Losing China? Truman’s Nationalist Beliefs and the American Strategic Approach to China, 1948–1949

Abstract Why did the Truman administration fail to pursue rapprochement with the Chinese Communists in early 1949? Available accounts focus on the existence of deep ideological differences—around the liberal/communist divide—between Chinese Communists and American leaders, which contributed to high levels of threat perception and inhibited effective communication between the two sides. Other accounts highlight the Truman administration need to secure public support and domestic mobilisation of resources, which was instrumental to the approval of the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Military Assistance Program (MAP), and NATO. By using recently declassified and underexploited sources, this article offers an alternative explanation: Truman’s nationalist beliefs and his cognitive image of China as a ‘colony’ led the president to shift economic and military support from the Kuomintang to local warlords in Western China to encourage covert operations against the CCP since late 1948. These findings confirm that pre-existing cognitive perceptions and stereotypes played a key role in shaping Sino-American relations in the early Cold War, and they might help US policymakers charting a more cooperative relationship with China today.


Introduction
Chen Jian locates the origins of the Sino-American rivalry from late 1949 onwards in the preexisting mutual perception and understanding between the CCP and the United States, with the former indignantly objecting to the American treatment of the 'old declining China with arrogance and a strong sense of superiority'. 1 Mao's approach to China's foreign relations was 'to change China's weak power status, proving to the world the strength and influence of Chinese culture': from Mao's perspective, this objective stood in sharp contrast with the American attempts to sabotage the Chinese revolution that occurred between 1946 and 1948. 2 If socio-psychological motivations and perceptions of the American understanding of China informed Mao and the CCP's approach to the United States prior to the founding of the P.R.C., then it would be useful to investigate whether similar considerations also shaped the Truman administration's strategic posture towards the CCP between the end of 1948 and early 1949. Was Mao's perception of American 'arrogance' and 'sense of superiority' towards China correct? If so, how did such features of the American behaviour shape foreign policy towards China in the period considered?
In this article I argue that Truman's nationalist beliefs-conceived of as a socio-psychological construct-were a key factor in shaping an interventionist attitude towards the CCP following the defeat of the Kuomintang in late 1948. The article has five additional sections. First, I discuss existing explanations that account for the US decision to support anti-CCP factions in 1949. Then, I define the concept of nationalist beliefs and describe the mechanisms through which they influence foreign policy. Third, I describe Truman's nationalist beliefs and their impact at the level of both domestic politics and foreign policy. In particular, I describe how Truman's nationalist beliefs-through a process of successful intergroup discrimination-shaped a colony image of China and of specific Chinese actors as a result of the Kuomintang repeated defeats and inability to stop the CCP throughout 1948, the concurrent CCP military advancements, and the worsening plight of the Chinese population. In the fourth section, I show that these developments shaped Truman's decision to support anti-CCP forces and encouraged his determination to maintain a confrontational policy towards the Communists for most of 1949. I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings.
Explaining American support to anti-Communist forces in 1949 The ideological argument The first explanation is provided by Mark Haas, who has argued that deep political ideological differences between Chinese Communist and American leaders contributed to high levels of threat perception and inhibited effective communication between the two sides. 3 Although this interpretation would intuitively explain why the United States supported local forces fighting the CCP in 1949, it presents two main problems. First and foremost, Haas ultimately puts the onus of the emerging Sino-American rivalry on CCP's choice to side with the Soviet Union, without examining American intentions or perceptions about the CCP; as a result, Haas states that the U.S. saw the CCP as a foe well before 1949, with the ideological distance between the two sides growing out alongside the liberalism/communism divide. According to the scholar ideological distance between the CCP and the U.S. began in the two decades preceding the founding of the People's Republic of China. Over that period, the CCP leadership had already chosen to side with the Soviet Union, against the American-British imperialists, deterministically casting a long shadow over the future of US-CCP relations: 'there was also no question in Mao's mind that armed conflict between the two camps was unavoidable in the long run because of their huge ideological differences'. 4 However, the assumption that enmity between U.S. and CCP, based on ideological distance, was in place since the 1920s and remained unchanged until 1949 seems far-fetched when considering the historical evidence. First, over the period considered by Haas (1929Haas ( -1949, the ideological distance explanation cannot account for the so-called 'Dixie Mission'. In 1944, American army officers and diplomats were dispatched to the Yenan, the wartime Communist capital in China, in order to assess the Communist potential for military collaboration against Japan, establish channels of communications with the CCP, and to understand how to best assist the Communists in their war effort. 5 In January 1945, the Communist leaders even offered to travel to Washington and meet with president Roosevelt in order to establish working relationship with the United States. 6 A more general issue in postulating U.S.-CCP enmity as caused by ideological distance also lies in the model's inability to reconcile two important counterfactuals happening in the same theatre: on the one hand, the attempt of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1947 to establish good relations with the Soviet Union, to which Stalin reacted favourably-in spite of deep ideological differences between the two actors; and, on the other hand, problems of communications faced by the CCP in grasping Soviets' goals during the Chinese Civil War and in relation to Stalin's ambiguous intentions towards the Kuomintang. As a matter of fact-and despite their shared ideologysuch discrepancies caused suspicion and inaction among the Chinese Communists towards Soviet instructions, as well as frustrations in Soviet officials operating in China. 7 Finally, the ideological distance argument to explain U.S.-CCP enmity in 1949 is also directly weakened by the words of Zhou Enlai. In the summer of 1949, Zhou urged Washington not to confuse the CCP's 'sincere desire to develop good working relations with America' with the CCP's 'political or ideological beliefs'. As stressed by the Communist leader in an interesting analogy with the Soviet Union, although the Soviet ideology was 'not the same as that of England and America' during the Second World War, Russia was able and willing to 'fight shoulder to shoulder' with the U.S. since it was in Russia's national interest to do so. 8 As a result, it follows from Zhou's words and the available historical evidence that the presence of ideological distance was not a necessary condition for interstate rivalry; on the contrary, in such a case it seems that precisely because actors like the Chinese and the Soviets were aware of the existence of deep ideological differences with the United States, they strove to overcome this gap peacefully by formulating policies to decrease threat perception, and by making their messages and intentions more clear.

The domestic politics argument
A second explanation is provided by Thomas Christensen. Regardless of ideology, the scholar argues that the Truman administration adopted a confrontational orientation towards the CCP to secure public support and domestic mobilisation of resources, needed to pursue the long-term national security of the United States which were embedded in the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Military Assistance Program (MAP), and the nascent NATO. Christensen suggests that throughout 1949 the combination between American public's anticommunism, hostility to any accommodation with the CCP, and the need to secure the votes of the fiscal conservatives and the 'Asialationist' to renew ERP and obtain $1.4 billion for MAP in Congress, pushed Truman to extend the China Aid Act and to grant an additional $75 million in military aid to China and Asia. 9 According to the scholar, it was for the same urgency to maintain domestic political support and mobilisation for the Truman Doctrine that the administration first refused to let ambassador Stuart meet Hua Huang in the summer of 1949, and then it did not recognise and make any attempt at rapprochement with the CCP. 10 Although Christensen's model for the persistence of the Truman administration's confrontational attitude towards the CCP is certainly more convincing through 1947 and 1948, when the same mechanisms are used to explain events between the end of 1948 and 1949, their explanatory power becomes greatly reduced. Most importantly, Christensen's account does not succeed in explaining why fiscal conservatives, some of them part of the China lobby in Congress and supposedly in favour of an active China policy, rejected repeatedly a number of measures to provide military and economic assistance to China in 1949.
In early 1949, the House Foreign Affairs Committee-that had previously made the support to the ERP conditional on a $150 million military aid to China-voted down an amendment to provide $200 million to China; and the same did the House when the China lobby presented a similar but more modest proposal. 11 Eventually, even if the Senate approved a request of $75 million to China in April 1949, this only succeeded because of its limited nature and purpose. The Connally amendment, under which the aid was granted, was in effect designed as a special fund to the president to spend at his discretion anywhere in China and the entire Asian region, without any accountability to Congress. 12 The great majority of the remaining funds authorised for China was used for humanitarian and reconstruction programs in 1949; at the same time, the National Security Council and the State Department rejected further monetary and military allocations, and the approved $75 million assistance to the general area of China, including Taiwan, was in fact spent elsewhere, making the China lobby's apparent success just an 'empty victory'. 13 The China lobby, a group mostly comprised of Republican congressmen, reached the peak of their influence over American foreign policy between 1947 and 1948, when the Republican party held the majority in both the House and the Senate.
Therefore, once the thesis of the influence of the China lobby is more properly assessed, Christensen's mobilisation model returns only a partial account for Truman administration's strategic posture towards the CCP between the end of 1948 and early 1949. As highlighted by John Garver, Christensen's account rejects the hypothesis that the CCP challenge to the perceived American interests in the region might have played an important role in the rise of the Sino-American hostility, for instance when it dismisses the impact of CCP seizure of US diplomatic personnel and properties between late 1948 and early 1950. 14 Furthermore, there is no discussion in Christensen's account for the Truman administration's apparently contradictory decision to disengage from the Kuomintang since late 1948 while, at the same time, pursuing a strategy of covertly supporting anti-Communist forces in China in 1949. 15 Once accounted for, this decision by Truman makes the mobilisational model advanced by Christensen less persuasive for the period here under consideration.
In conclusion, if neither ideological differences nor domestic politics can fully explain the Truman administration's decision to support anti-CCP forces in 1949-while at the same time disengaging the U.S. from the Kuomintang-then it is worth investigating alternative causes and to focus on actors, like Truman himself, whose beliefs and decisions have not been appropriately investigated in explaining this orientation. Interpreting this episode through Truman's nationalist beliefs offers this opportunity.
Nationalist beliefs, images, and foreign policy I conceptualise nationalist beliefs as the individual's moral attitude towards the national community of belonging. Therefore, nationalist beliefs are subjectively held by individuals belonging to a certain national community. 16 Nationalist beliefs are operationalised along a two-fold dimension: first, as the individual's understanding of their commitment towards the wellbeing of the national community of belonging; second, as the individual's loyalty and attachment to the national community of belonging expressed with claims supporting efforts at positive change. 17 Scholars of intergroup conflict have argued about the existence of a strong relationship between national and group identification, and self-esteem, with Daniel Druckman suggesting that 'nationalism links individuals' self-esteem to the [collective] esteem in which the nation is held' and that 'loyalty and identification with the nation become tied to one's own sense of self'. 18 Importantly, in studying the relationship between national loyalty and intergroup conflict, Druckman asserts that loyalty to the nations in individuals is associated to images about their own and other nations. 19 Cognitive images provide individuals with maps of the groups in their environment on which to act, and drive politics when they are shared by larger collectivities. 20 More specifically, images are a key factor involved in perception, which is a process of inference in which individuals-including decision-makers-develop understandings (the 'images') about other actors and what these will do in given circumstances. 21 Political psychologist have shown that the images individuals have of other countries become crucial elements in the identification of threats to self-esteem and opportunities to increase it, and they actively shape foreign policy preferences. 22 As argued by Herrmann and Fischerkeller, images operate as cognitive simplification devices organising and filtering information, and therefore they structure foreign policy decision making. 23 Against this background, I argue that the individual's loyalty towards the national community of belonging, by linking the individuals' self-esteem to the collective esteem in which the national community is held, triggers processes of intergroup discrimination between their own and other national communities of reference. 24 When the outcome of such a process is successful, considerations about differences in perceived status on political and/or cultural markers vis-a-vis another national community are considered positive, flattering or advantageous, returning an uplifted national self-esteem. 25 I suggest that to a successful intergroup discrimination and uplifted national self-esteem, it follows the establishment of an outgroup nationalist colony image (NCI). Nationalist colony images (NCI) reflect the national group's sense of superiority visa-vis another national group. Indicators of NCI of other nations can be traced back to the governing/foreign policy elite's remarks or claims of dislike, pity, or contempt towards such nations. When a NCI emerges, members of the ingroup holding nationalist beliefs will indicate the outgroup as politically, socially, and/or culturally backward and therefore in need of the ingroup's intervention to ameliorate the outgroup along these dimensions. 26 Hence, the outside exercise of control over the outgroup becomes a legitimate and morally warranted strategic aim. When such images originate in individuals belonging to the ruling elites, the intentions underpinning the ingroup's intervention in other national communities' affairs will be exploitative but presented as benign and to the benefit of these foreign communities. 27 A governing elite holding a NCI will pursue interventionist policies of economic, diplomatic, and military support to a third country or faction involved in a civil war, or direct military intervention abroad. 28 In the case of the United States, although the ruling elite coincides with the executive, the president remains the most relevant object of investigation on foreign policy, the figure on which the final word on foreign policy deliberations rests. This salient feature of the American institutional setting derives 'in part from the authority granted the president in the Constitution and in part from the combination of judicial interpretation, legislative acquiescence, personal assertiveness, and custom and tradition that have transformed the presidency into the most powerful office in the world'. 29 In the next section I process-trace the mechanisms by which Truman's nationalist beliefs influenced his decision to adopt a policy approach marked by a decidedly confrontational attitude vis-a-vis the CCP in early 1949. 30 In particular, the analysis of communications, correspondence, meetings, and other similar interactions occurred in private settings, and in which Truman was more likely to reveal to other key decision-makers and confidents his views on Chinese groups and actors object of intergroup discrimination, will help assess the mechanisms by which a certain image of China, and related foreign policy outcome, originated.

Truman's nationalist beliefs and the American support to anti-CCP forces in mainland China
Truman's nationalist beliefs: the domestic and foreign policy dimensions Truman's attitude towards the American national community can be traced in the 33 rd president's claims of commitment towards the wellbeing of the nation as well as his loyalty and attachment to the American community revealed in expressions of personal responsibility for the national constituency. In particular, Truman self-identified with and claimed to represent the whole nation: since he 'came to be elected by the whole people, he became responsible to the whole people. It is the President's responsibility to look at all questions from the point of view of the whole people'. 31 At the same time, accepting the existence of a public interest and elevating the national interest above any special interest or partisan views was key to a correct interpretation of the functions required by the presidency, and a core characteristic of Truman's nationalist beliefs. 32 Truman acknowledged his commitment to the American public in a speech in Raleigh, North Carolina, where-praising previous Democratic presidents like Andrew Jackson, James K. Polk, and Andrew Johnson-said that each of them 'did [their] duty as President of the whole nation against the forces of pressure and persuasion which sought to make him act as a representative of a part of the nation only'. 33 Truman believed that the American 'economic system should rest on a democratic foundation and that wealth should be created for the benefit of all'. 34 Since the 'prosperity of [the American] Nation is indivisible. We cannot get prosperity for just a few'. 35 Acting as a representative for each American citizen, Truman perceived himself as the 'guardian' of the national community: as such, he had to be ready to lead the country on the basis of his own evaluation of the best policy on behalf of the American people, and in order to favour the American national interest. 36 Truman's willingness to act on behalf of the American people was strictly intertwined with a sentiment of loyalty expressed through claims of support and concern for those Americans that had missed the opportunity to enhance their status and private wealth. Truman had 'a special sympathy for the fellow who does not have the advantages of those who belong to the socalled top-notch social outfits and privileged groups. And [he] have never lost sight of their problems'. 37 For Truman, the government's power was based on the consent of the people: the president had to be accountable to them and his role and actions shaped by this principle. As a result of tying the presidential power to popular legitimation, as well as to the constitution, Truman made his duty, representational role and requirements even more demanding to uphold. Truman's interpretation of his office was therefore highly consistent with his view of America and a key feature of the president's nationalist beliefs. 38 Truman's strong identification and connection with the American community remained an important feature and source of influence since his instalment as president in 1945 and then throughout the presidential years. 39 As a political leader strongly influenced by the populism of William Jennings Bryan and the progressive ideology of Woodrow Wilson and Robert La Follette, Truman conceived of the Democratic party as 'a grand pastiche of northern liberals and southern conservatives; of workers, farmers, and small businessmen; of ethnic minorities and blacks, nativists and segregationists; of energy producers and energy regulators; of machine bosses and good-government reformers'. 40 As a result, any source of interference or influence over him as a president-including 'the special interests' and the sources of 'private power' that might weaken or damage his ties of loyalty with the national community-needed to be rejected to pursue the 'interest of the people' and to 'stand for the rights of the people'. 41 Driven by the belief to be the 'guardian' of the American national community, the president rejected Congressional pressures and influence on his domestic and international agenda, and revealed that 'the proper thing to do [for the welfare of the country] is to do what I think is right and let them all go to hell'. 42 Among the 'proper' things to do, Truman relaunched his vision and priorities for profound domestic reforms; and reset American policy in China, in this case by stopping any additional aid to Chiang Kai-Shek beyond the China Aid bill.
At the domestic level, Truman interpreted his commitment to the American national community by revamping many of the policy proposals advanced at the end of 1945, collectively known as the Fair Deal, and whose legislative passage had been thwarted by the Republican-led Congress since thereafter. In the spring on 1948 the president committed himself to historical policy goals, including a programme for national health insurance, civil rights bills, a comprehensive federal housing policy, expansion of social security, the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, and federal aid to elementary and secondary education. 43 In 1948 Truman launched a historical civil rights program to win the African-American vote in the heavily populated industrial states of the North. Moved by a 'fusion of practical politics and democratic idealism'-that cost him the unity of the party and the birth of the States' Rights Democratic Party-Truman used his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention to push forward his plan of civil rights reforms. 44 Two weeks after the convention, on July 26, he bypassed Congress during the first day of the special session by issuing executive orders 9980 and 9981. The orders aimed at ending racial segregation and put into immediate effect, established 'fair employment practices within the federal establishment' and promoted 'equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed services'. 45 The summer of 1948 was a turning point in the American China policy: as Chiang Kai-Shek's army suffered from heavy defeats and gradually surrendered important outposts in North China, the Truman administration seized the opportunity to make a significant U-turn on the policy adopted thus far. Truman started to disengage from the Kuomintang by rejecting further requests from ambassador Stuart for additional military support in order for the administration to 'preserve a maximum freedom of action' in the country. 46 Members of the China lobby, which represented one clear example of those 'special interests' groups opposed by Truman, reacted vehemently to this policy turn. Senator Styles Bridge-chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and of the committee on foreign aid-denounced Truman's approach on China and urged the president to call a special session of the Eightieth Congress to discuss the opportunity to give aid to the Kuomintang. 47 In September, when the Kuomintang forces began to fall apart, Bridges sent the Democratic senator Clark of Idaho on a special mission to China to report on the ongoing economic and military conditions in the country. 48 Later in October, Alfred Kohlberg, a textile importer member of the China lobby and ally of senator McCarthy, attacked the administration and the Department of State and accused key figures like former vice-president Henry Wallace to 'build up the Communists' in China, and Acheson to be 'confused tools and unaware of the sinister forces' that from the United States had been aiding the Chinese Communists since 1944. 49 However, the re-election of Truman in November 1948, which was accompanied by the Democratic party regaining control of the House and the Senate, weakened the influence of the China lobby and domestic political competition over America's China policy between late 1948 and throughout 1949, thus allowing Truman's nationalist beliefs to play a more decisive role in the executive's foreign policy decision-making. 50 United States, China, and opportunities for intergroup discrimination According to Arne Westad, the election of Truman struck Chiang Kai-Shek as a 'big setback, almost on par with the military disasters' that the Kuomintang was concurrently experiencing in late 1948. 51 At the same time, Truman had to deal with the most delicate phase of the Chinese Civil War. In doing so, the president had the opportunity to engage with three major Chinese actors: the Kuomintang, the Chinese government, and Chiang Kai-Shek; the CCP and its leadership; and the general Chinese population. In combination with Truman's nationalist beliefs, two sets of events are likely to have triggered a process of intergroup discrimination vis-a-vis China over this period: the military defeats of the Kuomintang in the LiaoShen, the HuaiHai, and the PingJin campaigns, with concurrent defections or surrender of hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops and the PLA advancements in central China and Manchuria; and a mix of accusations towards the United States combined with pleas for further support, both coming from the Chinese government and the Kuomintang leadership.
The 'widening gap' between the Truman administration and Chiang over China was particularly fateful to the latter, and it resulted in a much weaker Chinese leadership. 52 The LiaoShen campaign reflected this growing gap. By mid-October, Chiang realised the need of United States assistance to guarantee his regime's survival and to protect Central China provinces from Communist attacks. However, on 12 October Washington gave the order to evacuate all American citizens from Beijing and Tianjin and, as a result of widespread corruption in the Kuomintang and Chiang's lack of leadership, on 22 October ambassador Stuart decreed that 'the present regime has lost confidence of people', a loss that 'is reflected in refusal of soldiers to fight and in refusal of people to cooperate in economic reforms'. 53 Throughout that month, the Department of State received reports from China highlighting that there was 'just no will to fight left' in the Kuomintang, and that the fall of several important outposts was 'caused by the defection … of a sizeable number of government troops'. 54 In a few days, the Communists took control of the entire Manchuria and almost 400,000 soldiers lost their lives, defected or were captured. 55 In November, the Communists launched a second major campaign-the HuaiHai campaign-which gave them control over the central provinces of China, with Chiang losing more 550,000 troops, including almost 64,000 defections. Finally, in a third and final campaign that started in late November 1948 and ended in January 1949-the PingJin campaign-another 500,000 troops were defeated, thousands defected to the Communists and both Beijing and Tianjin were captured-practically bringing the civil war to an end. 56 Chiang's ineffective attempt to make American public opinion more sympathetic over the issue of China aid in October, and the absence of additional support to the Kuomintang by the new administration left room to a stream of uncontrolled reactions by the Chinese government and army figures. Through diplomatic and other communications channels, Chinese counterparts started to openly blame this different America's China policy. In late October, General Bai Chongxi complained to an American diplomat about America loss of interest in fighting communism in China, noting that Marshall's earlier mediation with the Communists had prevented Chiang from defeating them. At the same time, the general hoped that the United States would 'no longer delay in extending substantial military aid'. 57 Writing to Marshall, ambassador Stuart reported a few general points agreed by the Legislative Yuan Foreign Affairs Committee-a branch of the Chinese government-that emerged from a meeting on Sino-American relations. The members of the committee indicated that the United States was largely to blame for the 'current Chinese mess … because of Yalta agreement, mediation efforts, and insufficient aid' and that therefore 'US military aid to Nationalists [was] an obligation'. The committee patronised their American ally by suggesting that was in fact CCP propaganda that 'led US to believe National Government corrupt and American aid ineffective'. For Stuart, such incoherent mix of accusations and implorations was the sign of a 'muddled thinking' emerged out of 'the desperation and panic' within the Chinese government, 'its frantic search for an answer, and its recognition of present hopeless situation'. 58 Likewise, an editorial published in the newspaper of an influential Kuomintang group criticised the United States for having 'adopted a "very fickle attitude toward China"' and reinstated charges that the current situation was 'due to Yalta, and American efforts of mediation between Communists and KMT'; it also added that the American consulate in Shanghai was 'spreading unfavorable news about war' and in so doing it had 'made a very regrettable impression in the minds of Chinese people'. Stuart interpreted such editorial as an 'unfriendly action' orchestrated to 'place blame on the US' as the military situation deteriorated. 59 Stuart also took note of the reactions of friendlier and more cooperative figures in the Kuomintang, like General Chang Chih-chung who had been 'one of the more active Government negotiators during General Marshall's Mission in China'. The general, trying to persuade the American government to grant a much-needed military and economic support, warned of a 'very general critical feeling toward US among all types of Chinese and expressed hope we would adopt clear-cut policy [of aid] and stick to it'. While Kuomintang 'followers blamed US for inadequate, long-delayed aid' the rest of the Chinese population not yet under Communist control 'blamed US for vacillating and inconsistent policy, however well-meaning, which only increased hardships of people and produced nothing constructive'. 60 After a meeting with Chen Li-fu-the Vice President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan-Stuart concluded that the 'tearful pleas for US aid to China in struggle against international communism' were only 'indicative of befuddlement in high Chinese Government circles' and their 'inability … to take any measures to help themselves'. 61 As the Kuomintang faced an overwhelming debacle during the autumn campaigns, Chiang Kai-Shek decided to undertake a last attempt to persuade the administration by sending his wife Song Meiling to Washington to meet personally with Truman and Marshall. 62 Song Meiling's visit to Truman went on for only 30 min in the late afternoon of 10 December 1948. The president refrained from commenting on the issue of more aid-in addition to the economic and military aid already allocated with the China Aid bill and that was still ongoing-and he denied on the possibility to send General MacArthur to China. As reported by the New York Times, although the president had listened 'sympathetically', there was 'no sign of a willingness to consider any new steps to help the Nationalist Government' and 'little this country could do that would make much difference at this stage, short of entering the conflict directly'. 63 So desperate was the situation, and unamendable the administration's position, that within the following few days Song cabled Chiang Kai-Shek that it was 'impossible to get American aid and … she urged Chiang to come to the United States'. 64 On December 16 the administration released a statement summarising the total cost of American aid to China until then-more than $3,884 million-and, as a reply to Chinese requests for sending a high-ranking American officer, Truman decided to withdraw the Joint United States Military Advisory from the country, after that it was formally established only on 1 November 1948. 65 That same day, Truman was informed by Hillenkoetter that Chiang was expected to resign in a matter of days as a consequence of Madame Chiang's failed mission. 66 Uplifted national self-esteem and the emergence of a colony image of China When Truman was confronted with the ongoing events in China and while engaging with the local actors throughout the afore-mentioned period, the bias towards the ingroup that came with national loyalty triggered a process of intergroup discrimination vis-a-vis China, whose successful outcome generated an uplifted national self-esteem and a colony image of China.
Key indicators of Truman's positive self-image in dealing with China are found in claims reflecting the president's conviction that the United States had done enough to support China through political, military, and economic means; and that the time had come for Washington to focus on other urgent issues while for the Chinese to take up the lead in preventing China from becoming communist. This position emerged by the end of 1948 and then continued throughout the whole of 1949. In a top-secret statement by Truman dated 26 November 1948, the president reiterated that, despite 'the earnest wish of this government and of the American people to see a strong, independent and united China' and the Congress' provision of 'substantial economic and military aid to China until April 3, 1949', the United States had to 'examine carefully, at every turn, how far we may go without prejudice to our own security and to our own economic stability, which is of vast importance to the entire world'.
As a result, Truman stressed that 'the Chinese government must take responsibility for the decisions to be made during this critical time, and which must arouse the Chinese people to a determined effort in their own behalf'. 67 Similarly, in a follow-up telegram to Song Meiling on December 27, 1948, Truman warned that it was 'hopeless to expect any further American support' at that stage. To communicate his belief that the United States had fulfilled their duty of support towards China and to avoid further killings among the Chinese population, the president offered 'to make way for negotiation [with the Communists through Russia] so as to prevent useless suffering of the [Chinese] people in the fight against communistic world domination'. 68 The president maintained this position until December 1949; when privately discussing the option of helping the Kuomintang establish a permanent basis in Taiwan and to send American troops and other military support, Truman made clear to Walter Judd, a Republican senator and a prominent member of the China lobby, that such open support had been offered in the recent past already with no use; unlike the Greek anti-communist forces, Truman asserted that the Kuomintang had refused to follow American guidance and surrendered 'every bit of aid we had given them'. 69 There was nothing that could be done for Taiwan either, and America's support to the Kuomintang, as far as Truman was concerned, ended officially on April 1949.
Against the background of a progressively deteriorating situation for the Kuomintang and the concurrent communist advancements, an uplifted national self-esteem resulting from Truman's conviction that the United States had done everything they could to support China quickly developed into a colony image of the Chinese.
On the one hand, the president became particularly resentful at the unrelenting and continuous Kuomintang's corruption and lack of competence, that started to emerge following the failure of the Marshall mission. At the end of November 1948, Truman reluctantly agreed to admit Chiang's wife to the United States for a final plea for help, but then he promptly dismissed Chiang's threat to look to the Soviets in case of no American support as coming from 'grafters and crooks'. 70 The president repeated twice the same contemptuous words towards the Kuomintang and their leaders in other private settings: first, during a conversation with David Lilienthal in May 1949; and then with William O. Douglas in 1951. 71 By 1950, Truman regularly referred to the Kuomintang government as the world's 'rottenest that ever existed', that 'had never tried to fight' against the Communists and that was comprised of 'corrupt bloodsuckers'. 72 On the other hand, Truman expressed similar claims of contempt and hostility towards the Chinese Communists. By referring to the 'so-called Communists', Truman opposed as early as January 1949 'any deal with a Communist regime' under any circumstances and approved documents that downplayed and diminished the CCP's ability to self-govern on the grounds that they had just 'moved from caves to chancelleries'. 73 Quite tellingly, the same memo declared that-if the Chinese Communists did not become independent from Moscow once in powerthen the United States had to 'discover, nourish and bring to power a new revolution, a revolution which may eventually have to come to a test of arms with the Chinese Communists'. 74 As revealed in later conversations, Truman considered the CCP as a 'cut throat organization' and 'a bunch of murderers'. 75 These startling considerations from the American president towards various Chinese groups revived and resurfaced some of the racial prejudices that animated the young Truman at the beginning of his political career-in particular when he revealed to his future wife that: 'I think that one man is as good as another so long he's honest and decent and not a nigger or a Chinaman. Uncle Will says that the Lord made a white man from the dust, a nigger from mud, then threw up what was left and it came down a Chinaman. He does hate Chinese and Japs. So do I'. 76 At the same time, however, Truman's colony image of China that emerged between the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949 made him consciously depict the rest of the Chinese population as victims of such groups, and as especially unfit to the Communist ideology; therefore, in need of the American noble and generous intent to alleviate their economic and political plight.
As suggested by Akira Iriye, during the crucial months between 1948 and 1949 'whether one took the pro-Kuomintang or the anti-Kuomintang stand, almost everyone expressed sympathy with and friendship for the people of China, victims of exploitation whether by the aristocratic, feudal elements or by ruthless Communist dictatorship'. 77 Truman was certainly no stranger to this ambivalent attitude towards China as showed by his claims expressing pity for the Chinese people when, as reported by Lilienthal, he blamed the Kuomintang government to have no 'interest in the millions and millions of Chinese who didn't have enough to eat' despite '2 half billion dollars had gone into China in recent years'; for the Kuomintang leadership, Truman continued, the 'rest of the people in China don't matter'. 78 Over an exchange with senator Vandenberg, Truman again expressed contempt for the Kuomintang when concluding that the 'corrupt' Chinese government was the ultimate cause of China's problems. 79 Truman's colony image of China, as revealed by the president's remarks, becomes even more evident during private discussions about the influence and role of communism and the CCP in the Chinese society. In his admission that Stalin was right in claiming that 'people of China will never be Communists', the American president was likewise convinced that the Chinese culture and society-which were thought to be characterised by 'a strong and rugged sense of individualism and democracy'-would be in conflict with communism and its model of social regimentation, and that the Chinese people would reject such unnatural ideology. 80 Therefore, Truman's colony image of China returned the perception of a country characterised by an American-like culture whose people, for which he expressed pity, had been badly failed by a corrupt and inept government, undeserving of any additional support, as well as by a puppet faction of the Soviet Union with whom no agreement, rapprochement or accommodation could be reached. 81 As hypothesised in the framework proposed in this article, it has been possible to trace key indicators of Truman's nationalist colony image. The analysis of remarks of dislike and contempt towards the Kuomintang and the CCP, as well as of the patronising claims expressing pity for the Chinese population, has revealed Truman's sense of superiority vis-a-vis China. The letter of transmittal accompanying the White Paper in July 1949-which Truman provided guidance to, signed off and then described as a 'clear and illuminating' document-encapsulated these attitudes: on the one hand, it accused the Chinese Communists to have 'foresworn their Chinese heritage' and, on the other hand, it invited to action against them, in the hope that 'the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke'. 82 However, exactly what policy approach did Truman take as a result of his colony image of China?

Strategic options and the decision to support anti-CCP forces
Following Chiang's retirement in January 1949, and between November 1948 and January 1949, the Truman administration was presented with a variety of strategic alternatives to replace their current China policy. In particular, and by ruling out any direct military intervention, three proposals were developed and considered for the post-Chiang era during the above timeframe: diplomatic pressure towards a new coalition government dominated by the CCP; a strategy of 'wedge-driving' and economic dependence; and continuing support to anti-CCP forces.
The 'diplomatic pressure' policy was initially promoted by ambassador Stuart; assuming that the American 'purposes in Far East continue best to be served by existence of political stability in China under friendly government' Stuart advocated the American support for a coalition government, led by the Communist Party, which contained 'indisputable elements of progress and reform'. 83 According to Stuart, although the Communists would initially enjoy a dominant position in such a government, the interaction between these elements of 'progress and reform' with liberal components of the government would produce 'permanent effects' on their ideology. Moreover, Stuart was confident that longer-term continued American economic aid dependent on 'certain conditions, such as the basic freedoms' and the emphasis on 'constructive gestures, our desire to help Chinese people, our advocacy of democratic institutions and free international intercourse, our traditional support of China's national independence' would have changed or diluted 'the anti-American feeling' of a government exclusively run by the CCP. 84 However, dealing with a Communist-dominated 'coalition' government would have been 'a matter of considerable complexity' given the CCP strong relations with the Soviet Union. Intelligence assessments conducted by the C.I.A. acknowledged that it was 'certain that the Chinese Communist Party has been and is an instrument of Soviet policy'; the eventuality of a Communist-dominated coalition government stood out as little appealing for the United States. 85 A strategy of 'wedge-driving' and economic dependence expected the establishment of a Communist-run China after the formal conclusion of the civil war. In formulating this proposal, their main proponents-officers at the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs-deemed a future Communist China still amenable to American influence. Otherwise known as 'Chinese Titoism', the proposal borrowed from Stuart's initial idea to use American economic leverage to generate pressure on a future coalition government; in this case, however, the aim was to push a Communist-only government to break with the Soviet Union-as it happened only a few months earlier in Tito's Yugoslavia. 86 Dean Acheson and the Division of Chinese Affairs argued against further military aid to indigenous anti-Communists movements-an action considered to be driving the Chinese Communists even closer to Moscow-and developed their favourite plan based on the maximisation of 'internal pressures' over the CCP once they had taken control of the country. To pursue this strategy, the United States should not establish comprehensive economic relationships with the CCP, but neither a total embargo that would have driven the CCP into the arms of Moscow. Instead, the United States had to show a 'restrained interest' or 'moderate restriction' to economic cooperation and trade with China even in the case CCP leadership had demanded that. By carefully controlling trade and economic overture to a Communist China this sophisticated proposal foresaw the achievement of a twofold objective: on the one hand, this limited economic activity was never meant to be enough to strengthen the CCP's hold on power; on the other hand, it would also pressure the Communists to reach out for more-especially with regard to goods and access to export markets that the Soviets could not provide-and in this way develop dependence on American trade and the overall American bargaining position visa-vis China. 87 The third and final proposal originated from inputs from the National Security Council, and it envisaged continuing American support to anti-CCP forces. This proposal departed from the previous ones in two significant ways: first, it rejected the possibility of a CCP-led China or the inclusion of the CCP in any coalition government; second, it assumed that the CCP-Soviet relationship was already too solid and the economic and strategic leverage of the Soviets over the CCP too strong to be undermined by mere diplomatic or economic means, which would have allowed for an American rapprochement. 88 According to the C.I.A., the 'possibility of a stabilization in Central China require[d] consideration' by the United States. 89 In order to prevent the whole China from becoming an adjunct of the Soviets, the National Security Council recommended that, following the collapse of the Chinese government and even in case of coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang, the United States had to 'furnish limited political, economic and military assistance to such of the non-Communist regional regimes as hold out promise of helping to prevent communist domination of China and to weaken and eventually to eliminate communist forces in China' while encouraging 'coordination, collaboration and eventual unification of the regional non-communist regimes'. 90 Regarding the regions of China under control of the Communists, the NSC made clear that the United States had to 'conduct aggressive political warfare designed to develop and increase rifts among the various factions in those areas, to the end that the Popular Front be fragmented and the minority Stalinist control isolated'. 91 An initial list of potential non-Communist regional leaders and recipients of American support had been provided to the American embassy in Nanking, shortly before the Council's special meeting held on 3 November 1948 to discuss this urgent matter. Among them there were members of the Ma Muslim family in Northwest China: Ma Hongkui in Ningxia, Ma Bufang in Qinghai, Ma Jiyuan in Gansu Corridor, and Ma Chengxiang in Xinjiang. 92 The State Department provided the president with a list of more than thirty Chinese non-Communist leaders deemed to be 'men of ability, sound character, and democratic outlook', often with a Christian background and educated in American universities. Such a list included former Chiang's ministers, regional governors from Taiwan, Sichuan, and Kwangtung, as well as military, labour, religious, political, and education leaders. 93 Despite frequent talks about Chinese Titoism or other forms of accommodation that entailed a more or less benevolent attitude towards the CCP, in the end the Truman administration did not formulate policy decisions that reflected such orientation, and Truman himself ever endorsed these courses of action. 94 Instead, by the end of February 1949 Truman decided to quietly ignore calls for Chinese Titoism and accommodation and opt for a policy of continued confrontation with the CCP. At the end of December 1948, both the Soviets and the CCP were aware of the future plans of the Truman administration in China. On 27 December Nikolai Roshchin-Soviet ambassador to China-highlighted the American 'unwillingness to support the bankrupt Jiang regime any further' in favour of establishing 'from the remnants of the [Chinese] regime and other reactionary elements a force which is able to oppose the CCP'. Likewise, in a letter from Mao to Stalin dated 30 December, the Communist leader stated that 'the Americans intend to proceed from active support for the Kuomintang to … support for local Kuomintang [groups] and local southern Chinese warlords, so that their military forces will resist the People's Liberation Army'. 95 Crucial to this decision was the emergence of Truman's nationalist colony image of China. Once established, this image made an American intervention in China a sensible, legitimate and morally warranted strategic aim due to the military inability and corruption of the Kuomintang, the CCP advancement, and the pitiful plight of the Chinese population. The continued American involvement in China through the support of anti-CCP forces that were unrelated to the Kuomintang leadership was still needed in the interest not only of the United States-in order to protect the credibility of the Truman Doctrine and as a last effort to contain communism in Asia-but also of the Chinese population themselves. The moral argument for some form of American intervention in China, and therefore for the maintenance of a confrontational orientation towards the CCP, laid in the American benevolent attitudes towards China, hope for economic progress and democratic development in the country, and in the underlying assumption that the interests of the two countries were indeed compatible, and that American intervention in the country ultimately benefitted China. 96 Therefore, Truman's overall colony image of China persuaded him in early 1949 that providing support to indigenous movements pursuing political resistance against the CCP was a coherent, legitimate, and morally warranted course of action. While the White Paper only wished for such a development, covert actions in support of a long-term popular revolt against communism in mainland China, led by pro-American forces independent from the Kuomintang, were approved and pursued by the administration as early as March 1949. 97 On 3 March 1949 Truman approved NSC 34/2 as the policy statement of the United States approach towards China. One of the recommendations of NSC 34/2 urged to 'avoid military and political support of any non-communist regimes in China unless the respective regimes are willing actively to resist communism with or without U.S. aid and, unless further, it is evident that such support would mean the overthrow of, or at least successful resistance to, the Communists'. 98 By adopting this policy statement, the United States officially committed not to support the Kuomintang government-which was firm in his request for unlimited additional economic and military aid; however, it remained open to alternative and more effective options. In particular, the final and concluding policy recommendation of NSC 34/2 (number 18) declared that the American 'principal reliance in combating Kremlin influence in China should, however, be on the activities of indigenous Chinese elements. Because we bear the incubus of interventionists, our official interest in any support of these elements, a vast and delicate enterprise, should not be apparent and should be implemented through appropriate clandestine channels'. 99 The type of 'vast and delicate enterprise' that such 'indigenous' actors had to pursue through 'clandestine channels' was outlined in a letter sent by Livingston Merchant-a businessman working for the American embassy in China-to Walton Butterworth, director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department, on 11 February 1949. The letter introduced a plan for 'China's part in a military defense of the Far East against Chinese Communists and the USSR' drafted by members of the Chinese Youth Party in the United States. 100 The enclosed top-secret and strictly confidential document mentioned prominent Democratic senators 'very very close to Truman'-such as senator Lucas, the majority leader in the senate; senator McGrath, who was chairman of the Democratic National Committee between 1947 and 1949; and senator Bloom. 101 The agreed 'working terms' set out a program-named 'Operation Belly'-which foresaw a 'defense-for-democracy' encirclement strategy on 'the eastern front vis-a-vis Soviet Russia'. In relation to China, the plan explained that Taiwan had to be used for 'ground force training and naval installations'; and it pointed out the 'provinces of Kwangtung, Hunan, Fukien, southern Kiangsi, Kweichow, Yunan, Szechuan, southern Shensi, Kansu, Ningxia, Chinghai, Western Suiyuan, and eventually Sinkiang will form the mainland of the Asiatic belly'. 102 Crucially, the document clarified that 'the so-called Moslem troops of the Ma family in the northwest shall be the bulwark of this flanking task force'. 103 As revealed in the recently declassified reports of the C.I.A.'s clandestine service run by the Civil Air Transport (CAT) and written by Alfred T. Cox-the then-president of CAT who ran covert operations in China alongside General Chennault between 1949 and 1950-in April Ma Hongkui requested ambassador Stuart further ammunition for his weapons to keep on fighting against the Communists. Stuart recommended the State Department to provide 'effective assistance' to the Chinese warlord, and he was backed in his plea by minister Lewis Clark in Canton. 104 As emerged from the discussions around 'Operation Belly' between representatives of the Chinese Youth Party in the United States and Truman's closest allies in the senate and the Democratic party, the president was indeed favourable in making the central provinces of China the base for anti-Communist defense in East Asia. The document outlining 'Operation Belly' is also important because it identifies the local actors-the Ma family-tasked with pursuing this course of action. As a result, recommendation 18 of NSC 34/2 signed in early March by the president perfectly encapsulates this new policy and reflects Truman's decision to support clandestine operations in China, including those presented in the top-secret and strictly confidential document. Aware of Truman's preference and the State Department's advice for a strategy of wedge-driving, it is very likely that Washington's envoys in China-and in particular the always careful American ambassador-supported enthusiastically Ma Hongkui's quest for more ammunitions in April despite Stuart formulating rather different options to deal with the CCP only a few weeks earlier.

Conclusions
The historical case presented in this article can account more convincingly and complement existing explanations for America's strategic approach to China between late 1948 and 1949, as well as for the American attitude towards the CCP in the same period. Arguably, Truman's enmity towards the CCP was not based on ideological distance: as a result of his colony image of China, Truman had been always sceptical about cultural and social compatibility between the Chinese society and communism, to the point that, according to historian Gordon H. Chang, he 'underestimated the extent to which the CCP had come to represent powerful aspirations in China'. 105 Truman's enmity for the CCP was ultimately rooted in the belief that Mao and his comrades were simply fighting on behalf of the Soviet Union, and therefore in their lack of agency as genuine Communist actors: the CCP was the instrument of 'foreign domination … masked behind the facade of a vast crusading movement which apparently has seemed to many Chinese to be wholly indigenous and national'. 106 Secondly, in the archival documentation analysed here there is no mention to the role of other domestic political actors, like the China lobby-which was instead openly and viscerally anti-Communist-in shaping Truman's decision to approve NSC 34/2 and encourage covert actions against the CCP. Even if plans for 'Operation Belly' were also reportedly discussed with two Republican figures associated with the lobby-senators Judd and Bridges-the key political actors holding power in Congress in that historical moment and appearing in the document were Truman's allies with no relation with the China lobby. Admittedly, it would have made little sense for the supporters of Chiang Kai-Shek in the senate to approve his dismissal, deny further aid, and at the same time make Muslim warlords-that had nothing to do with the lobby-the fulcrum of Chinese resistance to the Soviets. The lack of military assistance from the Kuomintang to the Ma warlords at some crucial passages in the resistance against the CCP in Lanzhou and Mongolia in the spring of 1949, lamented again by the Mas in August 1949, further confirms about the absence of any relationship or cooperation between these two Chinese groups, and therefore of any Mas' ties with the China lobby. 107 Most importantly, this article makes a twofold original contribution. On the one hand, by employing the novel concept of nationalist colony image, it adds a new analytical descriptor to the historiographical debate about U.S. empire in this crucial post-Second World War period. While not in opposition or alternative to material or ideological interpretations, the cognitive dimension of the decision-making process described by the concept of nationalist colony image-which in this historical case can be conceived of as an expression of Truman's racialised and hierarchical understanding of Sino-American relations-contributes to the scholarly conversation about the varied impact of nationalism over American foreign policy, 108 and to the recent literature on US imperial behaviour in the early Cold War period. 109 On the other hand, and by using underexploited evidence-including top secret letters outlining 'Operation Belly' as well as recently declassified material such as The History of Civil Air Transport (CAT) and a number of memoranda by Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the first director of the Central Intelligence Agency-this article also reveals that the American support to clandestine operations and the Ma family between March and June 1949 gained priority vis-a-vis efforts at Chinese Titoism over that period, and laid the ground for the so-called Chennault Plan and other well-documented covert initiatives pursued by the administration between June and November 1949. 110 This finding is significant as it demonstrates the United States' intention to develop a system of alliances with warlords in Western China as early as late 1948, during the final stages of the Chinese Civil War. These serious efforts, which began to materialise in the spring of 1949, reflected the American imperative 'to back potential regional leaders to replace Chiang' which were capable to guide regional anti-communist movements in the mainland. 111 The implementation of this strategic approach remained however short-lived: as soon as the People's Republic of China was officially established in late 1949, Truman gave renewed input to the strategy of Chinese Titoism by approving NSC 48/2, which rejected the Defense Department's insistence on economic warfare against the P.R.C., and accelerated the American military withdrawal from Taiwan as a precondition to Chinese Titoism. 112 Overall, the analysis of the American strategic approach to China between late 1948 and early 1949 suggests that the establishment of a collaborative relationship between a Communist China and the United States could have been possible in the early stages of the Cold War if Truman had been more willing to listen to Acheson and advisors in the Division of Chinese Affairs. 113 It is likely that, had Truman applied more restraint on the cognitive outcomes of his nationalist beliefs-that is, to his nationalist colony image of China-Sino-American relations might have developed in a different way during that period. It is worth noting that the interpretation offered in this article does not contradict, but rather complements and refines the conclusions reached over the 'lost chance' debate. Jussi Hanhim€ aki, summarising the 'lost chance' debate in 2003, wrote that it was between the immediate aftermath of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that there never was any chance, on both sides, to build a peaceful or at least non-confrontational relationship between the United States and the P.R.C.; therefore, not before October 1949, as I discuss in this article. 114 In addition to Arne Westad suggesting that it was during the Marshall mission, which ended in January 1947, that American policymakers lost the only chance during the late 1940s for building a cooperative relation with the CCP, 115 I argue that such a possibility was lost again between late 1948 and early 1949. Before the founding of the People's Republic of China, the American and CCP leaderships were not able to establish any fruitful diplomatic interactions, despite cautious and informal attempts at accommodating the CCP pursued by the American embassy in China between April and July 1949: first, the Huang-Stuart contact, prompted under ambassador Stuart's personal initiative but later rejected by the Department of State 116 ; and then the Chen-Stuart meetings, which however Washington did not follow up with by setting up talks with the CCP in Beijing. 117 What does this argument imply for how the United States should conduct strategic competition with contemporary China? Generally speaking, it suggests that if Washington wants to reach an accommodation or a more cooperative relation with Beijing on specific security issues it must be willing to set aside any preconceptions, stereotypes and cognitive shortcuts, including those triggered by leaders' nationalist beliefs. The United States and its leaders are of course not in control of how China would respond if it were to adopt a different course of action that, based on realpolitik principles, would lay the ground for a more cooperative relation on a series of limited but crucial issues. However, if an opportunity to reorient such re-emerging rivalry still exists, it is likely to be missed if American policymakers give way to the type of biases that shaped policy in early 1949.