‘Each Wagon of Coal Should Be Paid for with Territorial concessions.’ Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Coal Shortage in 1918–21

ABSTRACT Even a short breakdown in fuel supplies can have profound and dramatic consequences for modern economies. This paper explores a major coal shortage in Central Europe after WWI which shook local societies for two years. The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 provides a narrower context to this study, while its immediate focus lies upon the development of diplomatic and economic relationships between Czechoslovakia – a WWI victor and an important coal exporter, and Hungary – a war losing state that was a net coal importer. This paper underlines the scale of the Hungarian reliance on fuels from Czechoslovakia, and suggests that this dependency was one of the chief arguments that motivated Budapest to cede Slovakia to Prague’s control and, more generally, to accept the peace terms proposed at the Paris conference. It is safe to conclude that economic considerations played a much greater, if not dominant, role in the adoption of the peace treaty of Trianon of 1920 in Hungary. Overall, the paper demonstrates that cross-border energy interdependence substantially influenced diplomatic relations in Central Europe immediately after WWI, privileging coal-exporting states over coal-importing states.

decomposing state apparatus in Central Europe -the military -suffered from low morale and massive desertion almost to the extent of its functional disappearance at the end of the Great War. 11Local post-1918 armies had to be built from scratch.In the absence of sufficient governmental forces, many territories, be they in Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia or Poland, were left to the grace of self-appointed militias, paramilitary bands and warlords. 12uilding a functioning state and restoring the rule of law required satisfying the people's basic needs in food, transport and shelter.Obtaining these goods required cooperation with distant regions because pre-1918 Central Europe was characterised by highly integrated economic specialisation.Some regions supplied foodstuff, other -industrial products and mineral resources.The trans-national resource inter-dependence might explain much of the region's desire to seek normalisation with competing nationalists among neighbours, even at the price of formal territorial losses.The key word here is 'formal', as the weak post-war states often did not administer the lands which they were claiming and renouncing in international treaties.In other words, claiming far away spaces without practical means of exploiting or controlling them was probably less attractive, from a governmental perspective, than receiving resources crucially needed to manage the smaller areas under their feet.
Coal, known as 'the bread of industry', was an indispensable item which allowed European states, armies and economies to function from the 1850s until the 1960s.The decades surrounding the First World War witnessed the peak of coal dependence.Thermal energy from coal burning assured the operation of transport and industry, and the generation of electricity and heat.While firewood was already insufficient to meet energy demands, energy supplied by oil, gas or hydropower was still underdeveloped.The homogeneity of the coal-centred energy model made contemporary societies extremely vulnerable to potential coal shortages.Moreover, most of Europe relied on coal imports to meet its full energy needs.In 1913, only Britain, Germany and Austria-Hungary had a positive trade balance in coal. 13Much of their power (including geopolitical) was rooted in the mines of England and Wales, Westphalia, the Saar, and Silesia.Much of the rest of the continent depended on smooth trans-border cooperation with these coal centres through a complex transport infrastructure.While British coal was supplied by sea deliveries to certain continental ports, German and Habsburg coal moved within the landlocked area by rail and river canals.Replacing close, traditional coal suppliers required large investments, time and labour -to build new roads and harbours, to allocate more trains or ships.As Timothy Mitchell famously argued, the inflexibility of coal dependence gave great leverage over the state to the coal workers and industry. 14A larger conclusion is that transborder coal cooperation pushed the nation-states of Europe into a 'hidden (infrastructural) integration' long before the inauguration of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. 15 WW1 negatively affected coal supplies in Europe.International routes from mining regions to consumers were disrupted due to mutual blockades between the Entente and the Central Powers.Mines on the front lines, such as those in France and Belgium, were destroyed.The mobilisation of miners to the army, and the undernourishment or overburdening of those who remained on the home front, impaired mining productivity.Moreover, there were no replacements for depleted mines, and damaged infrastructure was slow to be repaired.Finally, Europe could not necessarily count on large coal supplies from the US. 16By the end of the war, Europe was facing an unprecedented shortage of coal, which only worsened in the first post-war year. 17In summer 1919, Director of the American Relief Administration in Europe (and future US President) Herbert Hoover sounded the alarm that 'the fate of European civilisation' was now in the hands of the coal providers. 18Coal output in 1919 decreased to 535 million tonnes (Mt) which was the bottom of the European production in the interwar (Figure 1).Simultaneously, the coal prices skyrocketed with a historical peak in 1920 (Figure 2).The coal extraction overpassed the pre-war level only by 1927, but the stabilisation of prices suggests that the coal crisis was overcome by the early 1920s.
The energy paralysis in Central Europe was worse than anywhere else.The chaos created by the dissolution of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires and a continuous blockade from the outside world by the Entente only aggravated it.In this context, new post-Habsburg polities had to fight 'coal hunger' for survival.The only exception was coal self-sufficient Czechoslovakia (Figure 3). 19he coal shortage in Hungary was especially acute.In 1918-9, the amount of coal available in the country fell by a factor of four.Coal ceased to arrive a 'matter of death and life' for post-bellum Hungary, this insight was not sufficiently developed. 21Historical accounts of Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations continued to be structured by the narratives of national struggle, military encounters and Western diplomatic pressure. 22The situation did not change even after 1986, when Czech historian Marta Romportlová demonstrated how profoundly the two countries were linked economically before the Great Depression. 23his study examines the importance of energy connectedness in central European peace-making on the example of the diplomatic relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia from the November 1918 armistice to the Trianon peace treaty of 1920.The former country -Hungary -was heavily dependent on coal imports and was considered by the Entente an 'enemy state '.Between 1918 and 1920, Hungary went through state collapse, multiple revolutions, civil war and foreign invasions.The population under the control of Budapest shrunk from twenty to eight million.The latter state -Czechoslovakia -was rather an important coal exporter, favourably treated by Western powers as an ally.During the same period, it developed from a 'government in exile' into a republic of fourteen million inhabitants, which controlled much of the energy supply in Central Europe.The paper scrutinises Budapest-Prague relations through four sections.The first section sketches the coal situation in Czechoslovakia and its nascent energy diplomacy towards Austria and Hungary.The second section describes how the diplomatic priorities of Hungary changed under the coal shortage.The third section depicts the parallelism of the territorial and coal talks between Budapest and Prague.Finally, the fourth section discloses the energy dimension of negotiations leading to the Trianon treaty of 1920.A brief conclusion reformulates the main argument.

Energy Shortages and Czechoslovak Coal Diplomacy
This section argues that Czechoslovakia was a key player in the Central European fuel supply chain in the early interwar period.As a French diplomat projected in early 1919, 'The mines of Bohemia have been and will increasingly be the main element of the wealth and hegemony of the Czechs, their means of pressure on the neighbouring states.Hungary and Austria cannot live without it'. 24Indeed, the Czech lands had already occupied a remarkable position in regional energy flows for decades.Inside the Habsburg monarchy, most domestic fossil fuel was produced in the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Bohemia proper, Moravia and Czech Silesia).In 1913, when the imperial production of black and brown coal exceeded 17 Mt and 36 Mt, respectively, its Bohemian component amounted to 13 Mt and 22 Mt.The mines in the Czech Silesian Duchy of Teschen (Cieszyn/Těšín) alone provided more than 9 Mt of black coal. 25In late 1918, when the Teschen mines were seized by the Czechs and Poles, it became apparent that 'if Czecho-Slovakia and Poland withhold coal, they can ruin Austria, Hungary and Greater Serbia absolutely '. 26 This energy advantage, and not the democratic appearance of the Czechoslovak regime, its military forces or skilful diplomacy, 27 provides a better clue for the early successes of Czechoslovak state-building and territorial expansion in the Habsburg lands.
Until 1918, the Czech political influence inside Austria-Hungary did not correspond to its economic weight.While the Bohemian lands belonged to the economic core of the empire, they had merely provincial status. 28The Great War boosted the Entente's support for Czech-(Slovak) independence from the Habsburg monarchy -a project popularised by exile Czechs grouped around the ex-Austrian MP Tomáš G. Masaryk and his disciple Edvard Beneš.While both were in emigration, their partners in Prague proclaimed an independent Czechoslovakia on 28 October 1918 and took control over critical local infrastructure, including railways.The new state almost immediately occupied a key position in coal distribution through the Danube valley.Allied with the Entente, Czechoslovak authorities immediately joined the trade blockade against the Central Powers from within the continent.On 31 October 1918, they froze all deliveries heading to Vienna and Budapest through their territory, 29 including coal transports.The Czech action was effective.On 3 November, appointed Foreign Minister Beneš informed the Western powers that Vienna was in the 'hands' of his government, thanks to the breakdown of supplies. 30Two months later, Masaryk, elected president of Czechoslovakia, instructed Beneš that 'if we had enough coal, we could provide it to Vienna, Budapest and the Bavarians, and through that we would have influence over these states '. 31 This understanding only increased the Czechoslovaks' efforts to conquer as many coal mines as possible, including Teschen in Silesia and Salgó-Tarján in Upper Hungary. 32As its territories were enlarged by over eight hundred kilometres to the east by the summer of 1919, the Czechoslovak Republic (hereafter: ČSR) became an even more important transport hub.While Prague's government could count on only around ten thousand soldiers inside Czechoslovakia in late 1918, 33 coal became a major tool of its diplomacy towards neighbouring countries.Energy supply was vital in reaching a compromise with Austria, especially regarding what were called the 'Sudeten territories' of Bohemia, where the Germans constituted an ethnic majority.Until the question of incorporating the Sudetenland into the ČSR was settled, Prague refused to refuel Austria as long as it continued to support the 'German bands' in the Sudeten territories. 34In December 1918, Prague and Vienna reached a first agreement on the supply of coal, which presupposed Austria's consent to the inclusion of the Sudeten territories in Czechoslovakia. 35Some even believe that Prague and Vienna reached a 'deal' whereby Austria renounced its rights to the Sudeten territories in return for coal and grain from the ČSR. 36ut the story of energy relations between Prague and Vienna was not so simple.Throughout 1919 the Czechoslovak authorities changed the volume of coal supplies to Austria multiple times.While Western diplomats suspected that Prague sought to exhaust its neighbours by refusing coal, their Czech counterparts, like Beneš, generally explained that the fluctuations were due to a lack of coal at home. 37Czechoslovakia was indeed affected by the coal shortage between late 1918 and early 1919.Most local mines reduced their output, and many refused to acknowledge Prague's authority. 38In January 1919, railroads and trams cut their services, and 'there was practically no coal for domestic use' in Bohemia. 39The situation was even more problematic in Slovakia.After Czech troops occupied Bratislava in January 1919, its new governor cautioned Prague that in the absence of coal supplies, 'we will be forced to run away'. 40Despite the coal hunger in the eastern parts of republic in the following months, 41 the overall energy balance of Czechoslovakia improved significantly.In February 1919, the government cheered that the railways finally had enough fuel, and it even became possible to sell coal abroad. 42By summer 1919, it was believed that coal production in Czechoslovakia slightly surpassed its normal energy needs. 43he coal supply in Czechoslovakia improved dramatically after the occupation of Teschen in early 1919.Before, the Czechoslovaks pretended that foreign demands for fuel supplies from Prague could be met only if it were able to exploit the mines of Teschen. 44On 10 January 1919, Beneš sent a letter to the French, pledging that 'if we are masters of the Silesian coalfield, which alone is capable of supplying Hungary with coal, we shall be exceedingly happy to be able to give due attention to all these demands'. 45Finally, in late January 1919, the ČSR took Teschen by force, but this raised the question of international allocation of the coal mined there.
The importance of Teschen coal for Central Europe was difficult to overestimate, so the Entente sought to impose international coal obligations on Prague.On 3 March 1919 the Allies ordered the ČSR to supply Poland with the same amount of Teschen coal that had been provided previously. 46In May, an Inter-Allied Coal Commission, charged with the mission of putting 'coal in motion all over Central Europe', was established in Teschen. 47It facilitated the signing of new Austro-Czech contracts on coal deliveries on 13 and 28 May 1919, which guaranteed a supply of 241 thousand tons of coal per month. 48The Allies were pushing Czechoslovakia even further.They proposed that Prague accept guarantees of coal deliveries from Teschen to Austria and Hungary in the peace treaties.As one French diplomat predicted -'at the moment when Czecho-Slovakia receives complete satisfaction with all territorial questions, it would assume this commitment easily'. 49Even though this idea was hardly welcomed in Prague, the principle of coal guarantees was finally fixed in the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty with Austria of 19 September 1919.According to Article 224 of this treaty, Czechoslovakia and Poland assumed the obligation to provide 'reasonable quantities' of coal products to Austria for fifteen years under beneficial trade conditions (including no export duties for three years). 50Despite the Czechoslovak protest, the Allies also approved including similar obligations in the peace treaty draft with Hungary. 51Interestingly, the Hungarian peace delegation at Paris later pointed out the straight 'logic' which the Saint-Germain treaty of 1919 established between Austria's renouncing its territories in favour of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and their providing coal compensation in return. 52It appears that the Allies intended to bind Czechoslovakia's energy hegemony in Central Europe to its obligation to provide energy supplies to its less fortunate neighbours.Yet this policy was hard to implement.At the end of 1919, the American representative at Vienna, Albert Halstead, thought that the Czechs have apparently felt that the more difficult the revival of Austria was made, the better would be the Czechish opportunity to obtain a predominant influence in Southern Central Europe.The very policies pursued at the Peace Conference by the Czechs, and the difficulties since the completion of the Peace Treaty made by Czecho-Slovakia in the matter of the delivery of coal, coincide with the practice of keeping Austria weak. 53en though Vienna and Budapest ceded their northern provinces to Prague in 1918 and 1919, Czech energy diplomacy towards them was initially quite different.While Vienna was indeed receiving a limited number of coal trains from Bohemia (loaded with Czech, German or Polish coal) on a regular basis, Budapest was cut off from Czech supplies until 1920.Why was there such a difference?Perhaps Czechoslovakia needed to favour Austria, as it was the Czech's main transit towards the sea and global trade.But the fear of complete poverty in Austria and its subsequent Anschluss to Germany, shared by Western countries, might have been another major motive for Prague.Urging the Czechoslovaks to send coal to Vienna, the Allies reminded them that the ČSR did not have any interest in 'scarifying Austria to Germany'. 54he coal crisis in Hungary, on the other hand, did not scare Western and Czech diplomats so much, so its international solution appeared less urgent.Prague continued its coal blockade, confirming a British assessment that Czechoslovak statesmen shared the opinion that 'the more the Hungarian misfortunes continue, the more assured will be the position of Czechoslovakia'. 55

Revolutionary Hungary and Foreign Coal Relief Expectations
This section examines the post-1918 coal shortage in Hungary.By stressing the devastating impact of energy scarcity on the functioning of the state, it joins studies challenging ethnic tensions inside the Habsburg empire; misguided Budapest diplomacy; or its military weakness as the only causes for the Trianon boundaries of Hungary.This section advances a new explanation of the state failure in Hungary and its peace-making efforts as a consequence of an energy shortage inside the country (Figure 4).
Up until the early 1920s, Hungary was a net consumer of fossil fuels.In 1913, it extracted 10 Mt of coal (mainly calorically poor lignite), imported an additional 5 Mt of calorically rich coal (3.7 Mt black coal and 1.2 Mt coke), and exported around 0.3 Mt.Coal came mainly from the Prussian and Bohemian parts of Upper Silesia, 56 but considering that it had to use Czech transit railways, Bohemia's role for the external energy security of Hungary was practically monopolistic.
During the First World War, Hungary faced increasing problems with coal supplies.By 1917, domestic production fell below 9 Mt, and the kingdom became more dependent on imports. 57But throughout 1918 Hungary's energy situation worsened further, with coal production decreasing to 5.6 Mt.By the end of the war in October 1918, Hungary was producing 27 thousand tons of coal a day, but, thanks to imports, was consuming 42 thousand. 58However, from late 1918 to mid-1920, foreign coal deliveries halted due to the Czechoslovak blockade.The worst situation was experienced in 1919.Local output decreased from 13 thousand tons per day in January to 6 thousand tons in spring, before increasing to 15 thousand tons in autumn.Annual coal production in 1919 Hungary is estimated at 3.6 Mt. 59 Hungary's dependence on Prussian coal strengthened the loyalty of Budapest to the military alliance with Berlin during the war.One anecdote relates that in late October 1918, Prime Minister of Hungary Sándor Wekerle refused to believe that Emperor-King Charles Habsburg (1916-8) had placed his rival -the leader of the anti-German pacifist opposition in Budapest, Count Mihály Károlyi, at the head of the government.As Wekerle argued, Károlyi had wanted to break relations with Berlin, and 'We cannot do it.Our railways have coal just for four days, and if the Germans stop supplying coal, our railways would stop on the fifth day'. 60Regardless of the veracity of this story, Károlyi indeed replaced Wekerle on 31 October 1918.This happened only days after the start of the Czechoslovak blockade, when the fuel situation in Hungary became catastrophic.By 5 November, the Károlyi government estimated that the country had only enough coal for a day and a half's consumption. 61The first Hungarian envoy to Prague in 1918, Géza Supka, believed that the Czechoslovak disruption of fuel supplies was the reason behind the sudden promotion of Károlyi. 62he Károlyi cabinet immediately declared Hungary's independence and neutrality in the war.Believing Károlyi to be a well-known pro-Entente politician, Hungarian elites expected that his appointment would guarantee Hungary fair treatment by the Western powers. 63The national press optimistically forecasted that the country would soon have enough coal to assure the operation of its industries and railways. 64Seeking to strengthen national energy security, the pacifist government in Budapest begged the Allies for  aid and criticised Czechoslovakia for establishing an unjustified blockade against Hungary.In a message conveyed to US President Woodrow Wilson on 19 November 1918, Károlyi anticipated a disaster: 'If we cannot import coal from outside, our factories will stop and our railways, which have been damaged by the long war, will be forced to suspend their service.It is then that famine will spread all over Hungary'. 65In another communication, addressed to the French on 6 December, the Hungarian cabinet stated that the coal shortage had rendered economic life impossible and put the new democratic order at risk. 66Finally, in a message to the British on 12 December, Károlyi, after repeating that 'our greatest need is coal', cautioned that the country was facing famine and . . .'Bolshevism'. 67rom his very first days in power, Károlyi attempted to connect the issue of coal to making peace with the Entente.On 7 November 1918, during the preliminary discussions of the armistice conditions with the commander of the Allied Army of the Orient, French general François Franchet d'Espèrey, Károlyi agreed with the Allies' occupation of parts of Hungary under the condition that the country's formal territorial integrity and civil administration should be respected until the peace treaty.At the same time, he solicited the Allies to urge Prague to restore coal deliveries to Hungary and demanded that any future armistice between the Entente and Germany include a paragraph obligating Berlin to supply two hundred thousand tons of coal per month to Hungary. 68These desiderata were accepted in part.The French general promised that the Allies would press the Czechs to grant free passage for German coal transports 69 ; he suggested that otherwise coal would soon arrive in Hungary via the Adriatic.The Magyar press covered the preparations for the armistice along the same lines.The mouthpiece of the Hungarian Social-Democrats Népszava, after declaring that 'Hungary from 1 November is not an enemy country, but a neutral country', emphasised the need for 'an immediate remedy to the urgent coal shortage', and pointed out that 'the key to the situation is in the hands of the Czechs and the Poles'. 70n 13 November 1918, Hungary signed a ceasefire with the Entente in Belgrade.Even though the convention stipulated that the territories in the south and southeast of Hungary would be occupied by Entente forces, this 'armistice' consolidated power under Károlyi, who combined popular support with the backing of the former elites.The government began demobilising more than a million soldiers, paring the armed forces down to forty thousand. 71Although the Belgrade convention did not mention the coal issue, the Allies showed some understanding of the Hungarian fuel scarcity and encouraged Prussian or Czech import of coal to Hungary.On 14 December 1918 a formal Hungarian-German agreement on coal was reached, 72 but it did not lead to the resumption of full-scale coal deliveries. 73he Czechoslovak blockade persisted as an unsolved obstacle for Hungary even after Budapest declared its desire to make peace.
The coal shortage underlined the dependence of Hungary on trade relations with territories behind its own borders, but most of all with Czechia.From this moment on, Károlyi and his partisans endorsed a plan of preserving economic cooperation among the former Habsburg areas in a kind of the Danubian (con)federation. 74On 24 November 1918, the government published a proclamation stressing the need to make Czechia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary 'something like one country'. 75In late February 1919, Károlyi continued to plead for renewal of the Habsburg common market and redistribution of urgently needed resources.In his opinion, the blockade and the subsequent coal crisis prompted the Bolshevisation of Hungary. 76While some Allied diplomats and politicians welcomed Károlyi's proposal to create a Danubian Federation out of economic necessity, they generally agreed that nationalist tendencies in Bohemia might delay any regional rapprochement. 77ven though Czechoslovakia itself was suffering from a severe food shortage, coal diplomacy temporally offered Prague bigger advantages.As one American diplomat inferred -'the Czechs seem . . . to be seized with a strong attack of imperialism and a desire to dominate Central Europe'. 78n the eve of New Year 1919, hopes in Budapest were raised by the soon-toarrive Inter-Allied commission, led by US professor Alonzo E. Taylor, and charged with examining the economic crisis in the Habsburg lands. 79The Hungarian press multiplied its appeals for coal assistance.The popular journal Az Est published a desperate call on 1 January 1919: 'We do not have coal, we will not have bread in the spring.Let them [the Entente -A.P.] see reason; we are defeated.We need the victorious people to understand us, help us; they have the flour, coal, food.[. ..].We need peace and life!' 80 When the Taylor group arrived in former Habsburg lands on 1 January 1919, its British member, William Henry Beveridge, noted that they had 'a sort of feeling that we were coming to a desert'. 81In Budapest, the mission learnt from the Hungarian officials 'a most depressing account of the general economic situation'.In Károlyi's words, that actual situation was 'intolerable and hopeless'. 82fter departure, Beveridge forecasted that 'if Budapest is left to itself it will sooner or later explode'. 83Beveridge called upon London to assist the successor states with food and fuel, and to encourage them to enter into economic union.Similarly, Taylor argued in his report that any return to economic prosperity without restoring the previous commercial network would be impossible, like trying to 'unscramble an omelette'.He further advised that the blockade be lifted to assure rail and river transportation and to distribute Silesian coal to Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. 84hile the Czechs continued their blockade, in March 1919, the Allies decided to assist Budapest with coal from the mines of the Southern Hungarian city of Pécs, occupied by the Yugoslavs in late 1918. 85The simultaneity of the coal and territorial bargaining is striking.After Belgrade promised to deliver coal to Hungary on 19 March 1919, 86 the very next day the Entente demanded that Budapest accept a substantial extension of Romania's zone of occupation in the east of the country. 87Károlyi rejected this demand and handed power to the Social Democrats.Joined by the Communists, they formed a new 'Soviet' government in Budapest on 21 March.At first, its leaders rejected new territorial demands.But by the end of March 1919, the Soviets agreed to recognise 'important cessions of territory to Roumanians, Jugo Slavs and Czechs provided economic unity of late Austro-Hungarian monarchy except Galicia be maintained'. 88In early April 1919, the Communist chief Béla Kun and his entourage pledged a new Inter-Allied mission led by General Jan Smuts to end the Entente blockade of Hungary, to send coal and food, and to organise a conference of regional states in Vienna or Prague in order to solve political and economic problems. 89As Smuts summarised in his final report, 'They, therefore, pressed very strongly that the settlement of political frontiers should be accompanied by a simultaneous arrangement of economic questions'. 90On his return trip to Paris, Smuts went to Prague, where he unsuccessfully attempted to convince President Masaryk that the Hungarians were not so interested in the frontiers, but looking forward to economic rearrangements, especially regarding coal supplies. 91cared by the proliferation of communist revolts across Europe, the Entente looked for a way to topple the Hungarian soviet regime.Coal was useful here as well.As the Allies were reluctant to move their Balkan troops against Red Budapest, the distribution of food and fuel were designed to encourage the decommunisation of Hungary.'It is rather like holding out a piece of sugar to get a canary back into its cage, but in the absence of a considerable force here there is not much else that we can do', wrote one British general in Belgrade. 92But Romania and Czechoslovakia launched offensives against Hungary of their own, which pushed Hungarian Bolshevik leader Béla Kun to accept their territorial claims on 1 May 1919.'In exchange', he wrote, 'we demand the immediate end of hostilities, non-intervention in our internal affairs . . ., free trade and signing of economic treaties'. 93This appeal was rejected, and in July 1919, the Hungarian Socialists entered into secret talks in Vienna with the Allies over removing Kun from power in return for lifting the blockade and sending provisions and coal. 94As French Prime Minister George Clemenceau explained to other Entente leaders on 26 July, 'Offering supplies in exchange for peaceful conduct will be a sure weapon in our hands. . . .We surround this country (Hungary -A.P.) completely and sooner or later it will have to pass where we want'. 95The same day, the Allies published a declaration which stipulated that Hungary would benefit from supplies, the end of the blockade, the opening of commerce and the restoration of peace, only if it were ruled by a representative government. 96On 1 August Kun resigned, and a Socialist government prearranged in Vienna assumed power.Nevertheless, it did not stop the Romanian army from entering Budapest on 4 August.They backed a new coup, which led to the formation of the right-wing István Friedrich government.The revanchism of Friedrich, who did not hide his ambitions to reclaim Slovak territories, displeased the Entente and the Czechs once again.Pointing to Friedrich as an inacceptable man for the Entente, many Magyar voices accused him of prolonging the blockade of Hungary. 97he unsolved coal crisis made the position of Budapest more vulnerable after the arrival of colder temperatures.As the Paris conference refused to provide coal before the signing of a peace treaty, 98 the Hungarians turned all their hopes to speeding up negotiations.In November 1919, through the mediation of the freshly appointed British minister to Prague, Sir George Clerk, Friedrich resigned.A new government was formed, which finally received an invitation to the peace conference.At the same time, the Romanians agreed to withdraw from Budapest and central Hungary.Almost immediately (on 5 December 1919), the Entente powers agreed that the peace treaty with Hungary would stipulate the obligation of Czechoslovakia to 'impose no export duty or restriction of any kind to the exportation of coal or lignite to Hungary' for five years after the peace treaty entered into force. 99hat, in addition to the stipulated return of the Pécs mines occupied by the Serbs, was considered to be a major guarantee of Hungary's energy security.These peace conditions, some Magyars argued in January 1920, would almost guarantee that Hungary could meet its demand for coal. 100

Towards the Budapest-Prague Deal on Slovakia and Coal
This section underlines the connections between Hungarian-Czechoslovakian coal and territorial talks.It argues that in the face of the post-war coal crisis, the main rescue plan for Budapest was to restore the previous intensive trade networks, namely supply chains linking Hungary to the Silesian mines.To achieve this goal, an accord with Czechoslovakia, located between these mines and Hungary, was indispensable.But there was a price.As one key figure in the events of 1918-9 later evoked, each coal waggon from Bohemia was to be paid for with Hungarian territory. 101This assertion constitutes the chief assumption of this third section and of the entire piece.
Three days after Czechoslovak independence was proclaimed in Prague on 28 October 1918, Hungarian independence was declared.The new Budapest government first hypothesised that the termination of hostilities with the Allies would guarantee a swift compromise with Bohemia.On 5 November 1918, Hungarian ministers assumed that the Czechs were blocking coal in order to force Budapest to disarm the German troops remaining in Hungary. 102To clarify the situation, Budapest immediately established direct contacts with the Czechoslovaks.As early as 7 November 1918, newly appointed Hungarian envoy to Prague Supka petitioned the Czechs to recognise Hungary's territorial integrity 'formally' and to ensure the delivery of coal. 103Another Hungarian delegation went to Teschen, 104 and finally, Budapest hosted a Czechoslovak mission, led by Slovak politician Emil Stodola.But Stodola, who acknowledged that the Hungarians were experiencing coal shortages and were ready to make new concessions every day, advised that Prague occupy Slovakia immediately. 105A few days later, Prague sent troops to western Slovakia, but the Hungarian military quickly repelled them to the tiny borderland areas. 106espite this incident, Budapest maintained a pacifist standpoint.On 12 November 1918, Károlyi issued a declaration urging for peace: 'Hungary is not at war with the Czecho-Slovak state, but wishes to live in the best neighbouring relations with the free and independent Czech Republic'. 107he next step was to restore direct contacts with the ČSR via new emissaries.The government appointed another official representative to Prague, Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry Rezső Krejcsi, charged with establishing economic relations with Czechoslovakia. 108In addition, it approved the establishment of a 'Hungarian Coal Centre' in Prague. 109The government wished to ensure the complete evacuation of the Czech troops from Western Slovakia in exchange for food supplies to Bohemia and Slovak autonomy inside Hungary. 110However, neither of these offers was able to bear fruit.The autonomy of Slovakia and food was not enough for Prague to unlock its blockade.As Minister of Trade Ernő Garami recognised on 24 November, 'the most burning and the most difficult question is still the coal shortage'. 111he domestic energy crisis pushed Budapest to multiply its efforts for the sake of détente with Prague.The local press started preparing public opinion to accept the need for territorial concessions in favour of Czechoslovakia.A Népszava editorial of 29 November 1918 argued that: '[The Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict] has to stop, it should be finished, because it is in the interest of the Czechs, the Slovaks and the Magyars.We need coal, the Czechs require some of our products, and all of us need peace'. 112On 5 December 1918 the Karolyi government appealed with a manifest to the public to stand behind its peaceful diplomacy.This policy aimed at assuring food and coal needs and creating 'a reasonable agreement with our nationalities, which will win sympathies and respect of our neighbours, even of our enemies, for the Magyar nation'. 113This manifest is important for two reasons.First, it links pacifist Hungarian diplomacy with the government's expectations of foreign supplies.Second, it was published just after Budapest agreed to cede Slovakia to Prague's control (on 3 December 1918), but before Czech troops advanced towards the East. 114On 6 December Budapest outlined which parts of Slovakia should be occupied by the ČSR in a joint document with the Czechoslovak envoy to Budapest, Milan Hodža. 115The same day, Hodža gave an interview to Népszava, promising that 'the solution of the Slovak question would quickly open possibilities for solution of the coal issue by the Prague government'. 116In confirmation, the Hungarian Coal Centre in Prague announced that it had reached a 'basic understanding' with the Czechs on coal supplies. 117The simultaneity of references to solving coal hunger in Hungary with Bohemian assistance at the moment of ceding Slovakia to Czech rule in early December 1918 certainly gives the impression that the two issues were connected -one would not go without the other.
The harsh truth was that the Czech coal transports amounted only to about two or three hundred waggons per day, which could not replace the previous 1700 waggons of imported coal.Shortly afterwards these trains stopped arriving.While the Czechoslovaks complained that it was impossible to renew coal deliveries to Hungary due to the lack of fuel in Bohemia, 118 the Hungarians interpreted the disruption differently.On 20 December 1918, Hungarian Coal Commissioner Jenő Vázsonyi complained bitterly that 'It seems that the Czechs, through the coal withdrawal, are seeking to obtain political results by exerting pressure'. 119Károlyi also despaired; in his eyes, the Belgrade ceasefire which he had negotiated two months earlier was being violated.He lamented: 'The [Belgrade] agreement guaranteed that the turnover of goods and trade would remain uninterrupted, and that the demarcation lines would not be customs borders.The opposite happened.Had I only suspected that the agreement would be interpreted in this way, I would never ever have signed it'. 120On 29 December 1918, Budapest decided not to take any measures in favour of Czechoslovakia as long as it continued blocking coal deliveries. 121he fuel shortage in Bohemia was probably not the main reason for reducing the amount of coal supplied to Hungary.Prague still considered the border question with Hungary to be open, and Beneš was asking the Entente to enlarge the Czechoslovakian zone of occupation.On 22 December 1918, the Allies issued a new demarcation line for Slovakia, where the Czechs were allowed to occupy the cities of Bratislava, Komarno, Košice and Užhorod, and access the Danube.The Károlyi government accepted this decision as well. 122owever, Czech aspirations went beyond even the new demarcation.In the early 1919, using a combination of ethnic and strategic reasoning, the Prague government envisaged expanding its zone of interest in Hungary all the way to Budapest-Vac and Salgó-Tarján-Miskolc in the south, and Sighetu Marmației in the east. 123wnership of the Salgó-Tarján mines, which provided a quarter of Hungarian domestic coal production in late 1918, 124 became the hottest point of territorial contention between Budapest and Prague.Although the Entente was more inclined to leave this mining centre in Hungary, the idea to attach it remained popular in Czechoslovakia. 125When the Czechoslovak military crossed the demarcation line with Hungary on 20 January 1919 and seemingly began preparing to seize Salgó-Tarjan, 126 Budapest sent its troops to Salgó-Tarján with orders to protect it against the Czechs by 'all means'. 127By the end of the month, the Czech troops retreated, but the conflict over Salgó-Tarján was still visibly open.
Nevertheless, Budapest was keen to pursue economic rapprochement with Prague.On 23 January 1919, it ordered another attempt to open trade with the Czechs. 128The next day, the Hungarian representative in Prague, Krejcsi, contacted President Masaryk with the proposal that the ČSR and Hungary work out a temporary agreement based on exchanging food and goods. 129But for its benevolence, Prague expected Budapest to recognise the Czechoslovak sovereignty in its new provinces, or even to abandon new territories.In early February 1919, the ČSR envoy in Budapest Hodža had unofficially suggested that Hungary should 'recognise' Slovakia if it wanted to receive coal from Bohemia. 130This offer was restated officially on 11 February 1919 by the Entente representative in Budapest Colonel Ferdinand Vix.In his memorandum for the Budapest government, Vix proposed reopening Czech-Hungarian trade under the understanding that Budapest would 'make note of' the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.The Hungarian reply was evasive.Budapest refused to acknowledge the de-jure loss of Slovakia. 131But inside governmental circles, it was specified that the relations with the Czechoslovaks were necessary in order to improve conditions for the population. 132he establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in March 1919 deteriorated relations between Budapest and Prague.Immediately, the Czechs sought to expand its zone of occupation over Hungary's northeastern province of Ruthenia and beyond Salgó-Tarján. 133On 27 April 1919, the Czechoslovak forces began their invasion of Ruthenia.At first, the soviets did not offer any resistance.The Magyar Red Army left Ruthenia, and on 1 May, the Communist chairman, Béla Kun, telegraphed to Prague that Hungary recognised their 'national and territorial claims'.In return, Kun demanded an end to their military intervention, 134 and offered that Masaryk sign agreements on the free transit of goods and on the protection of minority rights. 135Moreover, on 6 May, Kun went to Bratislava, where he proposed to recognise the demarcation line as a new final frontier, provided the Czechs would recognise his government and send coal. 136rague-Budapest relations escalated dramatically when Czechoslovak troops once again attempted to seize Salgó-Tarján.The Magyar Red Army repelled the Czech attacks on 2, 12, 14-16 and 17-19 May, 137 and launched a massive counter-offensive on 20 May 1919.The fear for Salgó-Tarján seems to be an essential motive in Budapest's decision to escalate the war. 138The Red Army managed to repel the Czechs and move deeper into eastern Slovakia. 139evertheless, the soviets abstained from exploiting their military success, and withdrew their troops behind a new demarcation line established by the Allies on 13 June 1919.It expanded Czechoslovak rule over Ruthenia, but not over Salgó-Tarján.Budapest and Prague formally accepted the new line, but skirmishes between their troops continued until a truce at the end of July.Subsequently, Hungary's Deputy Foreign Minister Péter Ágoston went to Bratislava to discuss the coal issue again, 140 but did not succeed in bringing new fuels to Hungary.In August 1919, when the soviet regime collapsed in Hungary, the Czech troops finally occupied Salgó-Tarján.
In autumn 1919, relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia only worsened.Hungary's new Prime Minister Friedrich (August -November 1919) considered a military return of Slovakia to Hungarian rule with the help of Romania and Poland. 141The Czechs applied an almost identical tactic.Prague reflected on a new military campaign to Budapest, hosted Magyar émigrés on its soil (including Károlyi) and assisted anti-Friedrich groups in Hungary. 142Once again, coal was used as leverage.The Czechoslovaks agreed to discuss with their new partners among Magyar socialists the possibility of supplying coal to Hungary, but not as long as Friedrich was in power. 143nder domestic and international pressure, Friedrich resigned on 24 November 1919.The Entente also ordered the ČSR to withdraw its troops from Salgó-Tarján, and Prague complied. 144Moreover, on 28 November 1919, Prague signed an agreement with Budapest on coal deliveries.Worrying that the agreement might be annulled, Hungarian Prime Minister Huszár called upon his ministers to refrain from any revanchist statements that might displease Prague. 145Three weeks later, Huszár urged his cabinet to move Hungary out of diplomatic isolation by improving relations with Prague.Apparently, the Entente was well-disposed towards Czechoslovakia, which could supply coal or even relinquish some of the Hungarian territories it occupied. 146Meeting the Czechoslovak representatives in Budapest in December 1919, Huszár tried to convince them that Hungary was sincerely willing to establish friendly relations with Czechoslovakia.Huszár assured that Hungary would sign a peace treaty despite quasi-certitude that her millenary 'territorial integrity' would not be respected. 147Although Czechoslovakia stopped sending fuel to Hungary in January 1920, 148 Magyar expectations that the peace deal would make a change in resolving the coal famine remained high.

Peace-Making, Economic Revival and Coal
This last section takes a closer look into the diplomatic background of the preparation of the peace treaty of Trianon in 1920.Compared to 1919, Hungary's political situation was relatively consolidated in 1920.A new parliament dominated by right-wing parties gathered in Budapest in February 1920.It called for restoration of the monarchy and granted supreme power to the regent Miklós Horthy.Historiography usually stresses the anticipations of the Horthyist regime in early 1920 that the negotiated peace treaty would be followed by the return of some occupied territories, especially those with significant Magyar populations. 149This focus on territorial readjustments, however, overlooks the weight of trade as a driver towards peace.Retrospectively, one French analysis of 1921 argued that economic advantages had outweighed the grief of territorial loses in Budapest and pushed it to accept peace in Versailles. 150As this section demonstrates, Budapest's primary motivation, thanks to the Trianon terms, was to re-start commerce with neighbouring countries, including obtaining coal via Czechoslovakia.
'The source of all our problems is that the world did not recognise us and continues ignoring us now', affirmed Prime Minister Huszár at the first session of the newly opened Hungarian parliament on 16 February 1920. 151he re-establishment of diplomatic relations and economic and financial cooperation with the 'outside world' was also a chief benefit for Hungary's signing the peace treaty, according to the analysis by Albert Apponyi, chief of the Hungarian delegation at Paris, dated 24 March 1920.Disregarding formal peace-making, Apponyi stressed the need to acknowledge that the territorial stipulations of the future peace treaty had 'already entered into force, and it is not in our power to change this situation'. 152The day before, when the delegation discussed possible consequences for Hungary in case it refused to sign the treaty, most voices, including that of Apponyi, pointed out the tightening of the blockade and the consequent economic disaster. 153Thus, the objective of returning from international isolation was probably persuasive enough for Hungary's counter-revolutionary masterminds Pál Teleki and István Bethlen to 'reject all territorial claims temporarily'. 154On 10 May 1920, presenting the peace treaty text to the parliament, Foreign Minister Teleki recognised that the 'treaty is bad, very bad', but also highlighted that the Entente powers were willing to support the restoration of 'old economic circulation' across the region. 155he idea that Hungary was ready to sign the peace treaty because of expected territorial revisions is usually based on a particular interpretation of the secret French-Hungarian talks in 1920.The wider framework of the negotiations was linked to the idea of a pro-French orientation of Budapest in exchange for Paris's backing in reaching a basic understanding between Hungary and its neighbours. 156Hungarian businessman Károly Halmos, who was related to the French Minister of Reconstruction and President of the European Coal Commission Leon Loucheur, acted as the main negotiator on behalf of Budapest.These conversations indeed touched upon the Hungarian dissatisfaction with the new borders, but as its main French antagonist, General Secretary of the French Foreign Ministry Maurice Paléologue, emphasised to Halmos on 19 March 1920, 'you should count more on economic concessions than on the territorial concessions'. 157egarding the lost provinces, Paléologue repeatedly told Halmos that their arrangements could not affect the decisions of the peace conference, and that territorial revisions would be possible only with the approval of Hungary's neighbours. 158conomic issues appeared to structure the Paléologue-Halmos meetings.In exchange for French mediation aimed at the re-establishment of 'reciprocal transport freedom' in Central Europe, Budapest was ready to make concessions related to rail and water transport, hydropower, and banking to the French holding Schneider-Creusot.The latter had recently acquired important industrial assets in Czechoslovakia and Upper Silesia, including the giant manufacturing concern Škoda, and wanted to exploit and link the regional economies.The negotiations were concluded successfully in July 1920. 159As the director of Schneider-Creusot, Armand Eugène Saint-Sauveur, recognised himself -'Hungary cannot live in her new borders and without economic accords with her neighbours. . ..[Hungary has] No minerals, no coal, no wood, no petrol'. 160By conceding Magyar railways to the French, Budapest may have envisioned the idea of ensuring its fuel supplies, as Schneider owned coal mines in the Teschen region, Berg und Hutten. 161Linking French-owned industry in Bohemia with its new assets in Hungary may suggest that a chief objective of the Paléologue-Halmos talks was Czechoslovak-Hungarian rapprochement.
The French desire to see the normalisation of relations between Budapest and Prague, or even an alliance, was expressed at the beginning of the secret French-Hungarian talks in late 1919.Halmos seemed to be the right man for these negotiations.A proponent of rapprochement with the ČSR, he even advised occupying Budapest with Czech troops in December 1918. 162A pact with Prague, as Hungarian diplomat Andor Semsey remarked, would imply 'significant territorial concessions' by Hungary to Czechoslovakia, but might lead to compensations obtained from Romania. 163Semsey, who seconded Halmos in these talks, remembered that 'we thought of the problems between Hungary and Czechoslovakia as easy to solve'. 164Introducing the director of Schneider Saint-Sauveur to Halmos and Semsey in March 1920, Paléologue promised to open talks with the Czechs as well. 165he signature of the peace treaty with Hungary was accompanied by a 'carrot and stick' approach to coal.In February 1920, the Allied Reparation Commission prescribed sending twenty thousand tonnes of Silesian coal to Hungary.In April it allocated thirty thousand more. 166These deliveries had to pass through the ČSR and required approval from Prague.But the ČSR postponed discussions with Budapest until the peace treaty had been signed. 167As Foreign Minister Beneš explained to the French on 12 May 1920, the ČSR even counted on the introduction of Hungary's blockade as a means of exerting pressure if Budapest refused sign the peace treaty.Otherwise, Beneš confirmed that Prague and Budapest would be able to 'normalise mutual economic relations' after the peace treaty. 168Around the same time, the ČSR increased tariffs on the export of coal by 150%.This measure was echoed immediately in Budapest.On 19 May 1920, chairman of the National Hungarian Trade Corporation, parliamentary delegate Pál Sándor, reminded the Hungarian parliament that 'we absolutely need this black coal, we should absolutely import it.There is no secret here'. 169At the same time, Czechoslovakia was expected to benefit mutually from opening trade with Hungary.As Teleki recalled later, '[w]ith Hungarian pourparlers went on for months, during which time Hungary could not get coal except by a roundabout route, Czechoslovakia, for its part, imported wheat from China'. 170Altogether, the French investments in Central Europe, the Silesian coal allocations, not to mention the export of its own production, probably were incentives enough to accept the peace treaty in Budapest.
The peace deal in Paris was also a coal deal.The Trianon treaty of 4 June 1920 implied that Budapest renounced sovereignty over its former provinces (including Slovakia and Ruthenia, which joined Czechoslovakia), but also obliged Czechoslovakia and Poland to provide coal to Hungary. 171mmediately after the signature, Budapest sent its representative to Silesia to supervise shipments of coal to Hungary. 172Perhaps equally important for Hungary was the decision the Western powers on 26 July 1920 to leave the Teschen mines in the possession of Czechoslovakia.This implied that Teschen coal would be also shared with its former Habsburg consumers -Austria, Hungary and Poland.As one US diplomat predicted: 'The proper settlement of the Teschen question will do more towards stabilising conditions in Central Europe than any one act' which great powers may take in Paris. 173Indeed, the regional distribution of Teschen coal might be regarded as an essential element to restoring peace in Central Europe and pacifying Prague-Budapest relations.
After the Trianon treaty and the Teschen settlement, Budapest anticipated that its energy situation would rapidly improve.Part of this expectation was derived from the French promise to help Hungary obtain Teschen coal. 174On 22 September 1920, Teleki, now Prime Minister, assured the parliament that the French had guaranteed the rapid import of Czech coal into Hungary.Nevertheless, his predictions that 'our situation in winter will be remarkably better' proved wrong. 175The cold season of 1920-1 was still difficult.The amount of coal from Silesia supplied to Hungary was below the demand. 176ut from 1921 the situation improved.Following direct negotiations between Beneš and Teleki in March and June 1921, Hungary concluded a new coal trade agreement with Czechoslovakia. 177Czechoslovakia rapidly became Hungary's chief trading partner, mostly due to the import of coal and export of its foodstuffs. 178Some years later, a high-ranking Hungarian ex-diplomat, Gusztáv Gratz, even suggested uniting Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the same way as the former Austria-Hungary. 179Only under the Great Depression and a subsequent trade war from 1931 between the two countries did their commercial exchange drop significantly, remaining low until the Second World War. 180Under these circumstances, the successful campaign of border revision in favour of Hungary in the 1930s only facilitated the erasure of the memories of previous economic interdependence between the two countries.

Conclusions
Similar to previous wars in Europe, the Great War brought new territorial settlements.But unlike all previous wars, as French historian Georges-Henri Soutou reminds us, it also produced a first international settlement of transborder energy flows at the Paris peace conference. 181It is well known that coalsharing dominated discussions between Germany, France, Belgium and Italy for many years after November 1918.Surprisingly, the story of European coal interdependence, turned by the war into the European coal shortage, is yet unwritten.This paper contributes to reducing this gap by analysing the impacts of coal scarcity on Central Europe.Foremost, it called attention to the double position of Czechoslovakia, as both a major coal producer in the post-Habsburg region and the main transit area for fuel transport from Germany and Poland to other Danube nations.This position gave Prague incredible leverage over neighbouring Austria and Hungary.The Czechoslovak blockade against these 'enemy countries' in November 1918 provoked a sudden 'energy shock' in Austria and Hungary, followed by their withdrawal from the war against the Entente and complete demise.As it was argued earlier, the dependence of Hungary and Austria on coal supplies from or via Czechoslovakia was also a chief motive that further pushed them to accept peace terms and large territorial concessions in favour of Prague.Austria had to abandon the Sudetenland, and Hungary left Slovakia and Ruthenia.
Central European fuel-sharing was far from a perfect deal and took time to bring fruits.No written agreements (or none that have been found) clearly stipulated exchanging fuels for territories, but the idea that coal would be supplied after the settlement of borders was widespread.Crucially important were the peace treaties of Saint-Germain and of Trianon in 1919-20 (as well as the Paris agreement of 28 July 1920 over the Teschen coalfields).These laid down new borders for Habsburg successor states, but also obliged Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Austria to share coal.The logic of this fuel-for-territories exchange is also apparent in other cases.The mines of Pécs, taken by the Serbs in November 1918, were formally promised to Hungary under the Trianon terms.In practise, the return of Pécs to the control of Budapest was linked to the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from western Hungary (Burgenland) -assigned by the peace treaties to Austria.The exchange of Burgenland for Pécs passed in August 1921, one year after the Trianon peace.This exchange of territories hardly can be explained by military pressure by Austria over Hungary or by Hungary over Serbia.But the desire of the regional trade restauration provides such an explanation.
Coal remained a sore point for Hungary in the subsequent years.When new tensions were rising, as during the two failed attempts of King Charles Habsburg to regain the Hungarian throne in 1921, Budapest feared disruptions to coal supplies and/or the Czech and Serbian reoccupation of Salgó-Tarján and Pécs. 182The circumstances of Charles's first restoration attempts led a French observer to note that 'more than one Magyar, no doubt, will think with reason that the country can more easily do without a king than without coal'. 183Due largely to Czech-Yugoslav pressure, the Habsburgs were dethroned in Budapest in November 1921.At the end, coal seems more important not only than a national affiliation to peripheral territories, but also more than the dynastic loyalty rallied by the Horthy regime.The Hungarian possession of near border mines remained highly dependent on Budapest's acceptance of the post-1918 status quo.In fact, the area around Salgó-Tarján was the last of the Trianon frontiers of Hungary where delimitation was carried out (only in 1923).Overall, as the case of post-1918 Hungary demonstrates, basic material needs trumped more abstract political (or nationalist) appeals.
abroad.The richest domestic mines were occupied by foreigners -Salgó-Tarján by the Czechs, Zsil and Anina by the Romanians, and Pécs by the Serbs.The output in other mines decreased drastically.Without fuel, most communication and industry stopped; as one attested in February 1919, due to the lack of coal and despite food stocks in Hungary, 'famine stares everyone in the eye'.
Figure 1.Coal Production in Europe (without Russia) in1878-1938, in Mt.Sourced from: Brian  R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, Europe.1750-1988.3dedition(MacMillan, 1992), 417-21.from 20Procuring coal as fast as possible became a vital mission for anybody who wanted to bring order to Hungary.Although the Hungarian historian Lajos Reményi asserted back in 1969 that the supply of Czech coal was Figure 3. Coal Distress in Central Europe in September 1919.Left column (blue): coal production in 1913 (in Mt); central column (red): estimated coal needs for 1919 (equals to consumption in 1913); right column (green): coal production forecast for 1919.Sourced from Organisation of American Relief, 691.