Reinvigorating India’s ‘Act East’ Policy in an age of renewed power politics

Abstract The year 2022 marks three decades of India’s ‘Look East’ Policy (renamed the ‘Act East’ Policy in 2014). The policy emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War amid efforts by New Delhi to revive the importance of Southeast Asia (and later East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region) in India’s foreign policy agenda. While the policy has proven to be resilient as a core component of India’s foreign policy agenda, looking ahead it faces three key challenges: domestically, India’s reform agenda failing to match the country’s foreign policy aspirations; regionally, the principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’ coming under growing scrutiny; and globally, an international order in flux amid a more pronounced rivalry between the United States and China (which has been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine). Addressing these issues will be key to maintaining the relevance of India’s ‘Act East’ Policy as it enters its next phase.


Introduction
The year 2022 marks three decades of India's 'Look East' Policy (renamed the 'Act East' Policy in 2014). The policy emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War amid New Delhi's efforts to revive the importance of Southeast Asia (and later East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific) in India's foreign policy agenda. This entailed more institutionalised and regular regional interactions aimed at strengthening economic integration, strategic cooperation, and people-to-people/cultural engagement. A key component of the policy is the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and both sides commemorated 2022 as the 'ASEAN-India Year of Friendship'.
Officially, the 'Act East' Policy (AEP) remains robust and 'ASEAN centrality' remains a core pillar of the policy with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi noting that, 'ASEAN's central role is synced to India's Act East Policy' (India Blooms, 2021).
However, the reality is more nuanced than official statements suggest. First, there are signs that India is gradually transcending ASEAN in its eastward engagement. This comes as the regional architecture is undergoing transition as established, open and inclusive regional initiatives (most notably those embedded within the ASEAN framework) are being challenged by newer, exclusive, and functionally driven initiatives. These range from the Quad to the Supply-Chain Resilience Initiative and AUKUS (Australia-UK-USA) security pact. At the same time, India's AEP is being crowded out by initiatives by the region's other major powers (most notably China).
On a more fundamental level, the strategic rationale undergirding the origins of the 'Look East' Policy (LEP) is being called into question. The LEP was very much a product of its time, reflecting a quest for newfound interlinkages in the international system following the removal of structural constraints imposed by the Cold War divide. But the renewed polarisation of the international system following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and emergence of a long-term strategic rivalry between the United States and China will put growing pressure on the LEP/AEP. As the international system underpinning the origins of the LEP is in flux, a new organising principle must be found to justify India's eastward engagement.
After providing a brief overview on the origins and evolution of India's LEP/AEP, this paper will establish that there has been substance undergirding the rhetoric of the policy. Illustrating with the example of India's maritime diplomacy, the paper will demonstrate that New Delhi's eastward engagement has evolved, matured, and deepened during the post-Cold War period. While India may not be the most significant power in the region, when judged on its own merits, India's regional engagement has gained substance and momentum over the course of the LEP/AEP. The paper will then assess how the policy can remain relevant as it enters its fourth decade (or 'phase') while navigating three key challenges (Bajpaee, 2017): India's domestic reform momentum failing to match the country's global aspirations; the principle of 'ASEAN centrality' coming under growing pressure; and an international order that is in flux underpinned by the rise of China and a more pronounced rivalry between the world's major powers.
Tracing the origins and evolution of the LEP India launched its 'Look East' Policy (LEP) in the early 1990s as part of a concerted effort to revive the importance of Southeast Asia in the country's foreign policy agenda. The policy sought to complement the country's longstanding historical, cultural and ideological linkages with the region with engagement in more tangible areas of economic interdependence, and political and security cooperation. This was reflected in a speech by then Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha in 2003: In the past, India's engagement with much of Asia, including Southeast and East Asia, was built on an idealistic conception of Asian brotherhood, based on shared experiences of colonialism and of cultural ties. The rhythm of the region today is determined, however, as much by trade, investment and production as by history and culture. This is what motivates our decade old 'Look East' policy. (Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 2003) The conclusion of India's sectoral dialogue status with ASEAN in 1992 is often cited as the origin point of the policy (although there is evidence that the groundwork for the LEP was laid a decade earlier under the government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89) (Bajpaee, 2022a, p. 19)). New Delhi's relations with Southeast Asia became further institutionalised when India became a full dialogue partner in 1996 with participation in the ASEAN ministerial meeting and Post-Ministerial Conference (MEA, 1996, pp. 18, 119;1997, pp. 19, 98). India then became a summit-level dialogue partner (on par with China, Japan, and South Korea) in 2002. The 'ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity', signed at the third ASEAN-India Summit in 2004, created a formal blueprint for India's engagement with the region (MEA, 2005, p. 125). This was operationalized during the annual Delhi Dialogue and the '2020 ASEAN-India Vision Document' that outlined a roadmap for cooperation. India-ASEAN ties were upgraded to a 'strategic partnership' in 2012 (MEA, 2013, p. 116). A separate Indian Mission to ASEAN with a dedicated ambassador was established in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 2015(MEA, 2015a. The growing breadth and depth of India's interactions with Southeast Asia prompted India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to declare that 'India is as much a Southeast Asian nation as a South Asian nation' (MEA, 2012, p. ii).
The LEP itself was first enunciated in a speech by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao during a visit to Singapore in 1994 when he called for 'forging a new relationship' with the region (Bajpaee, 2022a, p. 19;Rao, 1994). This came amid a broader reorientation of India's foreign policy with a greater emphasis on its economic dimensions, which came in the aftermath of the country suffering a foreign exchange crisis in July 1991 (MEA, 1992, pp. 65-67;1995, pp. 115-17). 1 As well as compelling New Delhi to accelerate the country's economic liberalisation, there was also recognition that India needed to reorient its external economic interactions as the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the loss of key markets and preferential barter arrangements (Gupta, 1995, pp. 73, 210, 211). While rapprochement with the United States was key to this reorientation, East Asia's dynamic 'tiger' and 'tiger cub' economies were also important to its externally oriented economic diplomacy. 2 This also came amid the growing regionalization of global trade fuelled by the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (e.g. NAFTA, European Common Market) that discriminated against outsiders through tariff and non-tariff barriers. In this context, India sought to join initiatives in East Asia in order to ensure that it was not being excluded from the wave of regional economic integration sweeping the globe while transcending the stagnant growth of South Asia (Chanda & Gopalan, 2008, p. 9). The culmination of these efforts was the conclusion of the ASEAN-India Regional Trade and Investment Area in 2015 (that covered trade in goods, services and crossborder investments) (Chanda & Gopalan, 2008, pp. 16-20).
Despite being launched by Rao's government, the LEP became institutionalized in the country's foreign policy agenda, which ensured a degree of policy continuity across various administrations. 3 Externally, India's LEP was accompanied by a concomitant 'Look West' Policy by several countries in Southeast Asia (Rao, 1996, p. 27). Notably, Singapore played a prominent role in facilitating India's renewed engagement with Southeast Asia. Indian leaders have acknowledged this, with Prime Minister Rao referring to Singapore as India's 'gateway' to ASEAN and Prime Minister Modi referring to Singapore as India's 'springboard to ASEAN' (Datta-Ray, 1994; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2018). Given Singapore's prominent role in ushering India into the ASEAN-plus framework, it is fitting that the city-state reassumed the rotating ASEAN country coordinator role for India as New Delhi marked three decades of its LEP.
Moreover, the expansion of ASEAN over the 1995-99 period, with the inclusion of the CMLV states (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam) deepened India's interaction with ASEAN by bringing the entire Southeast Asian region within ASEAN's membership (with the exception of Timor Leste that holds observer status within ASEAN). India's geographic proximity to Indochina and historically close relations with several states within the subregion was a further catalyst for cementing the India-ASEAN relationship. As Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee noted in 2001: 'even as we looked east, ASEAN moved west. The admission of new countries brought ASEAN literally to India's doors' (Vajpayee, 2001). Notably, Vietnam's entry into ASEAN in 1995 turned India's longstanding relationship with the country from a source of mistrust in the India-ASEAN relationship-following Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978 and New Delhi's recognition the Hanoi-installed Heng Samrin regime in 1980-to a source of strength and means to bridge the gap with ASEAN (Yahya, 2003, p. 91).
Additionally, Myanmar's admission to ASEAN in 1997 gave India a contiguous land border with the regional body.

Is the 'Look East'/'Act East' Policy real?
Despite these achievements, there have been frequent allegations that the rhetoric of the LEP does not match the reality of India's eastward engagement. This includes claims that the 'Look East' Policy is a 'sound byte' (Tripathi, 2012, p. 141); with 'scepticism about Delhi's ability to convert words into deeds' in its approach towards East Asia (Mohan, 2014); that the 'Look East policy had been less pronounced than its rhetorical position suggests' (Gordon,pp. 144,148); and that the renamed 'Act East' Policy is 'a mere effort at rebranding' amid claims that 'the switch from "Look East" to "Act East" has "largely been rhetorical" rather than marking a qualitative improvement in India's regional engagement' (Jacob, 2016, p. 87;Yadav, 2016, p. 52).
To be sure, when benchmarked against other major powers in the region, such as China, Japan and South Korea, India is still regarded as a relatively peripheral player. In terms of economic engagement, India-ASEAN trade stood at approximately $64 billion in 2020, which was dwarfed by ASEAN's trade with China, Japan and South Korea at approximately $503 billion, $195 billion and $153 billion, respectively (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021, p. 58). While this can be partially attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic with India's trade with ASEAN dropping from $77 billion in 2019, this does not negate the fact that other major Asian powers have a significant lead over India on the economic front (Ibid.). This is reaffirmed by the results of the annual 'State of Southeast Asia' survey report, which shows that India ranks behind other major powers (including the United States, China, Japan and the EU) on both hard and soft power indicators in the perception of Southeast Asian states (Seah, 2022). Moreover, strains in India's relations with some countries in the Middle East over alleged anti-Muslim rhetoric emanating from the ruling Hindu-nationalist BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) demonstrates the potential for India's domestic politics to spill over into the foreign policy domain (Ganguly & Blarel, 2022). Given that Southeast Asia is home to several countries with large Muslim populations (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei), similar strains may arise in India's eastward engagement (although ASEAN's commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states deters against this unless there is a major outbreak of religious unrest in India). 4 Nonetheless, despite these deficiencies when judged on its own merits, New Delhi's regional engagement has gained substance and momentum over the course of the LEP. In a speech in 2018, Modi noted that Southeast Asia stands out as a priority area of India's external engagement, stating that, 'for India, no region now receives as much attention as this [Southeast Asia]' (IISS, 2018). While India's trade with Southeast Asia remains low relative to other major powers, in absolute terms India-ASEAN trade has undergone significant growth from $2.9 billion in 1993 to $80 billion in 2018 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020;Koty, 2021).
More significantly, from being viewed as a distant and disconnected power in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, India has come to be seen as an integral participant in the regional architecture during the post-Cold War period. Following a short-lived effort to build an Asian community of nations in the 1950s, benign neglect took over in India's eastward engagement in the 1960s and 1970s as New Delhi became preoccupied with developments in its own neighbourhood (particularly after the 1962 war with China). The India-ASEAN relationship underwent rapid deterioration in the late 1970s and 1980s as they were on opposite sides of the Cold War divide. This was exacerbated by New Delhi's support for Vietnam, and concerns over an alleged India-Soviet-Vietnam axis and India's naval modernisation efforts (see below). However, following the launch of the LEP in the early 1990s, the erstwhile perception of India as a threat to regional stability not only dissipated but was instead replaced by a view of the country as a benign and stabilising force in the region.
In this context, while other major powers have acquired a more institutionalised and economically integrated relationship with Southeast Asia, India has acquired greater political and strategic alignment with Southeast Asia. This comes as the country has been perceived in more benign terms by ASEAN member states when compared to other regional powers (most notably China). While India has been successful at socialising into regional norms of interaction and regional confidence-building mechanisms, a latent suspicion remains about China's role the regional architecture (Thayer, 2011, p. 328).
A key example of this perceptional shift is India's maritime engagement with the region. In the decade preceding the launch of the LEP, ASEAN member states voiced concerns about India's military modernisation efforts, with New Delhi's attempts to enhance its long-range naval, air and ballistic missile capabilities raising anxiety among some countries in the region, particularly when seen in the context of India's close links with the Soviet Union and Vietnam (Naidu, 1991;Tellis, 1987). 5 Several countries expressed concerns about Indian ambitions to build-up its naval capability on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which fuelled rhetoric of India maintaining a 'super and unsinkable aircraft carrier, only 80 miles west of the Straits of Malacca' that was 'a springboard to project Indian naval power into the Malacca Straits and even into the South China Sea' (Munro, 1991). 6 These concerns would be alleviated over the course of the LEP as India demonstrated its status as a responsible power, which included promoting greater transparency about its military modernisation efforts and reaffirming the absence of any territorial ambitions in the region (Bajpaee, 2019). India's admission to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 was a significant milestone as this was the first time India joined a multilateral security forum given its longstanding inclination for nonalignment and aversion to security alliances (Naidu, 2000). India's accession to ASEAN norms of interaction, including the 'Treaty of Amity and Cooperation' in 2003, also reaffirmed the country's peaceful ambitions, as well as being a precondition for India's subsequent admission as a founding member of the East Asia Summit in 2005.
India's interaction with the ASEAN-centric regional architecture also had a 'socializing effect' on the country in terms of reconstituting its interests, identity and foreign policy behaviour (Acharya, 2013). Reflecting this, then Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar noted in a 2017 speech the 'critical role' that ASEAN 'played in shaping the thought processes of Indian decisionmakers' during the early stages of the LEP, with ASEAN serving as 'a forum for India to engage the world more expansively, test ideas, exchange views and seek feedback' (MEA, 2017c). He added that: At its most basic level, the relationship with ASEAN has contributed to changing the Indian mindset … Exposures and interactions have through osmosis raised new expectations and ambitions. Some of these are today very apparent in our policy activities and debates. (Ibid.) In the maritime domain, this was accompanied by a shared interest in maintaining the free flow of maritime trade and transport, the need for a joint approach in addressing humanitarian disasters, and mutual concerns in combatting the scourge of maritime piracy, illicit trafficking, and the latent threat of maritime terrorism. India's stepped up maritime diplomacy also manifested in the form of joint military training, exercises and coordinated patrols. In 2000, the Indian Navy conducted its first naval exercises in the South China Sea. Eight ASEAN member states also participate in the biennial Milan naval meetings that India has hosted since in 1995 while India was also a founding member of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Security Forum in 2012 (MEA, 2018a, p. iii; Roy-Chaudhury, 2018). Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HADR) operations emerged as a catalyst for India to expand its maritime presence in Southeast Asia, as noted by its assistance following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 when over 30 Indian Navy vessels were deployed in five operations, including in Indonesia and Thailand (2019, pp. 7, 71;MEA, 2009, pp. 10-11;Sakhuja, 2005). Joint naval cooperation with nonlittoral states also served to reaffirm the Indian Navy's presence in the region. For instance, the Indian Navy escorted US naval vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca as part of 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in 2002(Asia-Pacific Defence Forum, 2002. Amid these developments, the Indian government and strategic community became more vocal in acknowledging India's expanded maritime role in the region (Singh, 2018). As early as 2000, then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes declared that, as India had 'high stakes in the uninterrupted flow of commercial shipping, the Indian Navy has an interest in the ocean space extending from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea' (Aneja, 2000). This was accompanied by claims that the LEP had 'acquired a distinct naval dimension' (Mohan, 2011); that the South China Sea is 'now an integral part of India's security perimeter' (Mohan, 2012); 'crucial to our [India's] foreign trade, energy and national security interests' (MEA, 2011); and that while 'in geographical terms India is located outside the South China Sea, in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms India now increasingly operates inside the South China Sea' (Scott, 2013, p. 51). This also became evident at the doctrinal level when India's maritime strategy proclaimed the 'arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest' for the Indian Navy (Ministry of Defence & Government of India, 2004, p. 56). The South China Sea also acquired significance as a 'maritime gateway' between the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific (Chaturvedy, 2015, p. 373).
Emphasis on the maritime domain gained newfound importance under the Modi government when it unveiled the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative in 2015 as a means of strengthening maritime connectivity and developing the 'Blue Economy' (MEA, 2018b(MEA, , 2019Parliamentary Question, 2019). 7 This initiative was subsequently expanded eastwards to include the Western Pacific, with ASEAN 'at the centre of this maritime space' (MEA, 2021, p. 148). Prime Minister Modi also announced the establishment of the India Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) during the East Asia Summit meeting in 2019, which aims to 'create a safe, secure, stable, prosperous and sustainable maritime domain' (MEA, 2020a, pp. 17, 217).
Contrasting China and India's relations with ASEAN in the maritime domain, India maintains a more cooperative partnership with ASEAN while there is greater acrimony in the ASEAN-China relationship. This is reflected in China's expansive 'nine-dash line' maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and tensions over water diversion projects in the Mekong River Delta. This contrasts with the absence of any such disputes between India and Southeast Asian states.
Moreover, despite not being a party to the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, New Delhi has become more vocal in calls for maintaining the freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with the principles of international law; provided moral and material support for specific claimant states; and forged growing alignment and coordination with the United States and other major powers in challenging China's assertive regional behavior (MEA, 2014b(MEA, , 2014c(MEA, , 2015bMiglani, 2014;Pant, 2018). Illustrating this, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018 Modi noted the need for 'a common rules-based order for the region' that 'must equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons' and 'believe in sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as equality of all nations, irrespective of size and strength' (IISS, 2018). Without mentioning China by name, Modi implicitly called out Beijing's aggressive behaviour: These rules and norms should be based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few. This must be based on faith in dialogue, and not dependence on force. It also means that when nations make international commitments, they must uphold them. (Ibid.) New Delhi has also sought to offer an example to the region of how to peacefully resolve such disputes: In 2015, during the East Asia Summit meeting, Modi noted that: 'India and Bangladesh recently settled their maritime boundary using the mechanism of UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]. India hopes that all parties to the disputes in the South China Sea will abide by the Declaration on the Conduct on South China Sea and the guideline on the implementation' (Parliamentary Question, 2015). This statement came in the aftermath of the Philippines' decision to refer its maritime territorial dispute with China to the arbitration tribunal of UNCLOS in 2013. By demonstrating the ability to resolve disputes with neighbouring states peacefully and on mutually acceptable terms, India sought to contrast its actions with that of China by projecting an image of itself as a responsible maritime power.
As such, there is substance undergirding the rhetoric of the LEP. As illustrated by the example of India's maritime diplomacy, New Delhi's eastward engagement has evolved, matured, and deepened over the course of the policy. While it may not be the most significant major power in the region, when judged on its own merits, India's regional engagement has gained substance and momentum over the course of the LEP. Moreover, while India may not be a principal power in the region, it is firmly positioned in the region with its presence and participation granting credibility and legitimacy to the regional architecture.

Pressures on 'Looking East'
Notwithstanding these achievements, India's eastward engagement faces several pressure points. These emanate from three sources: domestically, as India's reform agenda fails to match the country's global aspirations; regionally, as the principle of 'ASEAN centrality' comes under growing pressure; and globally, as the international order is in flux.

Sustaining India's reform momentum
The LEP is contingent on India's domestic reform agenda, which will dictate the pace of its regional integration. While this is recognised by the Indian establishment-the MEA has noted that 'domestic transformation has been made integral to India's foreign policy strategy'-economic reform has always been the weakest link of New Delhi's external engagement (MEA, 2019, p. 7). This has been a recurring challenge over the course of the LEP as regional powers have questioned India's ability to sustain its growth and reform momentum. As former Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit notes in his memoirs, during the early years of the policy ASEAN chose to engage India 'gradually and on an experimental basis' in order to assess India's commitment to economic liberalisation (Dixit, 1996, p. 266). This prompted the decision by ASEAN to grant India sectoral rather than full dialogue partner status in 1992. Undergirding this was a perception that while India had implemented first generation reforms-that reduced import duties, removed export restrictions and permitted currency convertibility-the second wave of economic liberalisation-focussed on addressing structural issues, including infrastructure deficiencies and a difficult regulatory climate with respect to such issues as land acquisition, labour market deregulation, and the disinvestment (privatisation) of public-sector undertakings (stateowned enterprises)-remained slow-moving (Debroy, 2008, p. 6). A related concern was if India's economic liberalisation was losing momentum following a string of short-lived and unstable governments in New Delhi in the mid-1990s.
India's status in the region suffered a further blow during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-99, which slowed the country's economic engagement with the region. This came as the devaluation of several regional currencies plagued by the contagion effect of foreign capital outflows undermined the competitiveness of Indian exports to Southeast Asia (MEA, 2000, p. 15;2001, p. 14). The fact that India had been largely shielded from the crisis due to restrictions on capital account convertibility also demonstrated that its economy remained relatively detached from regional supply chains and transnational production networks. The Asian financial crisis had a lasting impact on the LEP (Meenakshi, 2009, p. 33). In its aftermath there was a growing emphasis on strengthening regional economic integration, which led to the emergence of new initiatives from which India was excluded, such as the ASEAN þ 3 in 1997 and Chiang Mai Initiative currency swap agreement in 1999. In this context, the regional architecture came to be regarded as a set of concentric circles with ASEAN at the centre; China, Japan and South Korea forming part of the inner circle or primary regional partners of ASEAN, while India was seen as part of the outer circle or a second tier country in the regional architecture.
Despite the government projecting a more investor-friendly image since India's economic liberalisation in the 1990s, the county's historically protectionist and conservative economic policies remain well entrenched. While India has escaped the shackles of the infamous 'Hindu rate of growth', it continues to face an equally cumbersome 'Indian rate of policymaking' rooted in problems of bureaucratic inertia and poor inter-ministerial coordination (Virmani, 2004). With respect to the LEP, this has created barriers in accelerating infrastructure connectivity, which has prevented India from leveraging geographic proximity and historical linkages with Southeast Asia while relegating it to the status of a second tier country in its engagement with the region. This is illustrated by the contrast between the rhetoric of India's northeast as 'India's Gateway to Asia in the 21st century', and the reality of delays in completing key infrastructure projects connecting India and Southeast Asia, such as the Trilateral Highway Project and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (MEA, 2014a).
This has also been reflected in the slow pace of trade negotiations between India and ASEAN. The prolonged period of negotiations began with a framework agreement in 2003 before a trade in goods agreement came into force in 2010 and a trade in services agreement and investment agreement was finally concluded in 2014, leading to the operationalization of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area. India-ASEAN trade targets of $100 billion in 2015 and $200 billion in 2022 have also been missed (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020). New Delhi's decision to exit the Regional Comprehensive Economic Agreement (RCEP) regional free-trade agreement in 2019 reaffirmed the link between India's domestic reform momentum and its eastward engagement as the decision was fuelled by concerns that Indian industries could not compete with their Asian (and particularly Chinese) counterparts (Jacob, 2019). It was also accompanied by Modi's 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' (self-reliant India) campaign, which is ostensibly about strengthening the resilience and competitiveness of Indian industries but can also be seen as a shift towards a more insular and potentially protectionist economic policy (Business Today, 2021). That being said, New Delhi's decision to join the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in June 2022, which followed the conclusion of trade agreements with Australia in April and the United Arab Emirates in February, allude to a possible softening of India's well-entrenched protectionist sentiment (although New Delhi retains a limited appetite for re-joining the RCEP) (Mattoo, 2022;Singh, 2022;The Economic Times, 2022).
As such, relative to other regional powers, India's level of economic integration with ASEAN remains modest, particularly in the areas of strengthening trade and connectivity (Lee, 2015, p. 78). India will need to overcome these impediments if it is to upgrade its status from a secondary to primary player in the regional architecture. One potentially positive development is the growing prominence of digital trade where Indian companies hold a comparative advantage (Singh, 2016). This in turn offers New Delhi leverage to play a prominent role in such areas as setting rules and standards (although even on digital trade India will need to begin by making reforms at home through implementing the necessary legal frameworks such as a personal data protection law (Yasir & Singh, 2022).
The LEP has never been a purely ASEAN-centric initiative. Bilateral and multilateral engagements outside the ASEAN framework have always been an important component of the policy. At the sub-regional level, these have included the establishment of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)-comprising Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand-in 1997 and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC)-comprising Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, India, Thailand and Vietnam-launched in 2000. At the inter-regional level, India was also an architect of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (originally known as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)) that was established in 1997 and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), established in 2008, which held its first leaders' summit in Indonesia in 2017. 8 Nevertheless, 'ASEAN centrality' has always formed a core pillar of the LEP, even as the geographic scope of the policy has expanded over time from Southeast Asia to East Asia and now the Indo-Pacific. Reflecting this, in a speech in 2018 Prime Minister Modi noted that 'ASEAN centrality and unity' is 'at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific' and 'will be central to its future' (IISS, 2018). For India, its support for the ASEAN-led process of regionalism is rooted in efforts to dilute an alternative regional architecture dominated by major powers (most notably China). Then Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj noted this in a speech in 2017: the 'centrality of ASEAN serves as a counter balance to the various great power concerts and rivalries that get played out in the region' (MEA, 2017a).
However, 'ASEAN centrality' is increasingly being called into question. Some of this is attributed to growing fissures within ASEAN, most notably between pro-Beijing member states and others that have sought to maintain a more balanced foreign policy with an equidistant position from major regional and global powers. This became evident in 2012 when during Cambodia's chairmanship of the organisation ASEAN failed to issue a joint communiqu e citing China's actions in the South China Sea (BBC, 2012). Another challenge is the regional body's rules of interaction, which remain embedded in principles of non-confrontation, non-intervention, and consensus (the so-called 'ASEAN way') (Goh, 2003). These norms of interaction, while granting ASEAN longevity, have relegated it to irrelevance in times of crisis, including the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the suspension of democracy in Myanmar and Thailand, and the COVID-19 pandemic (Bland, 2021; Darmawan, 2021;Kashyap & Bhattacharya, 2021). The Russian invasion of Ukraine has further fuelled these concerns amid ASEAN'S lukewarm response to Moscow's actions (Hayton, 2022).
In this context, India's regional engagement has increasingly transcended ASEAN through bilateral, trilateral and plurilateral initiatives that fall outside the ASEAN framework. The most notable example of this is the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, which was revived in 2017 after its short-lived inception in 2007. Such initiatives are often functionally driven and focussed on specific issues. For instance, India, Japan, and Australia launched the 'Supply-Chain Resilience Initiative' in 2020 with the aim of 'diversifying supply-chains in the Indo-Pacific region to ensure resiliency', which alludes to efforts to reduce dependence on China in strategically important sectors (MEA, 2021, p. 64. Also see: Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2021; Tan, 2020). Moreover, as these initiatives have matured with more senior level participation they have moved beyond a single-issue focus. For instance, the Quad, which has its origins in issues of maritime security following the humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami by the Regional Core Group of countries, has expanded its mandate to address such issues as pandemic response, climate change, and supply-chain resilience (The White House, 2021).
Outside the ASEAN framework, India is also increasing cooperation with several states through trilateral or mini-lateral initiatives. This includes the US-Japan-India trilateral framework, which began at the joint secretary (director-general/assistant secretary) level in 2011 before being upgraded to the ministerial (secretary of state/foreign minister) level in 2015 and the summit (presidential/prime ministerial) level in 2018. A Joint Secretary-level trilateral dialogue with Australia and Indonesia has also been held since 2017, which has focused on maritime security and HADR operations (MEA, 2018a, p. 28). The security dimension of BIMSTEC has also gained prominence with the first meeting of BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs in 2017 followed by the first joint military exercise in 2018 (BIMSTEC Milex-2018) with a focus on counter-terrorism (MEA, 2019, pp. 22, 245-7).
In the context of these new or newly defined regional initiatives, ASEAN's relevance in India's eastward engagement will continue to be called into question. As noted, the LEP has never been a purely ASEAN-centric initiative. But the degree to which 'ASEAN centrality' is now being challenged by growing institutional inertia within the organisation and the emergence of new regional initiatives will make this a potentially even less relevant pillar of the LEP. There are two reasons why this matters for India's eastward engagement. First, from a rhetorical perspective these developments make New Delhi's commitment to 'ASEAN centrality' increasingly tenuous and as such, it may need to consider whether this principle should remain a core tenet of the AEP. Second and more significantly, New Delhi will need to consider the implications of an alternative (non-ASEAN-centric) regional architecture for India's engagement with the region. This is particularly important in the context of a reversion to a regional and global order dominated by Great Power competition (see next section).
The utility of maintaining 'ASEAN centrality' as a core pillar of the AEP may be declining amid growing fissures within ASEAN, particularly on the question of China and the role of the regional body in tempering or restraining Beijing's regional assertiveness. However, what replaces the ASEAN-centric regional architecture remains unclear and New Delhi will need to reflect on this as it considers the future of the AEP. For instance, should New Delhi decide to double down on its commitment to 'ASEAN centrality' it will need to work more closely with member states that are falling under China's 'sphere of influence' (e.g. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) to shore up their independence and autonomy. Doing so will help to reinforce ASEAN's credentials and reaffirm the status of ASEAN-led groupings as the region's premier forums. Alternatively, should New Delhi conclude that 'ASEAN centrality' has outlived its usefulness, it may seek to strengthen its commitment to new (non-ASEAN-centric) regional initiatives, such as the Quad. New Delhi may also want to consider if India should join other regional initiatives such as the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership-the successor to the erstwhile TPP free trade agreement), or even the Five Eyes or AUKUS, which would more firmly embed it within the US-led regional architecture.

Regional/global architecture in flux
The preceding section alludes to a more fundamental issue facing the AEP regarding the strategic rationale underlying the origins of the policy. The LEP emerged in the early post-Cold War period at a time when globalisation was the key narrative driving the international system. But as the neoliberal international order comes under growing strain, the organising principle that formed the basis for the LEP needs to be renewed or revisited. New Delhi has acknowledged this shift in the global geo-economic and geo-political environment. As Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar noted in a speech in 2020: The contemporary relationship between India and ASEAN was founded very much in our shared interest in globalisation. In Asia at least, the ASEAN were pioneers of that process and helped bring India into it. But as it comes under stress today, we need to go beyond its economic and even social definitions. (MEA, 2020b) At the heart of this shift is the emergence of an increasingly pronounced US-China strategic rivalry, which is redefining the regional and global architecture in zero-sum terms. This has been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The renewed bifurcation or polarisation of the international system threatens to undermine India's longstanding commitment to an open and inclusive regional architecture embedded in the principle of 'ASEAN centrality'. For instance, the fact that United States, Russia, and China are all members of several ASEAN-led initiatives (including the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus) will place growing strain on these forums to operate effectively given the bad blood between these countries. India will face an early test of the institutional impact of these geopolitical fault-lines when it hosts the G20 Summit in 2023, as evidenced by the challenges faced by Indonesia as the host nation in 2022 (Nangoy & Sulaiman, 2022).
At the same time, there remain lines that India is unwilling or unable to cross with respect to the US-led regional architecture. An example of this is India's absence from US-led Freedom of Navigation patrols (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, which can be attributed to New Delhi's aversion to Washington's interpretation of the 'innocent passage' principle as enshrined in UNCLOS (Roy-Chaudhury & de Estrada, 2022). Despite New Delhi's opposition to China's expansive 'nine-dash line' claims in the South China Sea, India's requirement of prior notification from foreign warships to enter its Exclusive Economic Zone has deterred it from participating in US-led FONOPs in the region. This example illustrates the limits of India's willingness and ability to become more enmeshed in US-led regional initiatives (Singh, 2021;Zeeshan, 2021).
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated these pressure points as India has been labelled a 'shaky' member of the Quad as the odd man out amongst the Quad group of countries in terms of their punitive actions against Russia (Rajghatta, 2022;Tobita & Miki, 2022). This divergence is likely to grow as China and Russia's growing assertiveness prompts the United States to step up calls on regional allies and partners to do more (paralleling US pressure on its NATO partners in Europe to do the same) (Takenaka, Brunnstrom, & Martina, 2022). This includes stepping up support for smaller states facing pressure from Beijing, such as Pacific Island countries and claimant states to the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea (paralleling support for Ukraine and other European states bordering Russia in the face of Moscow's aggression) (Dominguez, 2022;Grossman, 2022).
This will also have a spill over effect into other areas of India's eastward engagement, such as defence cooperation (Pant & Singh, 2022). For instance, the conclusion of a contract with the Philippines in early 2022 for the export of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile was hailed as a sign of India's nascent but growing defence exports to Southeast Asia, particularly as other countries, including Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand also expressed interest in acquiring the Brahmos platform (Bhatt & Pandey, 2022;Saha, 2022). However, this achievement threatens to be undermined by the fact that Brahmos has been developed as part of a joint venture with Russia (Tiwari, 2022). Historically, India's overwhelming dependence on Russian military hardware has made countries that use similar Russian/ Soviet-era military platforms, such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia and Malaysia, key partners for India in the area of defence cooperation. However, future cooperation threatens to be delayed, if not derailed by Russia's growing pariah status.
This places India in the unenviable position of becoming increasingly marginalised in the regional architecture. On the one hand, New Delhi's long-standing commitment to 'ASEAN centrality' is being undermined by the growing irrelevance of the open and inclusive ASEAN-led process of regional interaction in the face of renewed power politics. At the same time, New Delhi remains a lukewarm supporter of more institutionalised and exclusive US-led mini-lateral regional initiatives.
India's eastward engagement has been further complicated by the increasingly bold and assertive foreign policies of other countries in the region, which has 'crowded out' India's LEP/AEP to some extent. The most notable example of this is China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative, which has been viewed by New Delhi as a direct threat to India's regional aspirations, national security and in some cases its territorial sovereignty (with respect to Chinese investment in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) (Baruah, 2018;Paul, 2019).
To be sure, the regional initiatives of some countries have complemented and reinforced India's LEP. Notably, rapprochement in the US-India relationship has facilitated an alignment of both countries' strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. The United States' strategic 'pivot' or 'rebalancing' towards Asia under the Obama administration, the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy' under the Trump administration, and the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy have all complemented India's eastward engagement to varying degrees (The White House, 2011US Department of State, 2010. Similarly, Japan has played a key role as a facilitator of India's eastward engagement. Prime Minister Modi noted this in a speech in 2018 where he referred to India's relationship with Japan as the 'corner-stone of India's Act East Policy' (IISS, 2018). India's MEA has also noted that, 'Japan and India are committed to leverage the synergy between India's "Act East" policy and Japan's "Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure" to develop and strengthen reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures that augment connectivity within India and between India and other countries in the region' (MEA, 2016, p. xi). The establishment of the India-Japan Act East Forum in 2017 aims to strengthen regional connectivity through infrastructure investment in India's northeast, which is a key node of connectivity between India and Southeast Asia (MEA, 2017d). Japan is also a lead partner in the connectivity pillar of Modi's Indo-Pacific Oceans' Initiative that was announced in 2019 (MEA, 2021, p. 63).
Concomitant concerns about China's growing assertiveness and the credibility of the United States' commitment towards the region has been the catalyst for a wave of 'middle power diplomacy' sweeping the region. This has complemented India's LEP/AEP. For instance, during the state visit of South Korean President Moon Jae-In to India in 2018 India's MEA noted that both sides 'discussed possible synergies between India's Act East Policy and South Korea's New Southern Policy (MEA, 2019, p. 95). As such, while some regional initiatives such as China's BRI and Global Development/Security Initiatives, threaten to undermine India's LEP/AEP, others, including Japan's 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' strategy, South Korea's 'New Southern Policy' and Taiwan's 'New Southbound Policy', serve to complement, if not reinforce India's eastward engagement to some extent.
The challenge facing India is that the LEP has yet to fully reflect or sufficiently leverage the changing strategic environment marked by the rise of China and more pronounced US-China strategic rivalry, which has been overlaid by broader fissures between the 'West' and China/Russia. India may struggle to straddle this increasingly polarized and potentially bifurcated international system given the country's long-standing proclivity for nonalignment in its foreign policy and it post-Cold War re-incarnations of strategic autonomy/omni/multi-alignment (Khilnani et al., 2012). For example, can India simultaneously remain a member of both the US-led regional architecture-such as the Quad-and the China-dominated regional architecture-such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (where India is the second-largest shareholder), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) Economic Corridor?
From New Delhi's perspective, strategic autonomy has served India well by allowing it to engage all major poles of influence in the international system and attract investment to support its development-driven diplomacy (Tellis, 2021). The most recent example of this is the Russia/Ukraine conflict where New Delhi has been courted by major powers on both sides (Bajpaee, 2022b). However, can India maintain this position in the event of a more divided regional and global order? So far, Washington has been sympathetic of India's predicament (arising from its overwhelming dependence on Russian military hardware and its energy security needs) while simultaneously being more critical of the 'no-limits' China-Russia relationship (Kremlin, 2022). But how long can this be sustained? For example, at what point will the rapid increase in India's import of discounted Russian crude (which has grown from less than 1 per cent of India's oil imports in 2021 to almost a fifth by June 2022 (Verma, 2022)) be seen as a sign that New Delhi is seeking to exploit (or benefit from) the Ukraine conflict by financing Russian aggression (Curtis, 2022;Miller, 2022;Tharoor, 2022)?
The principle of strategic autonomy or omni-alignment has already come under strain amid the deteriorating Sino-Indian relationship following the border standoff and skirmishes between both countries in 2020. This prompted New Delhi to lean further towards the United States and abandon any semblance of neutrality or maintaining an equidistant position on the US-China relationship (Bajpaee, 2021). The deterioration of Russia's relations with the West will further test India's commitment to strategic autonomy.
In terms of what this means for the LEP/AEP, India's commitment to an open and inclusive regional architecture (embedded in the principle of 'ASEAN centrality') reflects New Delhi's commitment to omni/multi-alignment in its foreign policy. However, this will be put to the test in the event of a more polarised and bifurcated international system that forces New Delhi to choose between a regional order led by the United States, China and/or a combination of other regional powers.

The 'China factor'
Within the context of this renewed 'Great Power' competition, the 'China factor' presents a specific and growing challenge to India's eastward engagement. For one, China's growing power projection capabilities threaten to erode or weaken India's strategic space to operate. An example of this can be seen in the maritime domain where Indian officials, while emphatically defending the country's interests in the South China Sea, have also acknowledged limits on India's ability to operate in these waters as the balance of naval power increasingly tilts in China's favour. This became evident during India's withdrawal from an oil exploration block with Vietnam in 2012 that came amid Chinese opposition to Indian activities in the South China Sea (Singh, 2012). Vice Admiral Joshi, then commander of the Western Naval Command and subsequent chief of naval staff, noted at the time that the 'Indian Navy will protect any Indian asset worldwide including [Indian state energy company] ONGC Videsh assets in South China Sea' (Times of India, 2012). However, former Chief of Naval Staff Arun Prakash noted that while 'India's trade and energy interests in the Pacific are as vital as those professed by China in the Indian Ocean', he also warned that in adopting 'an assertive posture vis-a-vis China, a distant location like the South China Sea is hardly the ideal setting to demonstrate India's maritime or other strengths' (Prakash, 2012). He added that it would be 'imprudent to contemplate sustaining a naval presence some 2500 naval miles from home to bolster ONGC Videsh's stake in South China Sea hydrocarbons' (Ibid.).
The linkage between the Sino-Indian relationship and India's LEP/AEP has also manifested in debates about counter-balancing China's encroachments into South Asia by strengthening India's engagement with East Asia (particularly with countries that maintain a history of difficult relations with China). The India-Vietnam relationship is a key example of this narrative with claims that the relationship is an 'anchor' of India's strategic engagement with Southeast Asia that 'can most closely be compared with China's relationship with Pakistan' (Yadav, 2016, p. 55); that 'in the South China Sea and the Eastern Pacific, India is gradually treating Vietnam just as China views Pakistan in South Asia: as a source of strategic heft' (Pant, 2018, pp. 7,8), and: That is why in some quarters in New Delhi, Vietnam is already seen as a counterweight in much the same way Pakistan has been for China. If China wants to expand its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, the sentiment in New Delhi is that India can do the same in East Asia. If China can have a strategic partnership with Pakistan ignoring Indian concerns, India can develop robust ties with states on China's periphery such as Vietnam without giving China a chance to veto such relationships. (Ibid.) Extending this equivalency between India's relations with Vietnam and China's relations with Pakistan, India's strategic community have also challenged Beijing for its double standards by opposing Indian oil exploration activities with Vietnam in disputed waters claimed by China in the South China Sea while at the same time ignoring New Delhi's concerns over Chinese investment in disputed territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Panda, 2017, p. 86).
The perceived equivalency between Chinese actions in South Asia and Indian actions in Southeast Asia has also manifested in calls for expanding India's strategic presence in the maritime domain near the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to counter-balance China's assertive posture along the Sino-Indian land border. 9 For instance, former Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations) Raja Menon has referred to China's sea lines of communication as 'the Chinese jugular' that India can seek to exploit with China's actions along the Himalayan border being 'held hostage by our strength in the Indian Ocean' (Menon, 2013). Admiral Arun Prakash has similarly stated that 'given China's immense logistical and overall superiority on the Himalayan borders, there is a view that India needs to look seawards for a countervailing maritime strategy, using its peninsular configuration, island territories and growing maritime power to dominate Indian Ocean sea lanes and exploit China's putative "Malacca Dilemma"' (Prakash, 2016, p. 178). Following the stand-off between China and India near the China-Bhutan-India tri-border region in 2017 one scholar also called on India to implement its own strategy of 'active defence' or coercive diplomacy by thinking 'more boldly about credibly deterring China by focussing on the latter's greatest vulnerability: the sea lanes south of the Andaman islands' (Mukherjee, 2017).
This proclivity for 'horizontal escalation' (that draws linkages between Chinese actions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region and Indian actions in East Asia and the South China Sea) means that a further deterioration of the Sino-Indian relationship (due to escalating border tensions for example) could prompt India to engage in greater security activism along China's periphery (in the South China Sea for example). Conversely, an improvement in the Sino-Indian relationship would make New Delhi more apprehensive about getting involved in a US-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific (by joining US-led regional initiatives for example).

Looking back to look forward
The early post-colonial period saw India's offer of leadership to Asia, as evidenced by New Delhi's call for an 'Eastern Federation' of nations and sponsorship of several regional initiatives. These included India hosting the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 (and leading the short-lived Asian Relations Organisation), as well as participation in the Eighteen Nations Conference convened in 1949 to voice opposition to Dutch 'Police Action' in Indonesia; providing military aid to the Burmese government in its campaign against Karen rebels the same year; helming the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at the end of the Korean War in 1953; chairmanship of the International Control Commission on Indochina following the end of the French-Indochina War in 1954, and sponsorship of the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Acharya, 2017;Asian Relations Organization (ARO), 1948, pp. 302-10;Banka, 2021).
However, in the post-Cold War period India has faced recurring calls to 'do more' in the region (The Economic Times, 2011). This was one of the factors that prompted New Delhi to rename the 'Look East' Policy to the 'Act East' Policy in 2014 in order to demonstrate renewed vigour and momentum in India's eastward engagement by making the policy 'more pragmatic, action-driven and result-oriented' (according to India's external affairs minister) (MEA, 2017b). However, India continues to face allegations of being a mere participant rather than a pro-active shaper of Asian regionalism. While India has got a seat at the table, it has yet to shape the rules of the regional architecture of which it is a member. Academic Amitav Acharya has noted this: 'New Delhi appears to be still hamstrung by a vision deficit. At a time when many of the original ideas of [India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru, such as an Eastern federation, seem realizable at least on the economic front, India seems to be still plagued by self-doubt and the burden of inherited ideologies' (Acharya, 2017, p. 165).
A renewed articulation of the strategic drivers of the AEP would offer a means to alleviate these concerns. One way to operationalize this would be through the formulation of a strategy document that outlines the key objectives of the policy. 10 This would also facilitate greater coherence across the various ministries and disciplines that have been involved in implementing the policy. Such a document would acknowledge that India's post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia has been driven by more than the economic and commercial considerations of expanding trade, attracting investment, and improving connectivity, and also rooted in a need to ensure a balanced regional architecture that is not dominated by any one power (most notably China). In doing so, New Delhi would also need to clarify or more clearly articulate the norms, values and principles driving its regional engagement. From a policy perspective, this would facilitate India's stepped up strategic engagement with regional powers as a possible 'secondary balancer' for example (Lee, 2015, p. 89).

Conclusions
Addressing the three challenges identified in this paper-India's domestic reform momentum failing to match the country's global aspirations; the principle of 'ASEAN centrality' coming under growing pressure; and adapting to an international order in flux-will be key to maintaining the relevance of the 'Act East' Policy as it enters its fourth decade. The reinvigorated US-China strategic rivalry has fuelled the emergence of new regional initiatives (AUKUS) or given existing initiatives newfound importance (Five Eyes) (Marlow, 2021). The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated these pressure points, leading to a renewed polarisation of the international system. These developments threaten to put pressure on India's role in the regional architecture.
Within the context of these three challenges, the Sino-Indian relationship will be a key variable in determining India's role in the region. In other words, India's willingness to take a more emphatic position in supporting US-led regional initiatives in confronting concerns about China or maintaining its commitment to an open and inclusive regional architecture embedded in the principle of 'ASEAN centrality' will in large part be dictated by the trajectory of the Sino-Indian relationship and the status of their unresolved border dispute. For instance, renewed hostilities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) demarcating the disputed Sino-Indian border will propel New Delhi to take a more proactive security posture in the Indo-Pacific. Conversely, a de-escalation of Sino-Indian tensions along the LAC would make New Delhi a more reluctant participant in US-led regional efforts to confront China.
In terms of actions, some of this will be about strengthening capabilities, including addressing deficiencies in India's external economic diplomacy (which is correlated with the pace of its reform momentum at home), as well as strengthening the substance of India's military and diplomatic engagement. As recently as 2014 less than 15 per cent of officers in India's Ministry of External Affairs reportedly covered the East Asia region (Gordon, 2014, p. 144). However, on a more fundamental level New Delhi needs to revisit and clarify the ambitions or strategic objectives driving the country's eastward engagement.
India marks the 75th anniversary of its independence in 2022 and will convene the G20 Leaders' Summit in 2023 as part of holding the G20 presidency for the first time. This is an opportune time for New Delhi to reflect on its role in the global order and reconsider the principles undergirding its foreign policy. As a key component of its external engagement, the 'Act East' Policy is an appropriate vehicle to test some of these ideas as India moves into the next 'phase' of its eastward engagement. Notes 1. India's economic crisis was triggered by short-term loans that became due for repayment and oil price shocks prompted by the first Gulf War, which undermined the country's balance of payments position and compelled India to seek an emergency bailout package from the International Monetary Fund. 2. The 'tiger' economies refer to Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, which was followed by the 'tiger cub' economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 3. At a bureaucratic level, Southeast Asia's increased importance in India's foreign policy priorities was reflected in relations with ASEAN being elevated from the Secretary (East) to Foreign Secretary level in 1992 and the Economic Cell of the Ministry of External Affairs identifying ASEAN as one of its 'thrust regions' (Sridharan, 1993, p. 141). 4. The spill-over of India's domestic politics into the country's eastward engagement is not a new phenomenon as noted by New Delhi's defence of its Diaspora populations in Malaysia and Fiji (Singh, 2014;Thakur, 1985 April 3, 1989, pp. 9, 28. 6. The growing apprehension about India's expanding naval capabilities was fuelled by the establishment of the FORTAN (Fortress Andaman and Nicobar) joint-services base at Port Blair in 1985. 7. The 'Blue economy' refers to the development of fishing, seabed mining, offshore oil and gas exploration, environmental protection, maritime trade and tourism and the development of port infrastructure. 8. The IORA membership includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand while the IONS also includes Myanmar and Timor Leste. 9. Such debates gained momentum in the aftermath of a string of tensions along the Sino-Indian border, which prompted calls for India to improve its border infrastructure. This led some to argue that strengthening India's naval capabilities to interdict Chinese commercial shipping would be a better allocation of India's military resources and a means to exploit China's weakness in the maritime domain to compensate for China's strength along the land border. Unsurprisingly, this has been a prominent narrative amongst Indian Navy officials that have sought to correct the Indian military's longstanding bias in favour of the army. 10. Various institutions exist that conduct analysis and compile data on India's eastward engagement. For example, the India-ASEAN Centre at the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) and Indian Council of World Affairs think-tanks are key nodal institutions on India's 'Look East'/'Act East' Policy. Such bodies would be well suited for developing a proposed strategy document.

Disclosure statement
The author reports there are no competing interests to declare.