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What is reliance?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Facundo M. Alonso
Facundo M. Alonso*
Affiliation:
Yale Law School, 127 Wall Street, New Haven, CT06511, USA Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Building 90, 450 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA94305-2155, USA
*
*Email: facundo_alonso@yahoo.com
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Abstract

In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ‘constitutive aim’: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance is, in contrast to belief, typically formed and revised in response to pragmatic considerations.

Keywords

reliancebeliefcognitive guidanceconstitutive aimsensible guidance
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 163 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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