were well received by locals 'we obviously unsettled them' and the conclusion reached was that too frequent visits might alienate the villagers 'because of the difficult position in which we place them'. 75 On a visit to the village of Tatahas in late 1965, Gurkas found the locals to be 'frightened and seemingly untrustworthy, though not hostile, they made it clear to the patrol they would side with whoever "won"'. 76 Another patrol reported that the headman of a local village asked them not to visit his village for fear of reprisals. 77 Even as Indonesian forces withdrew their bases under pressure of the Claret campaign, these fears remained. In August 1965, a hearts and minds visit bringing medicine and other goods that the villagers didn't have reported that the locals were happy and grateful for the visit. However, the villagers were fearful of what Indonesian forces would do if they returned to the area, and the headmen were afraid that they would be 'called to account' by the TNI. 78 On this basis, there were simply limits to what hearts and minds activities could achieve. It couldn't be assumed that friendliness towards Commonwealth forces translated into commitment to their cause. As one visit to the village of Sekajang identified, the locals 'appeared very friendly, in marked contrast to our normal reception'. But their replies to questions from the patrol were 'rather ambiguous' and 'the sincerity of their feeling is open to doubt'. 79 As another operation concluded 'The people behaved like other villagers on both sides of the border in this sector when visited by [our troops]. They were friendly without displaying much enthusiasm'. 80 Equally, travellers encountered on patrol could be actively problematic. In Operation Tail Wag of May 1966, one group of natives encountered were 'friendly and quite happy'. 81 But another native traveller wouldn't approach the patrol and, after he left, an enemy mortar began firing. The conclusion drawn was 'that civilians across the border are hostile and working for the en[emy]'. 82 After a similar situation in which a civilian encounter then led to Indonesian fire against the vicinity of an ambush site, the report for Operation Slapsy Maxy in May 1966 concluded that 'All locals in that particular area must be regarded as hostile to us however friendly they seem or willingly they volunteer information'. 83 A critical consequence of this was that it had to be assumed, and indeed it did often seem to be the case, that where Claret patrols gave away their presence to natives, their presence would be reported to Indonesian forces. 84 Even where patrols were trying to avoid villages, operations might be given away by inquisitive travellers investigating tracks or locals out hunting or going about their business. 85 This difficulty posed a significant challenge for operations and many of those cancelled were cancelled because the operation was compromised, or thought to be compromised, because it was spotted by border civilians. Civilians simply made it difficult to move unnoticed. 86 This could limit operations to certain times, make certain areas impossible to ambush or move through or slow down the rate of movement and lengthen the approach march to a target. 87 Hearts and minds activities could not address this problem adequately because the reality of the situation in which the Kalimantan population found themselves made them vulnerable to being punished by Indonesian troops.
Other responses had to be found, therefore, to circumvent this problem. One response that was adopted where Claret operations encountered civilians directly was to try if practicable to take them prisoner for a period sufficient to allow the operation to be completed. 88 For Operation Pine Marten in October 1965, for example, the troops encountered a group of 11 locals that they then detained for a short period in order to allow ambushes to be maintained. The villagers were released once the operation was completed, being given money and leaving happy and 'in good cheer'. 89 This could rarely be done for long, though, since the villagers were likely to be missed and others might come looking for them. 90 Locals might also be detained in order to be questioned. A recce patrol in mid-1966 detained three civilians that they encountered in their watch on a longhouse and detained them in order to maintain operational security. Spinning the story that the patrol was lost and needed help to get back to the border, the Commonwealth troops took the three back across the border to a helicopter landing zone where they were interrogated by a Field Intelligence Officer. They were then given $100 credit each at one of the cross-border trading posts and then released. 91 Detaining civilians carried its own challenges. There was a limit to how long they could be held before other villagers might come and look for them. This might require accelerating the operation. 92 Nor could holding them guarantee that they didn't compromise an operation. In one instance, for example, a cough from a detained civilian was enough to alert an Indonesian patrol and ruin an attempted ambush. 93 But fear of Indonesian retribution made locals generally reluctant to provide tangible aid, and throughout the conflict the assumption was that, if British forces were spotted by villagers, they would report the presence of Commonwelath troops to the Indonesian military: hence the emphasis in most Claret operations on avoiding contact with the population. Thus, throughout the campaign, unexpected contact with local villagers remained a continuous problem that often resulted in operations having to be modified or terminated early. 94 It might also make certain areas almost impossible for Claret operations to work in because of the high chances of being discovered by local villagers. 95 These challenges explain the low number of hearts and minds Claret operations. They also help to explain the often ambivalent attitude towards these activities on the part of Divisional Headquarters. One brigadier noted in early 1966 that hearts and minds operations had a role to play in the psychological battle against the Indonesians and that they might have a useful role in goading the Indonesians into deploying troops into areas where psychological operations had taken pace. 96 But the broader importance of these operations was something for superiors to judge and 'must be judged mainly on the return that higher authority considers that psyops gives'. 97 As the report went on to note 'so much depends upon Claret policy, operations inside Sarawak, and other factors'. 98 In order to illustrate the preceding points, it is useful to examine some hearts and minds activities in a little more detail The first of these is a recce/hearts and minds patrol launched by Central Brigade in October 1965. The aim of this operation was to visit the villages of Lipaha and Tatahas, and to reconnoiter the surrounding area, given rumours of the arrival of Indonesian troops and the presence of helicopter landing zones. The patrol consisted of 40 men from 1 st Battalion the Gurkha Rifles and was composed of the Assault Pioneer Platoon and elements of 3 Platoon. 99 The patrol was launched on the 13 October 1965 and arrived at Lipaha on the 16 th where they spent two and half hours. The locals seemed 'not unduly perturbed' by the thought of the arrival of the TNI, and their main concern was shortages of food and basic necessities, including salt, soap, clothes, oil lamps, and sugar. The troops bought a chicken in exchange for Malay dollars, and discussed the possibility of setting up a border trading post. The locals had no information to give on Indonesian forces. 100 On the 18 th , the patrol arrived at Tatahas, where they stayed for an hour. There the villagers wanted shotgun cartridges, oil lamps, and books and pencils for the local school. The villagers, though, seemed 'frightened and seemingly untrustworthy, though not hostile', and were unwilling to give information. Some information was given by one man that was visiting from another area. However, the grading given to it ('F4') indicates that he was not regarded as especially reliable. 101 Overall, it was assessed by the patrol that they had gained little information, though further visits and the establishment of a border trading post might be useful. 102 A second example comes from Operation Welcome Visit, in December 1965. This was undertaken by 3 rd Battalion the Royal Green Jackets and involved a visit to a village on the Brunang River, following up earlier visits across 3 Battalion, Royal Green Jacket's front to a depth of 5,000 yards. The inhabitants seemed to be 'delighted' by the visit, and the Indonesians were viewed with some apathy: a situation probably resulting in part from how little the village had seen of Indonesians. In the preceding two and half years, no Indonesian trader had visited the settlement and they hadn't seen any TNI since July. 103 The population had many needs. Most, including all of the children, seemed to be suffering the early stages of malnutrition, and nearly a third took up the patrol's offer of medical help, the ailments treated including headaches, fevers, scabies, and sores. 104 In addition to medical aid, the patrol left supplies of biscuits, rice, salt, and sugar. 105 Despite the welcome received, the information that the locals could provide was very limited and their awareness of current events poor. Asked if they knew what was going on in Indonesia, the reply was 'We only know our own problems and that it is dangerous to trade in Sarawak, because we believe that Sarawak Government are against it. We know nothing about what is going on in Indonesia or Malaysia'. Indeed, they had an equally vague knowledge of their own national leader: asked who President Sukarno was, the reply was: 'Don't know. A very few had heard the name but no one knew who or what he was'. 106 Another example comes from a Gurkha Independent Parachute Company recce patrol in February to March 1966. On this patrol, they bumped into a local whilst travelling. The patrol gave the man some biscuits, 'the first he had had for 4 years', and engaged him in conversation, establishing a 'genuinely friendly relationship'. 107 The traveller was able to pass on some information about a local TNI garrison at Wailaya of around 100 men and an unserviceable helicopter. This included information that TNI paracommandos had left, and that the remaining forces were very passive: they 'eat, wash, sleep and quarrel over women, steal chickens and are very afraid'. But the civilian's comments also illustrated the limits on his willingness to act on his antipathy towards the TNI: 'Whilst obviously disliking the Javanese intensely, as would seem to be the general attitude of the whole civilian population, this man was adamant in his refusal to do anything provocative'. 108

Conclusion
In terms of narratives of the Borneo campaign, actions on the Malaysian side of the border, and general British approaches to low-intensity operations, hearts, and minds might have been assumed to have been a substantial component of the Claret campaign. Interestingly, however, formal hearts and minds operations constituted only a relatively small number of Commonwealth cross-border patrols during the conflict. The reason for this disparity between commitment and practical activity was not because the psychological aspects of the campaign were viewed as of marginal relevance. Whilst border villagers could not solve the logistic challenges faced by Claret troops, having little food to give, the intelligence that the border population provided was not umimportant and provided additional primary or corroborating material to the wider intelligence picture. As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the concern to shape in positive ways the views of the local population of the border areas of Indonesian Kalimantan had important consequences for operation Claret. In some respects, of course, Indonesian troops helped to do the job of Commonwealth forces for them. The oftentroubled relationship between the TNI and its irregular allies and the local population, marked by incidents of coercion and predatory behavour, created a civil-military relations gap reflected in border villagers that frequently adopted the posture of relatively disinterested bystanders. But some Commonwealth hearts and minds operations were indeed undertaken.
More widely, Commonwealth forces took pains in their encounters to treat local inhabitants sympathetically. Moreover, the priority attached to avoiding civilian casualties had significant implications for the nature of Claret operations and the manner in which they were conducted. For example, many potential targets were given up because of the possibility that civilian casualties might ensue. Indeed, the desire to create a campaign founded on principles of precision and discrimination in attack helps to explain the broader structure of Claret, including the predominance of reconaissance operations, and the relative lack of what might have been for Commonwealth troops much safer modes of attack, including longer-range fire assaults.
Nevertheless, hearts and minds activities could never play a decisive role in operation Claret: the local population were not the prize. Operation Claret was political in intent, but its focus was on military action against enemy fielded forces, whether directly, through attacks on encampments and enemy patrols, or indirectly, through interrupting lines of supply. Local support for Commonwealth forces was always likely to be limited because the latter could never be more than a temporary presence. Even the comprehensive success of Claret forces would not change the fact that Kalimantan would remain a part of Indonesia after the war was concluded, because the objective of resisting Indonesian Konfrontasi was to defend, and not to change, the existing status quo. The local population of the border areas would have to live in the longer term with the consequences of any short-term interactions with Commonwealth forces. As we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, however earnest the attempts to co-opt the local population, the impact is likely to be mitigated by the answer to the real-politik question: which side will remain here in the long term?