Striving for trade not peace? Revisiting trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in the EU’s trade policy strategy amidst the Russia-Ukraine war

ABSTRACT This article dismantles the popular myth that the strategic framing of the EU’s trade with Russia following the 2014 ‘Ukraine crisis’ was nurtured by the liberal peace logic, and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine should be thus seen as an ultimate failure of a ‘liberal peace’ hypothesis. To challenge this argument, we provide a nuanced conceptualization of the trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in EU trade policy and apply it to the case of EU-Russia trade relations (2014–2022). We find that the trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in the EU’s framing of its approach to Russia has been shaped by the bargaining and restrictive logics. Though the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine does not immediately refute the liberal peace theory, we call for the critical reconsideration of the connections between peace and security concerns in the strategic and legal framing of the EU’s trade policy.


Introduction
Almost a decade ago, on 10 December 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 'in recognition of over 60 years of peace, reconciliation and democracy' (The Nobel Prize 2012).This formulation appeals to the nature of the EU as a peace project, which emphasizes the liberal values of free trade, democracy and the rule of law, 'but with a distinctly European twist an additional focus on functional integration and institutionalization' (Birchfield, Krige, and Young 2017, 3).Besides linking the internal and external aspects of security, the EU is known for its peace through trade policy in conflict-prone contexts, such as former Yugoslavia, Libya and, partly, the post-Soviet space (e.g. using trade instruments to facilitate political dialogue between Moldova and non-recognized Transnistria) (e.g.Belloni 2009;Kamel 2016;Kemoklidze and Wolff 2020).In all these cases, the Union utilized the prospect of more active trade with the EU and/or integration into European economic structures as a positive conditionality tool or, in simple words, a 'carrot' to foster stability within the conflictual orders (e.g. in Libya) and between them (e.g.Kosovo/Serbia relations).The negative conditionality logic underpinned the sanctions regime the EU introduced against Russia in connection to its aggression in Eastern Ukraine in 2014/2015.The condition for the operation of the sanctions regime has been the implementation of the 2015 Minsk Agreement, 1 providing for the reintegration of Ukrainian territories controlled by Russia through its proxy Donetsk and Luhansk 'People's Republics' (Council of the EU 2015).While these sanctions were relatively weak from an economic standpoint (Van Bergeijk 2022), the EU continued actively trading with Russia following its annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine, with the EU being Russia's first trading partner in 2021, accounting for 37.3% of its trade in goods (European Commission, High Representative 2021).
Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 thus became a 'cold shower' for the EU's peace-through-trade discourse but also the strategic and legal framing of the tradesecurity nexus in the EU's trade policy.We distinguish between peace as the absence of war or active hostilities, which does not preclude countries from competing at various terrains (e.g.political, economic or technological).Security goes beyond the mere absence of violence to incorporate, inter alia, political, economic, energy and information security.In both senses, the EU appeared to be unprepared for a major war in Europe.From the trade-peace nexus standpoint, the benefits of active trade with the bloc and the threat of new sanctions should have stopped Russia from waging a war against Ukraine, the EU's close ally.In trade-security nexus terms, a key critique was linked to the fact that, while providing billions in military and economic assistance to Ukraine, EU Member States continued paying much more to Russia for energy supplies (e.g.Kalymon 2022).Though the Member States agreed on imposing a coal and oil embargo on Russia, it could not be put into operation immediately.Deciding on a price cap on Russian refined oil products was only taken on 3 February 2023, almost a year after Russia invaded Ukraine.Though by now EU Member States significantly decreased their dependence on Russian gas, a gas embargo is still debated.In this context, it is broadly argued that the case of the EU's energy dependence on Russia and de facto funding of its aggression undermines the very idea of using trade to promote peace, in general, and in the EU's engagement with Russia specifically (e.g.Geis and Schröder 2023).Instead, it is increasingly often suggested that the EU revisits its strategic interdependencies with others and ensures that trade relations with third countries do not hamper EU, Member States and associated countries' security (e.g.Zerka 2022).
In this vein we ask: In which had the legal and strategic framing of the EU's trade with Russia embedded peace and security considerations?This contribution approaches this question from the perspective of linkages between trade and peace as well as between trade and security, rather than the EU's policy vis-à-vis Russia and EU-Russia relations.In doing so, it seeks to depart from the EU's Russia policy-centered lens in the wartime debate on trade with Russia (e.g.Siddi 2022aSiddi , 2022b;;Van Bergeijk 2022) and illuminate a broader challenge of consistently embedding peace and security considerations into the EU's trade policy strategy.The analysis thus starts with reconsidering the theoretical foundation behind the linkages between trade and peace, and trade and security.Thereby it refers to the notion of a 'nexus', stemming from sustainability studies and meaning both synergies and trade-offs between two (or more) concepts (Liu et al. 2018).Then it reflects on the way these theoretical ideas are manifested in the EU's primary external relations law and strategic documents in the domains of foreign policy, security, trade and energy, adopted in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine in 2014.The analysis proceeds with an insight into the framework legal and strategic documents governing the EU-Russia trade specifically.As a result of the legal analysis and content structuring analysis, the article shows that the EU used bargaining and restrictive logics, rather than the liberal peace logics, when shaping trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in the strategic and legal framing of its trade with Russia.It also highlights potential conceptual contradictions between peace and security considerations in the EU's trade policy strategy that may influence related legislation and, consequently, trade practices.

Liberal peace theory and the bargaining argument. Critique of the liberal peace approach
Despite the volume of works on the connection between trade and peace, there is no consensus among scholars as to whether an increase in bilateral trade reduces the probability of an interstate conflict (e.g.Barbieri 2002;McDonald 2004).There is also a dissensus regarding terminology, since various contributions speak not only about 'foreign trade' and 'international commerce' but 'economic interdependence' and 'economic integration' (Caruso 2017;McDonald 2004).Furthermore, it is unclear whether high bilateral trade volumes should reduce the probability of a conflict between the two states in question or whether its deterrence effects can spillover to third states.Already these aspects of the dissensus make it challenging to argue a simple and straightforward relationship between a more intense exchange of goods and/or services between countries and the probability of an armed conflict (Barbieri 2002, 3).As discussed below, an additional layer of complexity is added by the factor of the multilateral trading system and the degree to which a state in question benefits from it.
A straightforward relationship between trade and peace is, however, argued by the proponents of the 'liberal peace' view or, as Barbieri (2002) calls it 'the unconditional liberal hypothesis' (p.2), traced back to Charles Montesquieu and Immanuel Kant.Under this hypothesis, trade promotes peace between trading partners, irrespective of the nature of economic linkage and the context within which they evolve (Barbieri 2002, 2).The key rationale behind the liberals argument is that trade is conducive to peace, because military conflict discourages trade or, to put it differently, makes it useless for partners to escalate disputes to wars (Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010, 764).
Alongside this positive trade-peace logic, Hegre, Oneal, and Russett (2010) advance the bargaining argument, whereby trade is viewed as conducive to peace, since trade and investment relations offer a party to trade relations the leeway to send costly signals as a response to aggression by the other party, e.g. by introducing unilateral sanctions (Ibid).The bargaining argument is widely reflected in the literature on economic statecraft and sanctions, conceptualizing them as a coercive bargaining tool, rather than the instrument of shrinking an aggressor's economic base (e.g.Bapat and Kwon 2015;Rose 2005;Schwebach 2000).To be able to utilize sanctions as a bargaining tool or, more broadly, exert its power through trade, an actor should have a considerable power in trade, determined by the size of its market and engagement in international trade (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006).Zerka (2022) makes recourse to the bargaining argument in his analysis of the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels, claiming that eliminating interdependencies with Russia would mean losing a tool of leverage over the Kremlin (Ibid).He thus stresses that the EU requires not only power in trade but trade and resulting interdependencies with a target actor (potential or actual aggressor) to promote peace through trade.While acknowledging that a bare reliance on 'the unconditional liberal hypothesis' is too simple and naïve, Zerka (2022) continues by arguing that 'Europeans have already shown Russia that economic blackmail is a double-edged sword'.He calls for a 'proportionate' and 'prudent' engagement with Russia, thus, indirectly acknowledging that mere trade and interdependence is not enough to prevent wars, and more attention needs to be paid to the features of a trading partner and its economy, as well as the nature of an interdependencies being created and their economic impact.
This conclusion can be seen as relevant in terms of both the bargaining and the liberal peace logic.In both respects, it can be substantiated by the results of research by Martin, Meyer, and Thoenig (2008), who sought to answer the following question: 'If trade promotes peace, as suggested by the European example, why is it that globalization, interpreted as trade liberalization at the global level, has not lived up to its promise of decreasing the prevalence of violent interstate conflicts?' (p.866).In their subsequent quantitative analysis, Martin, Meyer, and Thoenig (2008), show that it is not the size of trade flows but the geographical structure of trade and the balance of openness to multilateral and bilateral trade that influences the probability of an armed conflict (p.894).
Coming to the critique of the liberal peace idea specifically, we would like to note that its critics usually support their positions by examining factors which may influence the trade-peace relationship, rather than fully denting the idea of trade being conducive to peace (e.g.Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010, 764;Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins 2010).Yet, some of the factors that tend to be included in the trade-peace model (e.g.proximity/ inter-capital distance and nation size) are quite challenging when it comes to their empirical use and comparisons.While the proximity argument makes sense in light of the LSG (loss of strength gradient) logic (meaning that the further away an army goes from a home country, the weaker it gets) (Boulding 1962), it fails to explain variation in the occurrence of conflicts between neighbouring countries that trade with one another (Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins 2010, 7).Nation size, whether it is calculated in terms of the population size, production size or their aggregation also seems to be a problematic variable, since size does not necessarily correlate with an actor's military power and/or its willingness to fight (Ibid).In other words, the size of a country, its strong military potential and its external interests do not automatically result in its desire to project power through military means.Keshk, Reuveny, and Pollins (2010) thus express concern as to whether it is correct to present 'an interstate conflict' as a binary variable, as most statistical datasets do.Authors substantiate this concern by the fact that many conflict datasets include relatively low-level military incidents, which do not influence trade (Ibid,p. 11).
Another factor, often referred to by critics of the liberal peace theory, deals with the asymmetries in trade relations and interdependencies.It is commonly asserted that trade reduces incentives for conflict only in relatively symmetric dyads or, in other words, where trade matters to both parties in equal terms (e.g.Hegre, et al., 2004).Yet, as shown by Barbieri (1996), it may be the degree, rather than the nature of interdependence, which influences the likelihood of militarized disputes between countries actively engaged in trade.She finds that it is 'extreme interdependence', whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, that raises the likelihood of an armed conflict.What can also matter in this debate is the nature of previous/existing relations between the trading countries ('friends'/'adversaries) and their trade relations with other countries, i.e. an ability to reinforce trade relations with third countries in an event of a conflict in order to compensate for economic losses (Garfinkel, Syropoulous, and Yotov 2020).With this, the factor of asymmetry in trade relations also should not be regarded as an immediate predictor of an armed conflict.Moreover, the use of different datasets embracing various geographical areas and time periods can demonstrate variegated evidence given contextual differences, namely those pertaining to studied countries' political regimes, (geo)political interests and their choice of means to facilitate such interests.Similarly, the literature on economic leverage and the effectiveness of sanctions and sanction threats offers an account of factors that influence the use of trade as a bargaining tool (e.g.Kavakli, Chatagnier and Hatipoğlu 2020;Peterson 2020), such as an initiating and target actor's positions in global trade networks, the size of their economies, the degree and nature of economic interdependencies between them, as well as the opportunities for a target actor to diversify its trade.

EU approaches to the trade-peace nexus
The review of literature on the EU's trade strategy reveals three distinct logics behind the way the EU links trade and peace in the realms of its trade, foreign and security policy strategies.The former reflects the liberal peace hypothesis, implying that more intense trade between two non-member countries (or a third country and a non-recognized entity) and between them and the EU, will foster peace in conflicting areas.More suitable for the intra-state realm, the second approach is built on an assumption that more intense trade with the EU and the prosperity it creates fosters stability and, therefore, security and peace within states.As it can be exemplified by the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), such a logic can be also seen as speaking to the trade-security nexus, as the EU sees prosperity, stability and absence of conflict in neighbouring countries as a prerequisite of security and stability within the Union (Lavenex 2017).Thirdly, the EU may base its action on negative conditionality, using economic restrictions to foster peace.As we show below, case studies from the EU's policies vis-à-vis the countries and regions all over the world demonstrate the limitations of each of these lines of argument, mainly stemming from domestic contextual factors and the influence of third actors.Kamel (2016) finds that 30 years of the EU's (and formerly the European Communities') active economic engagement with Iran andIraq (1979-2009) neither prevented the Iran-Iraq war, nor stopped these countries from applying efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.In his view, the failure of the EU's long-term peace-through-trade strategy in this context stemmed from complex ideological and political cleavages in the region.Actively advanced by the EU, trade interdependence between Serbia and Kosovo is found to have played 'a very limited role in the peacebuilding process', failing to prevent major political disputes between the two actors (Milošević and Hrnjaz 2018).The authors link this finding to the significance of obstacles to normalization between Serbia and Kosovo, such as political tensions and problems with the implementation of the agreement on border management (Ibid).At the same time, EU leverage in both Serbia and Kosovo, achieved through both political and economic integration with the Union, is recognized in literature as conducive to the Serbia-Kosovo normalization process (e.Bashota and Hoti 2021;Visoka and Doyle 2016).In case of Transnistria, its participation in the EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) reportedly strengthened this breakaway territory's bond with Moldova and fostered peace between the two (Milakovsky 2020).Evidence from Libya under the last years of Gaddafi's rule is illustrative of external trade's failure to foster stability and peace amid 'the Middle Eastern state's [complex] ethnographic and historical make-up' and its pursuit of a weapons of mass destruction programme and the sanctions which this induced (Kamel 2016).More broadly, the focus on functional cooperation and 'political myopia' is mentioned as a reason for destabilization in both Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods in the second decade of the 21 st century (Lavenex 2017).Not least, unilateral restrictive measures are also not a panacea to ensure peace, yet they may have a tangible impact even on an ongoing conflict, inter alia, by reducing its resource and financial base (Portela and Usobiaga 2015).
Thus, both evidence from theory and scholarship on the EU's application of trade to promote peace point to the ambiguous nature of the relationship between trade and peace and it being influenced by an array of economic, political and geopolitical factors.

Trade-security nexus
As discussed in the introduction, this article distinguishes between peace (understood as the absence of a militarized conflict) and security as a broader concept, meaning an entity's being secure from various types of threats.We also seek to stress that promoting security through trade does not equate to a peace-through-trade strategy, given the difference between the peace and security concepts and, thus, end policy goals and the toolbox being used.There may also be nuances as to whose peace and security is meant: the EU's as a policy-making and implementing entity or third country (or countries) to whom the policy is directed.As shown above, the peace-through-trade approach mainly signifies the EU's efforts to prevent and/or resolve conflicts in third states, while the tradesecurity nexus has an immediate focus on the EU's security and the operation of a collective security regime.At the same time, the EU's efforts to create a 'ring of friends' via the ENP, can be seen as a critical aspect of ensuring EU security.Even more broadly, the connections between the trade-peace and trade-security nexus can be best captured with a quote from the EU External Action Service (EEAS) website, stating that 'In an increasingly interconnected world, Europe's security starts abroad' (European Union External Action Service 2021).
The contemporary global security environment is marked by the combination of traditional threats (armed conflicts, conventional weapons and WMD) and nontraditional or hybrid ones, not immediately connected to the military domain (e.g.Giannopoulous, Smith, and Theocharidou 2020).Notably, hybrid warfare can be utilized by both states and non-state actors, whose involvement merely aims 'to generate a situation where it is unclear whether a state of war exists -and if it does, who is a combatant and who is not' (Thornton, 2015, p. 41).State actors, nevertheless, dominate the contemporary hybrid threats landscape, for instance, when it comes to the economy and infrastructure.
Against this background, our review of literature on the trade-security nexus was guided by two questions: 'What is the role of trade in ensuring one's security in the contemporary contested security environment?' or 'How should an international actor such as the EU design its trade-security nexus in a networked world?'.We looked both at general literature at the crossroads between trade and security, as well as the literature on security considerations in EU trade policy, as well as the literature on trade and security aspects of EU-Russia relations.The literature review demonstrated the lack of attempts to comprehensively map the interfaces between trade and security either in general Political Science/International Relations literature or EU Studies scholarship, including the scholarship on EU-Russia relations and the ENP.Table 1 summarizes the findings of the review, indicating literature strands that offer answers to two questions, guiding our review: This review demonstrates that, at a strategy level, the key challenge international actors (including the EU) try to address is finding the balance between making  (Muravska and Berlin, 2016).
Source: author's own elaboration.Due to the word limit, each point is illustrated by one source.
economic use of interdependencies created by trade, on the one hand, and ensuring that these interdependencies do not hamper one's security in the economic domain or beyond.The latter concern determines the restrictive logic of linking trade and security, i.e. having to limit trade and resulting interdependencies, highlighted in many of the literature substrands addressed above, such as the securitization of economic policies, security-driven unilateral trade policy or security in EU-Russia energy trade.The concepts of economic security and strategic autonomy also envisage restrictions on an actor's reliance on trade and interdependencies it creates because of security considerations.A different (and peculiar) logic is manifested by the ENP that sees prosperity, fostered in third countries through trade with the EU, as a means to avoid destabilization and the emergence of security issues at EU borders.

Four logics behind the trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in EU trade
In sum, the review of general Political Science/International Relations and EU-specific literature on peace and security concerns in trade enabled us to identify four logics behind the trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in the EU trade policy.The logics, presented in Table 2 below, were distinguished based on our close reading of sources, analyzed in two subsections above, whereby we focused on understanding mechanisms by which trade is expected to advance peace and/or security with a particular emphasis on the EU trade policy.Neither of the considered logics or their combinations is, however, unique to the EU-Russia relations.

Methodology
Methodologically, the study combines a 'back letter law' review with structuring content analysis of documents.We selected legal acts and documents for analysis in accordance with our ambition to explore the legal and strategic framing of the connections between trade and peace, and trade and security in the key documents.Thus, our selection focused on distinguishing framework thematic acts that set the context for and provide for the principles of concerned sectoral strategies (i.e.foreign policy, trade and energy 2 ) and geographical strategies focused on Russia.Since economic sanctions constitute the key element of the EU's response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine, our selection strategy also targeted sanctions-related policy documents.Overall, we selected 25 acts, three were approached from the legal perspective and 22 were analyzed through the lens of structuring content analysis.Their overview of the analyzed documents is available in Annex I.The 'black letter law' review focuses on the letter of the law or, to put it differently, a detailed analysis of the contents of legal acts.The 'black letter law' method does not envisage considering the socioeconomic context against which the law was adopted or law implementation practices, yet its application requires having a solid understanding of the legal system in question and its organization.This legal research method suits our goal of finding out whether and, if yes, in which ways, EU primary law provides for linking trade, peace and security objectives of EU external action.Though the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is a bilateral agreement, we decided to include it into analysis as the only framework legal document, setting the basis for EU-Russia relations and the EU's strategy-making.Notably, focusing on the legal framework and strategy levels, our analysis did not include EU specialized secondary law instruments, such as the legislation on export controls or anti-coercion.
Aimed at 'filter[ing] out particular aspects of the material, to give a cross-section through the material according to pre-determined ordering criteria, or to assess the material according to certain criteria' (Mayring 2014, 64), structuring content analysis enabled us to analyze relevant thematic and geographical strategies of the Union.We preferred structuring content analysis to discourse analysis, since our objective is concerned with tracing the connections between the policy objectives in question, rather than dealing with the language used by the EU to create meanings in the context of its foreign policy, trade and energy strategies.Thus, structuring content analysis was performed to trace respective nexuses in the EU post-2014 foreign and security policy, trade and energy strategies and strategy-level documents pertaining to Russia, as well as the Council documents on sanctions.The analysis was conducted with NVivo 12 software.As shown in the attached codebook (Annex II), coding categories encompassed subject matters in question (e.g.'trade', 'economic interdependencies, "economic integration", "peace", "security" and "stability"), The methodological approach utilized in the article can be applied to further deepening of research on the topic (for instance, supplemented with the Member States' dimension) and/or exploring the interplay between EU foreign policy objectives in other contexts.

Trade, peace, and security in EU primary law
One of the relevant innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty has been the harmonization of the EU's foreign policy objectives (Art.3, particularly 3(5), and Art.21( 2)) TEU).The introduction of an exhaustive list of EU foreign policy objectives testifies to the constitutionalization of the EU's legal order with an aspiration to a more consistent and coherent foreign policy (Larik 2016).Notably, the terms 'consistency' and 'coherence' are merely used in practice and research in an interchangeable way (Taufar 2017, 3).A slight line between them can be drawn as follows: 'while consistency is checked against criteria, defined in advance, coherence reflects the overall result of the policy' (Tulmets 2008, 111).Tulmets (2008) suggests conceptualizing consistency and coherence in foreign policy as embracing institutional, horizontal, vertical and geographical dimensions.Institutional and vertical consistency/coherence refers to the avoidance of contradictions and building synergies between various institutions and agencies involved in foreign policy-making, and between the EU's and Member States' foreign policies respectively.Ideally horizontally consistent or coherent policy means the achievement of synergies between various objectives and aspects of foreign policy (e.g. trade and security policy), and a required minimum is to avoid a situation where the quest to achieve one objective hampers the achievement of others.Not least, the debate on geographical consistency/coherence focuses on the geographical distribution of the EU's foreign policy efforts and resources.
Both Art.3(5) and 21( 2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) refer to both the promotion of peace and security, and free trade globally as the objectives of the EU external action.Both provisions refer to safeguarding and encouraging peace, security, 'free and fair trade' (Art.3( 5)) or the 'integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade' (Art.21( 2)(e)) on the same footing (European Union 2012a).In other words, the formulation of EU foreign policy objectives does not oblige EU institutions either to use trade as a lever to advance peace, security and prevent conflicts or integrate trade concerns into the peace and security action.Few explicit connections between trade, and peace and security are contained in other primary law norms, e.g.Art.346 TFEU, which stipulates each Member State's right to 'take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with . . ..trade in arms, munitions and war material' (European Union 2012b).Thus, it is primarily the requirement of consistency/coherence, stipulated in Art.21(3) TEU, which obliges EU institutions to consider nexuses between various foreign policy objectives in its respective strategic documents and policies.With this, we will proceed with an insight into the trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in the EU foreign and security strategies.

Foreign and security policy strategies
For the purposes of this section, we will focus on two key EU strategic documents in the foreign policy and security domain, namely the 2003 EU Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS).Though we look at the period between 2014 and 2022, the 2003 ESS is of relevance since it offers a useful basis for comparison, i.e. illustrating the EU's shift from a liberal and normative to a more self-interest-oriented and pragmatic power on the world arena (e.g.Biscop 2016).We show that this discursive change embedded, inter alia, a shift from a positive liberal logic of seeing trade and economic interdependencies as a driver for peace and security towards the restrictive and bargaining logic, as manifested in the ESS and EUGS respectively.
The 2003 ESS is overall marked by confidence in a highly positive picture of trade, whereby trade and investment flows are seen as having 'brought freedom and prosperity to many people in the post-Cold War environment', alongside other policies, such as technological development and democracy promotion (European Union 2003).'Trade cooperation' is mentioned as a foundation for a "more capable and effective Europe (p.21).Besides, the ESS is illustrative of the 'promotion of prosperity and stability through trade' logic, when it comes to 'upgrading the political and economic relations' with Eastern Neighbours and reform promotion in other third countries (Ibid,p.23).Trade activities are also seen as a part of the EU toolbox for crisis management and conflict prevention, alongside political, development and humanitarian instruments.
Despite its positive mode, the ESS also relies on a restrictive logic.When framing the EU experiences of contributing to fostering security through the multilateral trading system, the ESS mentions not only intra-EU confidence-building but the introduction of politicolegal regimes for arms control.In this vein, the Strategy expresses the EU's support for the adoption of the International Arms Treaty and its determination to combat organized crime through trade measures, especially when it comes to trade in timber, gemstones and small arms.It also mentions piracy and conflicts over trade routes due to climate change as potential threats connected to trade.
In contrast to the ESS, the EUGS is marked by the focus on the EU's self-interest and, thus, calls for the EU's 'principled pragmatism' (European Union 2016).The Strategy sees trade as a part of a 'balanced engagement' with countries having political disagreements with the EU (e.g.Russia, Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries) but does not put high hopes on its immediate peace effects.Besides, the EUGS adheres to a logic similar to the 'promotion of prosperity and stability through trade'.Instead of stability and/or stabilization it, however, focuses on building third states' resilience.In contrast to the idea of stability, which signifies a static condition and the absence or even avoidance of crises, 'resilience' recognizes the inevitability of internal and external crises and emphasizes 'the ability of states and societies' to reform, withstanding them (Ibid,p.23).In both cases, trade is not the only component of the EU's toolbox but is seen as a part of a 'joined-up' approach, which shall combine various instruments.
Compared to the ESS, the EUGS demonstrates a broader and more determinate framing of both the trade-security and trade-security nexuses when it comes to the combination of restrictive and bargaining logics.It argues, inter alia, that 'a political economy of peace [. ..] also means working to break the political economy of war and to create possibilities for legitimate sustenance to exist' (Ibid, p. 31).Subsequently, coordinated use of restrictive measures (e.g.export control for dual-use goods) and diplomacy is viewed as 'key tools to bring about peaceful change' (Ibid,p.32).
With this, the comparison between the ESS and the EUGS demonstrates the EU's emerging awareness about the limitations of both a liberal peace-based foreign policy and the focus on stability as an intermediary of security.In this context, we witness the Union's increasing reliance on the combination of bargaining and restrictive approaches to linking trade, peace and security agendas.

Trade and energy strategies
This subsection of analysis reveals that neither the EU's post-2014 trade nor energy strategies followed the liberal peace logic.Similar to the EUGS, the most recent EU trade strategy is illustrative of the EU's shift from a focus on stability as an intermediary of both peace and security to the combination of bargaining and restrictive logics.We substantiate these statements with a comparative analysis of the 2015 European Commission's 'Trade for All' Strategy and the 2019 Trade Policy Review 'An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy', as well as an insight into the 2014 Energy Security Strategy, related Council conclusions and the 2030 Framework for climate and energy.
Despite its focus on NTPOs, the 2015 'Trade for All' Strategy rhetorically connects trade solely to 'stability' and 'stabilization', rather than peace and security (European Commission 2015).Except for referring to trade as a 'stabilizing force' for the Union, this Strategy also mentions it as a part of the EU's stabilization policy in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods (Ibid,p.8).A rather short paragraph on Russia labels the tightening of EU-Russia ties as 'the EU's strategic interest' (Ibid, p. 34).The Strategy does not, however, envisage the EU's active role in liberalizing or pacifying Russia, as it notes that the prospects for the EU-Russia economic rapprochement will be 'primarily determined by the course of Russia's domestic and foreign policy' (Ibid).On a restrictions side, exports controls policy of dual use goods is defined by the Strategy as a priority (especially with respect to human rights in the digital domain).
A strong focus on unilateral restrictive measures can be seen as a manifestation of assertiveness under the 2019 EU's 'Open, Strategic and Assertive Trade Policy'.Under this Strategy, the Commission seeks to find a 'fine line' between the EU's openness and readiness to engage with trade partners and the protection of its own interests and security (European Commission 2019).The Review thus demonstrates relatively moderate transformative ambitions, merely focusing on joining-up EU trade agreements and unilateral instruments to promote human rights and sustainable development in partner countries.Besides, autonomous measures are framed as a means to protect the EU's interests and security, inter alia, with respect to the rise of China, unsustainability of food supply chains and digitalization.In contrast to the 2015 Strategy, the 2019 Strategy did not at all mention Russia.
Similar to the trade strategies, neither of the considered strategic documents in energy domain uses a liberal peace argument in relation to energy trade with Russia (European Commission 2014; European Council 2014a).In contrast, energy dependence on Russia is framed as a challenge to be addressed through diversification.Yet, despite diversification attempts (e.g. the 2016 liquefied natural gas and gas storage strategy (European Commission 2016)) and a focus on renewable energy, the 2020 EU Energy Policy Review reveals Russia's continually central role in the European markets for fossil fuels (International Energy Agency 2020).Thus, as EU energy policy research reveals, it had been 'existing path dependencies in the EU-Russia energy relationship, together with market forces [that] continue [ed] to drive bilateral trade' prior to the 2022 full-scale war, rather than the liberal peace directedness of the EU's energy strategies (Siddi 2022b, 237).Thus, neither the EU's post-2014 foreign and security policy strategies, nor those in trade and energy terrains had been fueled by the liberal peace logic.Instead, we trace the growing role of bargaining and restrictive logic to the way the EU rhetorically connects trade, peace and security.

Eu's engagement with Russia (2014-2022): no liberal peace concerns
This part of the analysis focuses on the framing of trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in the legal framework and strategic documents governing EU-Russia relations between 2014 and 2022.It reveals that the EU legal and policy documents focused on Russia predominantly apply bargaining and restrictive logics to shaping the trade-peace and trade-security nexuses, respectively, rather than address trade as a means to foster liberal peace.The 2010 EU Partnership for Modernization with Russia, which never became reality, is the only initiative at question clearly manifesting the liberal peace logic. 3

partnership and cooperation agreement and a failure of the 2010 partnership for modernization
Concluded in 1997, the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) still constitutes the legal framework of the EU-Russia political and economic relations (European Communities 1997).It contains provisions on trade in goods and trade in services based on the GATT most-favoured nation treatment provisions and GATS, respectively, but does not link trade to either a peace or security agenda.In line with Art. 1 and Art.3 PCA, the Parties considered negotiating a new agreement, but these attempts failed amid Russia's use of force in Georgia and energy security issues, i.e.Russia's weaponization of gas supplies to Ukraine and Moldova (Dettke 2011).
In 2010, the EU and Russia announced a Partnership for Modernization as a framework for 'promoting reform, enhancing growth and raising competitiveness' (Council of the European Union, 2010).As the initiative was advocated by Germany, it is characterized in the literature as the 'Ostpolitik for Europe' (Stelzenmüller 2009).It was adopted as a response to Russia's newly elected President Medvedev's suggestion to create a new security architecture in Europe, involving both NATO and the former Warsaw Pact institutions (e.g. the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS) (Dettke 2011).Interestingly, ensuring the openness of Russia's economy through its WTO membership lay at the heart of the EU's vision for Russia's modernization.Thereby the Union hoped to develop a network of new trade agreements which would foster a large free trade area including the EU, Russia and Eastern Neighbours.Thus, from the EU perspective, the Partnership for Modernization with Russia should have become a new valuable dimension of its efforts to promote prosperity and stability through trade on its Eastern borders.Moreover, the EU's hopes to link Russia and Eastern Partners within a large free trade area in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war clearly followed the liberal peace logic or, put differently, sought to use trade to prevent another war in the Neighbourhood.There is no single reason why the Partnership for Modernization did not become a reality.The most evident one is that the window of opportunity for EU-Russia 'constructive bilateralism' closed after the 2012 presidential elections in Russia and Putin's return to power (Fix 2021).Besides, the parties had different ideas about what modernization should mean, with Russia refusing to include political and institutional matters into the modernization agenda (Dettke 2011).The Partnership de facto ceased to exist following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and aggression in Donbas, leaving no alternative to the PCA as a framework for EU-Russia trade relations.

Sanctions and new principles of engagement post-2014
Alongside massive political and economic support to Ukraine, the EU response to the 2014/2015 events in Crimea and Donbas included the introduction of sanctions against Russia and a reconsideration of the principles of EU-Russia engagement.
Am insight into the Council's regulations and decisions on restrictive measures against Russia demonstrate the prevalence of a bargaining, rather than restrictive logic behind them.For instance, the Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 on individual sanctions takes recourse to negative conditionality by stipulating that the solution to the crisis should be found through negotiations between the Governments of Ukraine and of the Russian Federation, including through potential multilateral mechanisms, and that in the absence of results within a limited timeframe the Union will decide on additional measures, such as travel bans, asset freezes and the cancellation of the EU-Russia summit.(Council of the EU 2014, 1) Notably, when reconsidering existing sanctions and introducing new ones, EU officials repeatedly emphasized the 'reversibility and scalability' of these restrictive measures, hinting that sanctions can be either leveled or further strengthened, depending on Russia's behaviour in the political arena (e.g.Council of the EU 2015; European Council 2014c).The bargaining logic is also central to the formulations of the Council conclusions of 19-20 March 2015, whereby it decided to link the duration of restrictive measures to the complete implementation of the Minsk Agreement (European Council 2015).Numerous accounts of the sanctions' primary focus on bargaining can be found in research contributions, stressing that economic effects of sanctions shall be estimated with regard to 'signaling' and 'diplomacy' objectives of the EU (e.g.Veebel and Markus 2015).Though there is a consensus within the research community as to the limited effects of 2014/2015 sanctions on the Russian economy (Van Bergeijk 2022; Veebel and Markus 2015), sanctions in the domains of capital markets' access, defense, dual use goods and sensitive technologies follow both the bargaining and restrictive logic, i.e. refer to the EU's intention to promote peace by limiting Russia's resources to continue its aggression (Council of the EU 2014).
The bargaining logic, based on the combination of a 'stick' and a 'carrot' is traceable in two key post-2014 documents setting the strategic framework for the EU's engagement with Russia, namely the 'Five principles guiding the EU's policy towards Russia' (adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union in 2016) and the 2021 Commission's and High Representative's Joint Communication on EU-Russia relations -Push back, constrain and engage" (Council of the EU 2016;European Commission, High Representative 2021).In line with the 2015 Council conclusions, principle 1 under the 'Five principles' links the possibility of lifting sanctions to the full implementation of the Minsk Agreement.This principle finds support in the 2021 Communication, whereby 'the clear linkage of these sanctions to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements is designed as an incentive for the Russian government to contribute to a solution to the conflict, while the perspective of the EU agreeing additional sanctions is meant as a deterrent against it worsening the situation further through its aggressive behaviour' (Ibid, In contrast to the 'Five principles', the 2021 Joint Communication contains a 'push back' aspect, including the declared aim of 'limiting resources the Russian government can draw on to carry out its disruptive foreign policy', mainly with respect to corruption and money laundering.This aim, however, comes in contradiction to the positive framing of EU-Russia economic interdependencies as an aspect of the EU-Russia 'fundamental common responsibility for peace and security in Europe', alongside the Parties facing common challenges and being bound by the same obligations in international organizations (Ibid, p.2). Though admitting the challenges posed by the political context, the Communication refers to high volumes of EU-Russia trade as a foundation for bilateral relations (Ibid).It does not, however, portray high trade volumes as automatically leading to peace, emphasizing the Russian government's responsibility for normalizing political relations with the EU and Eastern Neighbours, and stopping its aggression against Ukraine.The combination of restrictive measures and engagement (including trade) is, in contrast, framed as an instance of 'principled pragmatism', whereby engagement with Russia is in the EU's [pragmatic/economic] interests (Ibid,p.11)Similar to the thematic documents in the energy domain, the 'Five principles' and the 2021 Communication do not see the EU's interdependence with (or dependence on) Russia in the energy domain as a determinant of peace.Principle 3 'Strengthening the resilience of the EU' securitizes the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels, rather than sees it as an opportunity for preventing conflict with Russia or preventing it from committing aggression against third countries.In the same light, the 2021 Communication sees the EU's movement to decarbonization as a means to strengthen the EU's energy independence and decrease its reliance on Russian fossil fuels.
Not least, neither the 'Five principles', nor the 2021 Communication apply the 'promotion of prosperity and stability through trade' vis-à-vis Russia.With a focus on resilience rather than stability, this approach is, however, declared as foundational for the EU's engagement with Eastern Neighbours in the context of Russia's aggression.
With this, we see that liberal peace considerations occupy a limited role in the strategic framing of the post-2014 EU's Russia strategy, marked by the application of the bargaining and restrictive logics to shaping the trade-peace and trade-security logics, respectively.

Conclusion
EU energy dependence on Russia and the activation of EU-Russia trade between its 2014 aggression against Ukraine and 2022 full-scale invasion is widely believed to challenge the foundational liberal idea of advancing peace through trade.The key question we asked in this vein is whether the legal and strategic framing of the trade-peace nexus in EU-Russia relations had been at all marked by the liberal peace logic.
To answer this question, we distinguished four key logics that can explain the connections between respective issue areas in theory and EU external action, paying particular attention to whose peace and security is at stake.The liberal peace logic was found least relevant to the framing of the trade-peace nexus in EU-Russia relations between 2014 and 2022.This logic was found to be salient in the 2010 Partnership for Modernization initiative that manifested an attempt to reload EU-Russia relations after the Russo-Georgian War but quickly lost political relevance.Widely applied to the EU in the ENP and Eastern Partnership context, the logic of 'promotion of prosperity and stability through trade' also got little salience in the documents in question.Instead, we found numerous manifestations of the EU's combined application of bargaining and restrictive logic.The bargaining approach is based on negative conditionality, whereby restrictive measures are linked to a counterpart's shift to diplomacy and compliance with a peace agreement.It merely seeks to promote peace between third countries.The restrictive approach seeks to limit a third state's access to materials and technologies that it can use to continue or wage a war.Both logics have inevitable implications for both peace in third countries and European security.
Thus, we find that the case of EU-Russia relations between 2014 and 2022 and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine does not immediately challenge the liberal peace hypothesis as such, since the EU did not rely on it when building its trade links with Russia.Nevertheless, the challenge of Russia's weaponization of energy in the context of its invasion of Ukraine is illustrative of the fact that interdependencies with others may bear not only benefits but threats.The weaponization of energy challenge also reveals the diversity and interconnectedness of traditional and hybrid threats the EU should consider in its foreign policy, trade and energy strategies, when including peace and security as NTPOs.As the contemporary world enables autocracies to weaponize everything -from energy sources to food and migration -further research and policy analysis should bear a stronger focus on mapping the EU's interdependencies with others and their implications for the EU's efforts to promote peace and security beyond its borders.In this vein, stronger cross-fertilization is needed between the literature on the trade-peace nexus and its limitations, economic security and the trade-security nexus, as well as the EU's strategic autonomy and its impact on the Union's geographical strategies vis-à-vis autocratic powers.
The findings of the study also hint that, as Russia continues its war against Ukraine, the EU's trade strategy vis-à-vis Russia will continue being dominated by the confluence of the bargaining and restrictive logics.The latter is likely to gain even stronger prominence, since the existing international sanctions regime did not manage to deprive Russia of the financial and technological means to continue its aggression, including weapons' production.In our view, irrespective of when and how exactly the current war finishes, the EU will continue being cautious and selective in its trade with Russia, especially as to goods and services that can be utilized for military purposes.Partial lifting of sanctions is, however, likely to be used by the EU as a tool for promoting peace negotiations if the current Russian leadership expresses genuine interest in holding them or Russia experiences a regime change, with the new leadership seeking to reload Russia's relations with Ukraine and the West.The trade-peace and trade-security nexuses perspective will be thus of value for researching the evolution of EU-Russia relations and the role of trade issues in the post-war settlement processes.

Table 1 .
Literature substrands, relevant for mapping the trade-security nexus.
• The role of trade and prosperity in the Neighbourhood for European security

Table 2 .
Trade-peace and trade-security nexuses in the EU trade policy.