Who wants to be a millionaire? Nigerian youths and the commodification of kidnapping

The youth

Youths (aged 15–35) constitute the majority of the African population. The meaning, conception and perception of youth are, however, dependent on cultural and contextual specificity (Christiansen et al. 2006). Once seen as the hope of the continent, African youths are now seen as ‘dangerous, criminal, decadent, and given to a sexuality that is unrestrained and threatening for the whole society’ (Diouf 2003, p. 4). The African youth is now characterised as ‘lumpen’ or ‘loose cannons’ in an attempt to explicate their role in African civil wars (Abdullah 1998, Kaplan 2006, pp. 118–189). Excluded from the public space, work, education and leisure, the African youth has now carved out a social space in a marginal geography and culture that is resistant to the mainstream or dominant culture (Diouf 2003, pp. 5–7). For young Africans, engagement with the state becomes ambivalent, combining elements of ‘complicity, insurgency, monitoring and disengagement’ (Gore and Pratten 2003, p. 211). They have been held responsible for leading their country to the ‘bush path to destruction’ (Abdullah 1998, p. 204); or described as a ‘social category in crisis, being excluded, marginalised, threatened, victimised, abused, and consequently angry, bitter, frustrated, desperate and violent’ (Osaghae et al. 2007, p. 5). Furthermore, the youth more than other social categories also suffer increasing neglect (Vigh 2006a, 2006b). Consequently, some of them resort to aggression, violence and criminality against society, especially those they perceive as being responsible for their predicament and hopeless future.

Character of the Nigerian state

Nigeria is a richly endowed nation in terms of human and material resources, but it is itself underdeveloped. Despite its enormous oil wealth, the state is unable to provide adequately for its teeming population of over 140 million. Material conditions for many of its citizens are harrowing and unkind owing to limited economic opportunities and people's inability to fulfil their genuine and legitimate aspirations. In Nigeria over 70 million people live below the poverty line (Abati 2009a, p. 51). The average income is about US$1/day; and ‘a fifth of children die before their fifth birthday’ (Peel 2005, p. 2). The rates of unemployment, poverty and infrastructural decay are very high.

The socio-economic frustration of many Nigerians, resulting from the failure of the nation-state project, the cumulative adverse effects of the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, the psychological brutalisation of nearly two decades of continuous repressive military dictatorship, coupled with the ready availability of firearms, accentuates disengagement from the state (Sesay et al. 2003, pp. 18–21). Thus, the control of the state is located in a complex of conflictual interactions between the elites and the idle, frustrated, angry and disenchanted all over the country (Imobighe 2003, p. 14). This army of unemployed and angry youth often employs disorder as a political instrument for economic benefit (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Since 1999 alone, civil disturbances and sectarian violence, partly occasioned by the introduction of Sharia law for criminal offences in many northern states, have resulted in the death of thousands of people, including an estimated 8000 between 1999 and 2002. This violence was essentially instigated by youth with scanty means of self-actualisation (Reno 2004, p. 219).

The fundamental basis of the organisation of the Nigerian state is personalisation, corruption, predation and brazen abuse (Amuwo 2009, Lewis 2004). Thus, an opportunity to serve is perceived as a chance to loot state resources (Imobighe 2003, p. 14). In line with the argument of Bayart et al. (1999), the state is criminalised and the corollary disorder of criminalisation is instrumentalised not only by the power elite, but also by those deprived who then resort to anti-state activities such as kidnapping for survival.

Like many African states, the Nigerian state is fragile and failing (Chabal 2005). This is indicated by its inability to manifest justice, fair play and equity in the process of governance. This is reflected in the underperformance of its institutions and their fast-shrinking legitimacy and authority. The institutions of the state such as the security agencies are weak, inept and lack the capacity to discharge their statutory responsibilities effectively. In particular, in the face of the increasing crime rate only a whimper comes from the Nigeria Police Force (Osumah and Aghedo 2010, Harnischfeger 2003, pp. 23–24). Consequently, there is a high number of informal security groups, such as street gangs, ethnic militias, rebel groups, cult groups and ‘area boys and girls’ which have emerged to fill the vacuum created by inept security forces (Meagher 2007, p. 100, Sesay et al. 2003, p. 41, Smith 2007, p. 186, Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008, p. 574).

These fundamental attributes of the Nigerian state shape, condition and create in the ranks of the oppressed citizenry an increasing consciousness and realisation of the insensitivity and unresponsiveness of those who control the affairs of the state to their plight: hence the proclivity and disposition to participate in violent crimes such as kidnapping and armed robbery. Flowing from the above, the state and youth participation in kidnap operations for ransom are closely interlinked. A state that is largely unresponsive to the genuine and legitimate needs and aspirations of its youth is likely to elicit violence and anti-state engagements, such as commodified kidnapping, from the deprived and depressed youth.

Forms of kidnapping

Kidnapping takes various forms and motivations in Nigeria. For analytic purposes three forms can be identified: the ritual-oriented, politically motivated and business-related. The ritually oriented kidnap is the oldest form of kidnap. Initially, the targets and victims of the masterminds and sponsors of this form were in most cases children, lunatics and the physically challenged. In ritual kidnapping the victims are usually killed and dissected, with vital human organs such as private parts and armpit hair removed, ostensibly for sacrifice and money-making rituals.¹ This form of kidnapping has been going on unreported for years.

Another form of kidnapping is the politically motivated type. This is largely a function of the neo-patrimonial character of the African state which makes political actors place a high premium on power and employ any means to acquire power for self-regarding gains (Chabal and Daloz 1999). This form of kidnap booms in areas characterised by youth underclass phenomena such as cult groups, school-dropouts, touts and area boys who are readily available for mobilisation by desperate politicians. A classic case of political kidnap was the abduction on 10 July 2003 of the serving governor of Anambra State, Dr Chris Ngige (Smith 2007, pp. 125–130).

A third form is the business-oriented form of kidnapping which is usually fuelled by business rivalry. Here the perpetrators sponsor and fraternise with kidnap gangs for protection and fortification of their business interests and trademarks as well as to curtail stiff competition from business rivals.² However, the Otokoto episode in the Eastern part of Nigeria and the Clifford Orji episode in Oshodi-axis of Lagos brought money-making kidnapping to the limelight in the 1990s (Smith 2007, pp. 138–141). Instructively, these various forms of kidnapping are underpinned by a common motivation which is a compulsive accumulative tendency.

Social profile and motivations of the kidnappers

Most kidnappers are essentially young unemployed persons and students of universities. Although most arrested kidnap suspects have been young men, there have also been some young females among them. This suggests that gender has little bearing on kidnapping. While some kidnap suspects are self-motivated, a large proportion of them have ‘barons’ and financiers. Collusion has been a major driver of the criminal industry, as there has been alleged involvement of some bank officials, traditional rulers and top businessmen in kidnap operations.³

Since Nigeria implemented the Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1980s, living standards for the masses, particularly the youth, have declined. The majority of Nigerian youth has therefore been entrapped in poverty. Consequently, most of the idle, unemployed, frustrated, and desperate youths in both rural and urban areas need little motivation to partake in violence and criminality as it offers them the opportunity to reposition themselves in the economic space of inclusion (Osaghae 1999).

However, the ‘exit’ of the youth from the ‘existing state’ in Nigeria takes various forms including illegal migration to Europe and other Western states, local and international prostitution, armed robbery, internet fraud (locally referred to as Yahoo Yahoo), human and drug trafficking, fake-document syndicates, smuggling and piracy (Glickman 2005, Osaghae 1999, van Dijk 2001). Commodified kidnapping is therefore only one of the available ‘exit’ options for the excluded and marginalised Nigerian youth. According to the Inspector General of Police, Sir Mike Okiro, kidnappers and hostage takers in Nigeria have pocketed ransoms of over US$100 million in 2008–2009 (about N15 billion).⁴

The victims, targets and trends of kidnap operations

The victims and targets of kidnap gangs have been people of high economic value such as traditional rulers, religious leaders, business moguls, leading officials of industries, top military retirees, legislators, international professional football (soccer) stars, and other prominent individuals and their close relations, young or old. Victims of kidnap operations cut across nationalities, age, gender and class. For instance, a three-year-old British girl and a visiting Canadian woman were among recent victims.⁵ Targeting of affluent individuals by kidnap gangs underscores the desperation of the kidnappers to escape from the shackles of economic want and misery. The status of those targeted suggests that the kidnappers perceive them to be the cause of their pauperisation, exclusion, marginalisation and inability to meet their basic needs (Imobighe 2003, p. 30). As has been noted, youth combatants in Africa ‘navigate no simple path of modernity in their contestation of gerontocratic powers’ (Christiansen et al. 2006, p. 21).

Kidnapping has assumed unprecedented dimensions in Nigeria. Between 1991 and 2000 alone Nigeria ranked ninth behind nations such as Colombia, Mexico, Russia, Philippines and Venezuela. Recently, the ASI Global Response rated Nigeria second to Iraq in terms of the greatest risk of kidnapping of foreign workers. Between January and May 2009 the police in Anambra State arrested 31 kidnappers and killed 18 in various operations. In Enugu State 20 cases have been recorded. Several persons have been killed and over N250 million paid out in ransoms. In Edo State, particularly Benin City, high-profile kidnapping has become rampant. Over 20 prominent businessmen and relations of the affluent have been said to be victims of recent kidnap cases. The most recent high-profile kidnap victims include the wife of a serving commissioner, the father of a current member of the State House of Assembly, a retired Major-General of the Nigerian Army, and the directors of a major filling (petrol) station and a prominent transport company.⁶

The geography of ransom kidnapping has been varied. It started in the Niger Delta region, where it was employed as a negotiation strategy by militant youths in their agitations for an equitable share in oil-revenue allocations from the Nigerian state and better community development engagements from the oil multinationals operating in the Delta in January 2006. The targets of kidnap operations in the Niger Delta were mainly expatriate oil workers. However, in the twilight of the Obasanjo administration in 2006, kidnapping spread to other parts of the country, particularly in the South Eastern states such as Anambra, Abia, Enugu, Ebonyi and Imo. Several cases of kidnapping have been recorded in other states of the country including Edo, Delta (South–South), Lagos, Ekiti and Ondo (South–West), Kaduna and Kano (North–West), and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (North–Central). Between January 2008 and June 2009 alone the Police Affairs Minister Yakubu Lame claimed that Nigeria recorded a total of 512 cases of commodified kidnapping.⁷ Analysis of newspaper reports (not shown) suggests that this represents an increasing trend since 2007.

Instructively, prior to the close of the twentieth century, although there were no statistical data on the cases of kidnapping, it was neither as rampant nor commodified as it is in recent times. Since the end of the Obasanjo administration (1999–2007), the Nigerian economy has been prostrated owing to the near collapse of the power and energy sectors required to power the manufacturing sector and small-scale industries. At the same time, the power and business elite bought up the national inheritance in the guise of privatisation and perpetrated mind-boggling corrupt enrichment. The financial and material resources were diverted and mobilised in a brazen manner from the nation's account for intra- and inter-party political contest (Amuwo 2009). In a display of ostentation, they cruise around the cities in expensive, imported and air-conditioned limousines, jeeps and sports utility vehicles (SUVs) to the envy of the poor, especially the youth who therefore seek any possibilities of escape from deprivation and squalor.

The increasing trend is indicative of the weakness of the state security apparatuses to live up to their statutory responsibility of protecting lives and property, and of the declining economic fortunes in the country. Though the phenomenon of kidnapping resonates in various parts of the country, there has been a higher concentration of it in the South, particularly the South Eastern region, which is home to the Igbo-speaking people who are known for commodity trading. Furthermore, the market value of the victims and targets exchanged in the commodified operation as well as the ransom demanded by or paid to the masterminds of the kidnap operations reflect the materialistic and acquisitive appetite of the kidnappers as well as their desperation to extricate themselves from deteriorating economic conditions (Akhaine 2009, Amaize 2008, Anyanwu 2009, Ero 2009, Ocholi 2009, Oguseri 2009).

Kidnappers' methods and scale of ransom

Kidnappers adopt various ruses and tactics to get at their victims and targets. Some of these tactics include posing as lunatics, pastors and security operatives to prey on their unsuspecting victims. A case in point is the recent arrest of a couple in Benin City for ritual kidnapping (Oguseri 2007, pp. 48–50).

Ransom kidnapping has also involved collusion between the perpetrators of the crime and financial institutions such as banks, and prominent individuals including traditional rulers and politicians (Alexander 2009). The kidnap gangs are usually armed with pistols and shotguns. They use these weapons to frighten their victims and kill those who resist them. The weakness of the state has resulted in widespread proliferation of small arms in Nigeria (Sesay et al. 2003, p. 41, Reno 2004) and this enables criminals to operate with relative ease and impunity. For instance, when a nine-year-old boy was kidnapped on 29 January 2009 in Port Harcourt, his 13-year-old sister who was taking him to school was shot dead because she resisted the kidnap of her little brother.

They operate solo and in gangs at times numbering 30 persons. Kidnap gangs usually have their hideouts and operational bases in the thick forest, uncompleted buildings and remote villages. They wait in ambush for their targets in residences, at school gates, offices, highways, places of religious worship and other venues of social engagements (Onovo 2009).⁸ Kidnappers abduct and detain their victims in hideouts while they establish contacts through telephone conversation with close relations of the victims to negotiate their release. The victims are released after huge ransoms have been paid. The ransoms demanded are usually in the millions (Vanguard 2007).

Often the kidnappers detain their victims for as long as two weeks to enable their relations to get the ransom demanded before their release. Where the relations of the victims are not willing to pay or quick in paying the ransom demanded, the kidnappers threaten to and in some cases kill victims. Indeed, kidnappers have become increasingly brutal, raping and killing victims sometimes even after huge ransoms have been paid. For example, the proprietors of God Is Good Motors and Alpha Furniture in Benin City were allegedly killed after their captors had received ransoms. The daughter of one of the local government council chairmen in Akwa Ibom State was reportedly bruised, raped and killed by her abductors even after collecting a N10 million ransom and N20,000-worth of mobile phone recharge-cards from her father, who had to take a loan from the bank in order to raise the huge ransom. Sometimes the kidnappers rebuff the relations of their captives who negotiate with a very low offer to secure the release of their relations: ‘We are not here selling crayfish, we are here for business’ (Ocholi 2009, pp. 12–16).

These methods and dimensions of commodified kidnapping indicate the desperation to escape socio-economic marginalisation and political exclusion perceived to be foisted on them by the dominant and exploitative class. It also shows their unbridled quest to reposition themselves in the space of affluence and power. As a result, they see nothing wrong in trading their oppressors to realise their goal. As it were, yesterday's victims of power abuse and misgovernance have become today's ‘victors’ through the instrumentalisation of commodified kidnapping.

Furthermore, the use of force (torture, rape, murder, etc.) underpinning kidnap operations also indicates a throwback to military indoctrination and dictatorship. Protracted military misrule especially under Generals Babangida and Abacha (1985–1998) has resulted in a prostrate economy and collapsed socio-economic infrastructure and thus the replacement of virtue with vice in the quest for survival (Jike 2004).

Implications of commodified kidnapping

The phenomenon of kidnapping has a myriad of implications for the Nigerian state, economy, its citizens and even the international community. For analytical convenience the various implications are divided into political, social and economic forms. Politically, the high spate of kidnapping in Nigeria is a symptom of a weak, fragile and failing state, especially in the area of security. Many innocent people now feel unsafe.

Kidnapping has further dented Nigeria's battered local and international image. The government is aware of this notoriety, hence the current rebranding policy of the federal government aimed at changing the negative local and international perception of Nigeria and Nigerians. Though this subject is outside the scope of this work, it suffices to say that the widespread corruption and criminality in Nigeria make nonsense of the government rebranding campaign.

Economically, the feeling of insecurity has serious implications for the people's survival strategies as they now find it difficult to go about their day-to-day economic activities for fear of kidnapping. The insecurity also scares investors and expatriates, especially owing to their high economic value to kidnap gangs who see them as ‘white gold’. As Abati (2009b, p. 70) argues, ‘Nigeria has become a high-risk investment destination.’

Socially, kidnapping restricts the movement of people, especially at night (Sanyaolu 2008, p. 71). In addition, the prevalence of kidnapping erodes the culture of hard work. Since kidnapping can make one an instant millionaire, the culture of hard work is seriously undermined. In addition to undermining diligence, it also serves to attract law-abiding citizens, especially the army of unemployed youths, into crime. Added to this, the profitable nature of kidnapping makes the crime hard to check, as its perpetrators would find it difficult to accept less lucrative jobs in the formal economy. There is already a growing belief among Nigerian youths that hard work is old-fashioned.