China’s foreign policy rhetoric between orchestration and cacophony

Abstract Xi Jinping cast himself as the sole herald of China’s foreign policy. Following his lead, many observers base their assessments of the Chinese government’s intentions on his statements alone. However, China’s foreign policy rhetoric is still shaped by various actors within the government. This article examines variation in China’s foreign policy rhetoric by examining how China’s national interest is constructed and whether it has become more consistent the longer Xi Jinping is in office through quantitative and qualitative content analyses. It finds significant differences in emphasis between policy-making levels and between the General Secretary/State President, Premier, State Council Information Office, and Foreign Minister. Hence, to decipher China’s foreign policy intentions, researchers should also consider foreign policy statements by actors other than the General Secretary and be attentive to differences in statements by different actors.


Introduction
Examining how China's national interest is constructed offers insights into how domestic actors shape China's foreign policy and communicate it to the outside world.Against the backdrop of the increasing centralization of political power in China and its repercussions for the foreign policy process, many scholars question whether Chinese domestic actors other than the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary still have any say on China's foreign policy (Chin, 2021;Lin, 2019;Wang, 2017Wang, , 2019)).This article understands China's national interest as constructed.It compares the should be expected between their statements.Nevertheless, the documented variation in China's foreign policy rhetoric provides evidence for the fragmentation of China's foreign policy processes and hints at debates within the Chinese government.There might be vibrant debates internally if there are differences in what is communicated to the outside.The paper hence offers a peek inside the closed Chinese system.While the substantial divergence between policy levels indicates that Chinese foreign policy rhetoric remains fragmented, the fluctuations in the degree of divergence show that there are attempts to make Chinese foreign policy rhetoric more coherent and that, at times, these attempts succeed.The fact that the ranking of the components of the construction of China's national interest is largely consistent across foreign policy actors provides evidence for the centralization of political power.The smallest divergence between the General Secretary and other actors shows that he guides China's overall foreign policy rhetoric.However, the considerable divergence in how much emphasis different actors put on the different components of China's national interest over time shows that underneath the top level, there is considerable divergence between foreign policy actors, especially between the Premier and others.
The article proceeds as follows.The next section situates the article in the literature on China's foreign policy and the involvement of domestic actors.For the analytical framework, it first discusses changes in China's foreign policy process before introducing the actors who are shaping China's foreign policy rhetoric, that is, the CCP General Secretary/State President, the Premier, the State Council Information Office, and the Foreign Minister, and how recent changes in China's political system affected them.Then, the section introduces the conceptualization of the construction of the national interest that the article draws upon.Before presenting results from the empirical analysis, the next section briefly introduces the data the analysis is based on and how it was analyzed.In the following sections, the relative salience of the different components of the construction of China's national interest and discrepancies between policy-making levels and foreign policy actors are described and interpreted.After mapping the evolution of China's foreign policy rhetoric over time, the article zooms in on note-worthy shifts in policy substance.The final section then summarizes the article's main findings, discusses implications for future research about China's foreign policy, and addresses the study's limitations.

China's foreign policy (rhetoric) and the involvement of domestic actors
Much scholarship on China's foreign policy examines China's foreign policy rhetoric.In this literature, it is fairly common to zoom in on one foreign policy actor and, consequently, conceive of China as a unitary actor (for a valuable exception, see Smith, 2021).Many researchers, for instance, examine Xi Jinping's speeches as pars pro toto for China's foreign policy rhetoric (Nathan & Zhang, 2022;Poh & Li, 2017).Some authors draw attention to other foreign policy actors, for example, through examinations of the annual government work report (You et al., 2010) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press conferences (Dai & Luqiu, 2022;Mochtak & Turcsanyi, 2021).While these assessments offer valuable accounts of how China's foreign policy rhetoric changed over the past decades, they miss differences in rhetoric between different foreign policy actors.
In contrast, in scholarship on foreign policy-making in China, the involvement of a broad range of domestic actors is widely documented (see, for example, Duggan, 2019).Jones (2019) demonstrates that state authority is increasingly fragmented, decentralized, and internationalized (2019, p. 579).According to him, due to fragmentation and internationalization, agencies whose activities used to be purely domestic are now increasingly involved in foreign policy-making in different policy fields, including the PLA, the Ministries of Defense and Public Security, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China, the National Development of Reform Commission, policy banks, the CCP International Liaison Department, and state-owned enterprises (ibid, p. 586).Extensive decentralization resulted in many national-level agencies having local counterparts at the provincial level who also began to be involved in foreign policy-making (Jones, 2019).As a result, a wide range of domestic actors, from state to societal actors, are involved in China's foreign policy-making.
Based on the existing literature, the CCP General Secretary/State President, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and different ministries are the most important state actors shaping China's foreign policy.Many scholars link the transformation of China's foreign policy to Xi Jinping's beliefs in China's historical destiny to play 'a global role commensurate with its growing power and influence on the global stage' (Zhang, 2017, p. 120) and his conviction that 'history was irreversibly on China's side' and that 'a world anchored in Chinese power would produce a more just international order' (Rudd, 2022).Char and Bitzinger (2018) specify that Xi Jinping is not only 'harnessing the PLA as his personal domestic powerbase,' but he is also using it 'as a foreign policy tool complementing China's hard economic assets ' (2018, p. 842).From interviews with PLA generals, Jaeho (2013) learns that while the PLA cannot dictate China's foreign policy, they are an important pillar of the Chinese regime (2013, p. 476).Ji (2014) argues that 'the PLA does not influence Chinese foreign policy-making but is an integral part of it ' (2014, p. 236).Applying the bureaucratic politics approach to studying Chinese foreign policy, Lai and Kang (2014) highlight three aspects scholars should pay attention to, the agencies involved, their respective responsibilities, and how inter-agency coordination takes place.They argue that in many areas, specifically trade, finance, economy, climate change, soft power, and military affairs, other ministries and bureaucratic agencies than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have come to exert significant and growing influence (Lai & Kang, 2014, p. 294f.).Bureaucratic politics has been used extensively to explain China's position in the South China Sea maritime disputes.For example, Jones (2017) argues that the MFA and the military's parochial interests shaped domestic contestations over China's role in the South China Sea during the 1980s (2017, p. 362f).Zhang (2019) even points out that the rivalry between these two actors and the maritime law-enforcement agencies threatened the effectiveness of China's foreign strategy (2019, p. 780).
To sum up, domestic actors' involvement in China's foreign policy-making is well documented.However, the existing literature focuses on concrete policy decisions instead of broader trends in China's foreign policy rhetoric.Building on the literature about Chinese domestic actors' involvement in China's foreign policy-making, this article provides a systematic and in-depth assessment of selected government actors' influence on China's foreign policy rhetoric captured through the construction of China's national interest.

Domestic political change and the construction of China's national interest
This section details changes in China's political environment under Xi Jinping and how these changes affected China's foreign policy process.Then, it zooms in on the four shapers of China's foreign policy rhetoric that this article focuses on the CCP General Secretary/State President, the Premier, the State Council Information Office, and the Foreign Minister.It details each actor's involvement in foreign policy-making and how the political changes under Xi affected the actor.Lastly, the section details how the construction of China's national interest is conceptualized and relates to other conceptions of the national interest in the literature.

Changes in China's foreign policy process
The shift from collective leadership to personalistic rule and the return to the Maoist idea that 'the party leads all' are important changes in China's political environment under Xi Jinping that seriously affect the foreign policy process.Xi Jinping consolidated his power quickly after assuming office (Baranovitch, 2021;Lee, 2017), which is visible in the fact that he was named the 'core' of the party leadership much earlier than his predecessors and managed to promote close aids and key supporters to important positions (Cabestan, 2019).Under 'collective leadership', each member of the Politburo Standing Committee used to oversee one policy era.In principle, key policy-making bodies were supposed to make decisions based on a majority vote or consensus.By establishing coordinating agencies, such as the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms and the Central National Security Commission, all chaired by Xi Jinping, he effectively dismantled the system of collective leadership.Instead, he 'increasingly divested himself of the existing intra-party checks and balances and established himself as the leader with 'the final say on all major policy issues' (D€ uben, 2020, p. 112).In addition, his name and ideology have already been enshrined in the party constitution.He abolished the term limits on the State Presidency in the state constitution and, more importantly, broke with the tradition of informally appointing his successor (Economy, 2018), and stayed in power for a third term.Apart from the return to personalistic rule, Xi Jinping deepened the concentration of power in the party's hands to the detriment of the state, mainly through the 'Plan for Deepening Reform of Party Institutions' (Cabestan, 2019).According to Cabestan, this plan aimed to strengthen the 'leading' and the 'management role of the Party' (Cabestan, 2019, p. 4).
The centralization of political power in foreign policy-making under Xi Jinping resulted in the General Secretary himself and party bodies increasing their control over foreign policy.Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders tried to disentangle party and state institutions, while overlaps in function and personnel persisted.With the major overhaul of party and state institutions announced in 2018 (Xinhua, 2018), party institutions will likely take on more functions, including in foreign policy.Central Work Conferences are an important tool for top-level design.The fact that Xi Jinping has already convened three such conferences on international issues signals that he wants to play a more direct role in foreign policy-making (Zhao & Gao, 2015, p. 44).Regarding institutions, upgrading the leading small group for foreign affairs into a commission that continues to be chaired by Xi Jinping is the most important example of the centralization of political power in foreign policy-making.
Fragmented authoritarianism continues to be a useful lens to study Chinese politics, including its foreign policy rhetoric.According to Mertha (2009), the framework 'asserts that policy made at the centre becomes increasingly malleable to the parochial organizational and political goals of various vertical agencies and spatial regions charged with enforcing that policy' (2009, p. 996).In the context of this article, it draws attention to the different actors that shape China's foreign policy rhetoric, the CCP General Secretary/State President, the Premier, the State Council Information Office, and the Foreign Minister.

The shapers of China's foreign policy rhetoric
As CCP General Secretary, Xi Jinping holds the ultimate decision-making authority in all policy areas, including foreign policy.He also represents the PRC internationally as State President.Internally, he chairs all coordinating bodies involved in foreign policy decision-making, including the Central Military Commission, the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, the Taiwan Affairs, and the Finance and Economy Leading Small Groups of the CCP (Cabestan, 2021, p. 3).He also introduced and now chairs a National/State Security Commission that mainly deals with domestic security issues but has also developed some international responsibilities (Cabestan, 2021, p. 4).The General Secretary's foreign policy statements are at the strategic policy-making level.His political work report presented to the party congress held every five years is the most authoritative document in China's political system.Observers describe it as the most important document outlining the party's strategy for the coming years in all policy sectors (Jakobson, 2013;Miller, 2017).It reflects the broader party leadership consensus across party organs and provides policy guidance (Cha, 2017).The CCP General Secretary's/State President's speeches are mainly in front of international audiences, at multilateral meetings such as BRICS or G20 summits, at meetings hosted by the Chinese government, for example, the Belt and Road Forum, or in front of the UN.Occasionally, he talks to a domestic audience about foreign policy when he convenes a Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs or speaks at a Politburo Collective Study Session that deals with an international issue.
At the beginning of the term of the Xi/Li administration, the Premier was in charge of coordinating economic policy.However, over the past years, Xi Jinping increasingly sidelined Li Keqiang.As a result, many observers agree that he has little influence on China's foreign policy.Occasionally, the Premier represents China at international summits and meets with heads of governments of other states.Li Keqiang's speeches at international summits are located at the policy planning level.Addressing a domestic audience, the Premier presents the government work report each year to the National People's Congress, which contains a few sections on China's foreign policy, reviewing its achievements of the past year and outlining plans for the coming year.
After the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, headed by the Premier, is the second major coordination body in China's political system.The Central Committee has tasked it with the day-to-day administration of the country (Jakobson & Manuel, 2016).Its Information Office, closely linked to the CCP Propaganda Department, publishes White Papers explaining the Chinese government's position to the outside world.There is no fixed schedule for the publication of these documents.In the past few years, white papers mostly outlined China's regional foreign policy strategies, for example, China's approach to the African continent.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for implementing day-today foreign policy.In 2018, Foreign Minister Wang Yi was promoted to State Councillor.He has been tasked with coordinating foreign policy within the State Council in this new role (Cabestan, 2021, p. 9).Occasionally, the Foreign Minister represents China at international summits, most often in front of the UN General Assembly.Domestically, the Foreign Minister summarizes China's foreign policy at an annual symposium speaking to diplomats and foreign policy experts at the end of each year.

The construction of China's national interest
While only proponents of realism take a state's national interest as a given, most International Relations (IR) scholars conceive of the national interest as static.Many analyses of Chinese foreign policy follow the Chinese government's definition of national interest (Moore, 2016;Shih & Huang, 2015;Shih & Yin, 2013;Tsang, 2020;Zhang, 2017;Zhou, 2019).Other scholars take China's national interest as a given in their studies of the country's role in multilateral cooperation mechanisms (Wang & Rosenau, 2009;Yun & Park, 2012).A few decades ago, prominent Chinese IR scholars were already thinking about China's national interest.Yan Xuetong speaks of the 'common material and spiritual needs of all people of a nation-state,' whereby the material needs include security and development, and the spiritual needs he describes as respect and recognition of the international community (Yan, 1996).Wang Yizhou describes interests under the keywords development, sovereignty, and accountability.Development interests refer to domestic modernization, for example, guaranteeing prosperity and rooting out corruption.Sovereignty refers to the protection of territorial integrity.Responsibility refers to playing a positive role in the Asia-Pacific region and transforming the international order (Wang, 2004).However, since all these conceptions regard a state's national interest as static, they fail to account for changes.
This article conceives a state's national interest as constructed: Before a state can pursue its national interest, it must be defined.To conceptualize the construction of the national interest, constructivists' claim that the national interest is socially constructed is combined with neo-classical realists' premise that domestic actors define it.Building on the assumption that ideas construct identities and interests, constructivists hold that 'national interests are intersubjective, rather than derived objectively from the distribution of material capabilities' (Klotz, 1995, p. 454).The national interest is thus a social construction that emerges 'out of situation descriptions and problem definitions through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them' (Weldes, 1996, p. 280).Neo-classical realists show how groups within the state shape the national interest.Trubowitz (1998) argues that the national interest is 'defined by those societal interests who have the power to work within the political system ( … ) to translate their preferences into policy' (1998, p. 4).Snyder (1991) finds that economic sectors and state bureaucracies 'logrolled their various imperialist or military interests, using arguments about security through expansion to justify their self-serving policies in terms of broader interests in national survival' (1991, p. 2).Politicians then incorporated these justification strategies into their statements (ibid).
In many ways, this article's conceptualization of the construction of the national interest draws from existing conceptualizations in IR scholarship.It builds on Morgenthau's considerations by understanding the national interest as dependent on the political and cultural context in which the state's foreign policy is formulated (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 8f.).From Krasner's (1978) and Katzenstein's (1976) conceptualizations, the article takes the idea that the national interest is defined and can be inductively traced in policy-makers' statements (Katzenstein, 1978, p. 298;Krasner, 1978, p. 13).Following the tradition of constructivist scholarship, the national interest is not conceived as 'out there,' waiting to be discovered, but as constructed through discourse (Humphreys, 2015).Constructivists agree that before a state can pursue its national interest, it needs to be defined but disagree about the level at which this happens.For Finnemore (1996), socialization occurs at the international level.She describes states as 'embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in the world' (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2).Internationally held norms about what is good and appropriate influence decision-makers' behavior and the mass publics who constrain them (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2).In contrast, Weldes (1999) holds that the construction of the national interest occurs within the state.She argues that 'before state officials can act for the state, they engage in a process of interpretation to understand both what situation the state faces and how they should respond to it' (Weldes, 1999, p. 4).
In several ways, this article's conceptualization of the construction of the national interest goes beyond existing conceptualizations.Morgenthau (1960), for instance, does not specify how one can grasp the substantive content of national interest but merely equates it with 'national security' (1960, p. 562).The substantive content of national interest remains equally abstract in Krasner's conceptualization as he depicts it as 'associated either with general material objectives or with ambitious ideological goals related to beliefs about how societies should be ordered' (Krasner, 1978, p. 10).While these goals are easy to identify in official documents, establishing the correct ordering of preferences is more difficult because, from public documents, one can only get unranked objectives, according to him.Nuechterlein's conception of the national interest allows for bringing in the substantive content of a state's national interest.
To identify the different components of a country's national interest, the basic needs Nuechterlein describes in his conception of the national interest are linked to recent empirical investigations into national interests.First, defending its territory, political system, and citizens are in a country's interest.Nuechterlein describes 'defence interests' as 'the protection of the nationstate and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state and/or externally inspired threat to its system of government' (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 248).Second, expanding its external economic relations is in a country's interest.Nuechterlein describes economic interests as 'the enhancement of the nation-state's well-being in relations with other states' (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 248).The empirical literature on national interests references economic interests: Roberts points to promoting trade (Roberts, 2014).Kitaoka refers to the people's prosperity and identifies free trade as a precondition (Kitaoka, 2016, p. 36).Third, it is in a country's interest to lead global governance.Under 'world order,' Nuechterlein discusses the 'maintenance of a political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure, and its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders' (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 248).Fourth, it is in a country's interest to promote its values.For Nuechterlein, ideological interests refer to 'the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the people of a nationstate share and believe to be universally good' (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 248).Reviews of the literature on China's foreign policy, in particular, suggest that Nuechterlein overlooks regional order and the provision of global public goods.Fifth, it is in a country's interest to establish itself as the leading power in the region it is situated in.Sixth, providing global public goods is in a country's interest.Table 1 provides an overview of the components of the construction of the national interest as they apply to China. 1

Data and methods
Before presenting the results of the empirical analysis, this section briefly introduces the data analyses drawn upon and how it was analyzed.It first provides an overview of foreign policy statements in the Chinese context e Keywords: regional cooperation, regional integration, regional organizations, regional security, Asia, Asia-Pacific, neighborhood, neighbors.and where they can be found.Then, it summarizes how frame analysis inspired this article's qualitative and quantitative content analyses.
Statements about China's foreign policy appear in leaders' speeches, policy papers, press conferences, and authoritative commentaries in party-state media (Gitter & Fang, 2018, p. 2).Following Robertson, this article distinguishes the strategic from the policy planning level (Robertson, 2017).Foreign policy statements at the strategic level outline broad and longterm directions.This applies to the Political Work Report to Party Congress and other statements by the CCP General Secretary/State President in the Chinese context.Statements on the policy planning level describe more focused communication related to a particular context.This level covers speeches by the Premier and Foreign Minister and policy papers issued by the State Council Information Office on specific issue areas. 2  Some of these documents and speeches only partially deal with foreign policy.For the analysis, relevant text passages were selected based on the following understanding of foreign policy.This article understands foreign policy as a program of an independent political authority designed to address some problem or pursue some goal that entails action toward entities outside policy-makers' political jurisdiction (Hermann, 1990, p. 5;Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 3).'Program' suggests focusing on general guidelines rather than single decisions.Instead of describing China's external relations, this definition points to purposeful action undertaken by the Chinese government.Building on Hermann's three levels across which foreign policy stretches: world view, goals, and means to achieve these goals (Hermann, 1990, p. 5), descriptions of the state of the world (world view), depictions of China's role (foreign policy goals), and general proposals on how to engage with others (foreign policy means) were identified. 3 The quantitative and qualitative content analyses whose results this article reports were inspired by frame analysis.Frame analysis describes the systematic identification and examination of frames.A frame is a schema of interpretation that performs at least one of the following four functions: problem description, diagnosis of causes, moral interpretation, and suggestion of remedies (Entman, 1993).Since frames result from framing processes, frames from different points in time differ.Comparing frames across time reveals policy shifts (for details on the methodology, see Mokry, 2023).Stable frames appear multiple times across the analyzed foreign policy statements.Faded frames stopped appearing, while new frames only appeared once.Modified frames change across the documents.Since each frame consists of a frame object and a frame verb, three possible modification scenarios exist.First, a change in the frame object signals a change in the issue a frame describes.Second, changes in the frame verb describe changes in degree.Finally, changes in issue and degree can be detected if both the frame object and frame verb change.Apart from examining these shifts in policy substance, shifts in emphasis on the different components of the construction of China's national interest were examined.For this, the percentages of frames that pertained to each component as operationalized above were compared.Distinguishing the six components of the construction of China's national interest allows for examining patterns in relative salience across policy-making levels and between the different foreign policy actors within the Chinese government.

The evolution of China's foreign policy rhetoric
To capture the evolution of China's foreign policy over time, the following section describes changes in emphasis in China's foreign policy rhetoric between 2008 and 2022 and details the extent of divergence between policy levels and foreign policy actors.

Changes in emphasis over time
Most importantly, after 2013, lead global governance (Gov) continuously gained importance in Chinese foreign policy statements.After 2018, it emerged as the most salient component of the construction of China's national interest.Only in the last couple of years has its relative salience decreased slightly.Offer global public goods (Publ) featured prominently throughout the analyzed time frame.Between 2010 and 2018, it was the most salient component of the construction of China's national.After 2018, it lost relative salience while lead global governance became more important.Control the region (Reg) was, for the most part, the least salient component of the construction of China's national interest.There was, however, a peak in emphasis between 2012 and 2014.During that time, it became more important than expand China's economic relations (Econ) and promote China's values (Val).Expand China's economic relations became more important over time, but there were frequent shifts in its relative importance.Promote China's values was mostly the second least salient component of the construction of China's national interest.After losing in importance between 2010 and 2013, it became slightly more important again.There were frequent shifts in the importance attributed to defend China's territory, political system, and citizens (Def).A sharp drop in emphasis around 2010 was followed by an increase in prominence a year later, followed by drops in emphasis.Figure 1 illustrates these shifts in relative salience in the six components of China's national interest over time.
Over the years, it became apparent that the Chinese government intends to take on a leadership role in international politics.While it had always emphasized its willingness to offer global public goods, under Xi Jinping, it focused more on taking on a leadership role in global governance.After Xi Jinping took office, ideology became slightly more important, but its overall importance remained fairly limited, at least its ambition to spread China's values.After an initial push for regional leadership, the Chinese government toned down these ambitions.Every other year, the Chinese government emphasized either expand China's economic relations or defend the country's territory, political system, and citizens, with modest fluctuations overall.Defend the country's territory, political system, and citizens was always more salient than expand China's economic relations.Especially after 2020, the Chinese government put again more emphasis on security issues.
There are significant differences in the patterns of relative salience of the different components of the construction of China's national interest between Hu and Xi's leadership.The emphasis on lead global governance frequently shifted under Hu but constantly increased under Xi.While control the region became more important under Hu, it became less important under Xi.Under Hu, expand China's economic relations, promote China's values, and offer global public goods all rapidly gained and lost emphasis.Under Xi, there were also frequent shifts in relative salience for expand China's economic relations and for defend its territory, political system, and citizens.In contrast, the amount of attention attributed to promote China's values and offer global public goods under Xi remained fairly constant.

Divergences between policy levels
Examining the extent of differences between Chinese foreign policy statements on the strategic and policy planning levels offers a quick look into how coherent China's foreign policy rhetoric is. Figure 2 shows that in 2008 the degree of divergence between the two policy-making levels was by far the highest.Overall, the extent of divergence between the two policy levels did not evolve linearly.Instead, there were frequent shifts in the degree of divergence.Between 2009 and 2012, the degree of divergence increased and then decreased again.More precisely, in 2013 and 2015, it was comparatively high.In 2014, it was particularly low.Between 2016 and 2021, there was again an increase followed by a decrease in the degree of divergence.In 2022, the divergence between the strategic and policy planning level was again high.
The divergences between policy levels appeared especially in the components of the construction of China's national interest defend China's territory, political system, and citizens, lead global governance, and control the region.For defend China's territory, political system, and citizens, there were particularly pronounced differences in emphasis between the two policy levels.In almost all years, the divergence related to this component of the construction of China's national interest was a lot higher than average.This was also the case for lead global governance in 2013, 2015, 2018, and 2022. In 2011-2013and 2016-2017, the divergence between policy levels for control the region was also higher than average.For the most part, defend China's territory, political system, and citizens appeared more prominently in the policy planning than on the strategic level.Only recently, there has been more emphasis on the strategic level.At the beginning of the time frame, lead global governance featured more prominently on the strategic level; towards the end, it was more prominent on the policy planning level.

Divergences between foreign policy actors
At first view, there were only minor differences in how prominently the six components of the construction of China's national interest appeared in statements by different foreign policy actors.Figure 3 presents the average percentages of frames pertaining to each component of the construction of China's national interest in foreign policy statements by the different foreign policy actors.Most importantly, if one ranks the six components based on relative salience, they appear in the same order across all foreign policy actors.Offer global public goods appears as the most salient component of the construction of China's national interest across statements from all actors, and control the region features as the least salient component.Except for statements by the Foreign Minister, lead global governance is the second most salient component.Regarding defend China's territory, political system, and citizens and expand China's economic relations, there are some differences in emphasis between foreign policy actors.
However, over time, there were considerable differences between foreign policy actors in their emphasis on the different component of the construction of China's national interest.As no linear pattern in how the degree of divergence emerged over the years, China's foreign policy rhetoric did not become more or less coherent.Figure 4 illustrates the aggregated differences in how much emphasis the different foreign policy actors put on the different components of the construction of China's national interest.The biggest divergence appeared in 2016, the smallest in 2011.Between 2018 and 2020, China's foreign policy rhetoric was fairly aligned.There was little divergence between the General Secretary and the other foreign policy actors.Over time, these differences were largely decreasing.On the other end of the spectrum, most divergence appeared between the Premier and other foreign policy actors, both between 2008-2010 and 2014-2017.Overall, there were more differences between the State Council's and all other statements than between the Foreign Minister's and all others.Between 2010 and 2014, the patterns in the degree of divergence developed in parallel and decreased slightly.After 2014, there were increases and decreases in divergence, and the patterns between State Council and Foreign Minister followed each other.
Across all components of the construction of China's national interest, discrepancies decreased over time (Figure 5).The patterns for defend China's territory, political system, and citizens, leading global governance, and expand China's economic relations were particularly noteworthy.For defend China's territory, political system, and citizens, discrepancies between the General Secretary and other actors were fairly constant.Discrepancies between the SCIO, the Foreign Minister, and other actors shifted constantly, but after 2017, these discrepancies decreased significantly, and the overall patterns were similar to discrepancies between the General Secretary and other actors.For lead global governance, discrepancies between the General Secretary, the SCIO, and other actors were fairly similar.Regarding expanding economic relations, the General Secretary's statements became more aligned with other foreign policy actors.For the SCIO, there were constant fluctuations in how big discrepancies were.

Coherence and divergence in policy substance between foreign policy actors
While there was much coherence regarding concrete details of policy substance between the different foreign policy actors, divergence in policy substance could also be traced.The following section details coherence in policy substance, for example, in describing changes in China's international environment or regarding China's approaches to changing the international order.Then, it describes some differences in policy substance, for example, regarding the Chinese government's position in the fight against terrorism and how the global economy should be governed.

Coherence in policy substance
All actors who shape China's foreign policy rhetoric observed changes in China's international environment.Most importantly, heightened competition in international politics was singled out as a critical trend.In the 2012 Report to Party Congress, 4 the General Secretary already pointed to 'fierce competition in overall national strength' (综合国力竞争空前激烈) (Hu, 2012).At the Central Work Conference for Foreign Affairs in 2014, the General Secretary called for acknowledging the 'grave nature of international tensions and struggle' (估计国际矛盾和斗争的尖锐性) (Xi, 2014c).After the 2013 Defense White Paper (DWP) noted competition in military affairs (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2013), the 2015 DWP called upon the PLA to take on a leadership role in this competition (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2015a).It further specified that international strategic competition unfolded in outer space and cyberspace.After 2018, more general descriptions of increased competition between great powers put forward by the Foreign Minister (Wang, 2018) and more international strategic competition identified by the SCIO (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2019a) replaced the focus on military competition.
Over time, the General Secretary and the SCIO voiced more forcefully how the Chinese government intended to change the international order and system.Shortly after taking power, Xi Jinping described the contest over the international order as 'protracted' (国际秩序之争的长期) (Xi, 2014c).Five years later, a white paper described this contest as even more intense and complex (国际秩序之争激烈复杂) (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2019a).The Chinese government also spelled out what kind of international order it sought to create: In 2014, the SCIO put forward that China wanted to construct a 'peaceful, stable, equitable, and orderly development environment for all countries' (为世界各国创造和平稳定、平等有序的发展环境) (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2014) and described China as pursuing a more just and equitable international order (推动国际秩序和国际体系朝着公正合理的方向发展) (Li, 2014;State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2014;Li, 2015;State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2015b).In 2015, the SCIO described China as an active player in the current international system in the policy paper that described China's Africa policy.The Chinese version of the document described China as an important participant, builder, and contributor to the current international system (现行国际体系的重要参与者、建设者、贡献者) (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2015b); four years later, the General Secretary merely claimed that China would not destroy the international system (Xi, 2018a).However, the SCIO did describe how the Chinese government wanted to update the international order: First, it said it would expand the world's capabilities to respond to systematic shocks.Then, in 2019, it outlined that it wanted to pursue innovations in the international system (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2019a).

Divergence in policy substance
Important differences in policy substance between foreign policy actors emerged regarding the Chinese government's strategy for combating terrorism.In 2015, the SCIO noted that regional terrorism, separatism, and extremism were detrimental to China's security and stability (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2015a).Since 2018, the General Secretary and the SCIO have pointed to more threats from terrorism and extremism (Xi, 2018b;State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2019b).In international speeches, the General Secretary also tried to get other states on board: In 2014, he called upon members of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) to not tolerate terrorism, separatism, and extremism (Xi, 2014a).Shortly after, he argued that SCO members must pursue a multipronged approach against terrorism, separatism, and extremism (Xi, 2014b(Xi, , 2019a)).The General Secretary and the SCIO frequently call for addressing terrorism's roots and not only its symptoms (Xi, 2014b(Xi, , 2017;;State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2015b, 2016;Wang, 2014Wang, , 2017)).In 2019, the General Secretary was much clearer when he called for 'effective preventive measures to eradicate extremism' (各种有效的预防性措施) (Xi, 2019a).Regarding the targets of its efforts in combating terrorism, there was a slight shift in emphasis: In 2014, the Chinese government called for prioritizing the fight against religious extremism (Xi, 2014b); five years later, it pointed to the more acute fight against separatists (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2019b).
There were substantive differences between Chinese foreign policy actors' takes on how the global economy should be governed.At the 2019 Belt and Road Forum, the General Secretary explained that China would work with others to create international economic and trade rules of higher standards (更高水平的国际经贸规则) (Xi, 2019b).The 'China and the world' white paper issued by the SCIO called for innovations and improvements of rules and institutions that proved effective (应继续坚持和维护已经被实践充分证明是正确有效的贸易自由化) (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2019a).A change in policy issue appeared in how to guarantee international trade: In China's Five-Year-Plan and the Foreign Minister's first speech in front of the UN, the WTO was described as the main channel of international trade (维护世贸组织的主渠道地位) (Yi, 2013;National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 2016).The 'China and the world' White Paper then replaced this with a claim to make trade more regulated, accessible, and open without mentioning the WTO (State Council Information Office (SCIO), 2019a).

Conclusion
Despite the widely-documented, increasing centralization of political power in China's political system under Xi Jinping and its implications for the foreign policy process, China's foreign policy rhetoric did not become more coherent over time.Even though the analysis in this article focused on domestic actors directly involved in China's foreign policy making, discrepancies between policy levels and foreign policy actors in how prominently the different components of the construction of China's national interest appeared over time.The degree of these discrepancies fluctuated throughout the analyzed time frame.Hence, at certain times, China's foreign policy rhetoric was more coherent than at others.Regarding policy substance, there were areas with a high degree of coherence but also differences between foreign policy actors, for example, regarding the Chinese government's approach to combat terrorism or differing views on how the global economy should be governed.
The systematic analysis of Chinese foreign policy statements issued by the General Secretary, Premier, State Council Information Office, and Foreign Minister between 2008 and 2022 revealed the following key findings.Across all statements, there were important changes in emphasis over time.The component of the construction of China's national interest lead global governance became more important over time.Control the region mostly played a minor role, except for a brief time span shortly after Xi Jinping took power when this construction of national interest rose to some prominence.The divergence between the strategic and policy planning levels fluctuated throughout the analyzed time frame.It was particularly pronounced for defend China's territory, political system, and citizens, lead global governance, and control the region.While the overall order of priorities attached to the different constructions of national interest was the same for all foreign policy actors, there were considerable differences over time.The smallest discrepancies appeared between the General Secretary and other actors.The biggest discrepancies appeared between the Premier and other actors.Regarding policy substance, all actors observed changes in China's international environment and highlight heightened competition in international politics as a critical trend.In particular, the General Secretary and the State Council Information Office proposed how they intend to change the international order and system.However, there was also a considerable degree of divergence in policy substance between Chinese foreign policy actors.Regarding the fight against terrorism, some statements only described threats.In some statements, Chinese actors tried to get others on board.The General Secretary tended to suggest more radical approaches than the others.Regarding targets, there was a shift in focus from religious extremists to separatists.Regarding governing the global economy, there were suggestions to create better rules, improve only those institutions that proved effective, and different suggestions on guaranteeing international trade.
There are two main limitations that come with solely focusing on the rhetorical level of China's foreign policy.First, given the secrecy associated with authoritarian rule due to the lack of checks and balances (Barros, 2016), there might be big differences between what is publicly communicated and what is discussed behind closed doors.Second, observations of China's foreign policy hint at potential differences between the official portrayal of China's national interest and how the government pursues it.Most recently, Nathan and Zhang (2022), for instance, argued that 'Chinese foreign policy behavior often diverges from the face meaning of its rhetoric [ … ]' (2022, p. 58).China's approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea is a prominent example of these differences.In its rhetoric, the Chinese government emphasizes that disputes should be settled through mutual respect and negotiations.In practice, however, it does not acknowledge the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling and continues building large, militarily fortified artificial islands to stake its claims (ibid, p. 70).This article cannot account for such gaps between China's foreign policy rhetoric and behavior.However, longer-term analyses of official foreign policy statements can serve as a jumping-off point for identifying such gaps.At the same time, it is still worth paying close attention to foreign policy rhetoric, especially if one analyses it carefully and finds discrepancies between different actors.
Drawing attention to different actors within the Chinese system and their influence on China's foreign policy rhetoric in particular, this article offers a new perspective on widely documented changes in China's foreign policy.The systematic analysis of Chinese foreign policy statements issued by the General Secretary, the Premier, the State Council Information Office, and the Foreign Minister provides evidence for the fragmentation.The substantial divergence between the strategic and policy planning levels indicates that China's foreign policy rhetoric remains fragmented.At the same time, the fluctuations in the degree of divergence between policy levels show that, at times, the attempts at making China's foreign policy rhetoric more coherent succeed.The fact that the different foreign policy actors put roughly the same amount of attention to the different constructions of national interest is also a sign of the centralization of the foreign policy process.As the degree of divergence between the General Secretary and other foreign policy actors is smallest, he guides China's foreign policy rhetoric.However, the considerable divergence in how much emphasis different foreign policy actors attribute to the different constructions of national interest shows that there are considerable differences between foreign policy actors underneath the surface.Lastly, the analysis of policy substance also showed that coherence and divergence both characterize China's foreign policy rhetoric.Future research should attempt to find out what factors condition coherence and divergence in China's foreign policy rhetoric.
The differences in emphasis and policy substance that the systematic analysis of Chinese foreign policy statements revealed show that it is necessary to pay attention to the different actors shaping China's foreign policy rhetoric.Since the systematic analysis of Chinese foreign policy statements provided evidence for fragmentation and centralization, both tendencies continue to affect China's foreign policy rhetoric and should still be at play in China's foreign policy process.Hence, despite the increasing centralization of political power in China's political system and its implications for the foreign policy process, it is still worth examining what roles different actors beyond the General Secretary, such as the Premier, State Council, and Foreign Minister, play.Notes 1. Codes for the components of the construction of the national interest have been developed inductively on the material.2. The strategic level covers the CCP General Secretary's Political Work Report to Party Congress (n ¼ 2), his speeches in front of domestic audiences, including central work conferences and politburo study sessions on foreign affairs (n ¼ 8) and international audiences (n ¼ 79).The policy planning level covers the annual Government Work Report (n ¼ 14), the Five-Year-Plan (n ¼ 3), the Foreign Minister's speech at the annual symposium for international affairs (n ¼ 8), policy papers (n ¼ 19), the premier's international speeches and the United Nations General Assembly (n ¼ 10) and the Foreign Minister's international speeches (n ¼ 16).The full list of documents is available on the author's personal website.3. Passages relating to China's domestic affairs, for example, the state of its economy or descriptions of what individual domestic actors, such as the PLA were supposed to do were excluded.The same applied to policy prescriptions that focused on China's approach to individual countries or regions because this article focuses on China's foreign policy more generally.4. While the 2012 report was still presented by Hu Jintao, it is commonly acknowledged that his successor already had a heavy hand in its drafting.

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Relative salience of the components of China's national interest in Chinese foreign policy statements.

Figure 2 .
Figure 2. Aggregated divergence between the strategic and policy planning level.

Figure 3 .
Figure 3. Average percentages of frames pertaining to each component of the construction of China's national interest.

Figure 4 .
Figure 4. Aggregated differences between foreign policy actors across all components of the construction of China's national interest.

Figure 5 .
Figure 5. Divergence between foreign policy actors across selected constructions of national interest.