Specialists, spinners and networkers: political appointees in Iceland

Abstract

Theories of politicization trace attempts by politicians to stay in control of an increasingly complex policy environment to three main roots: changes in mass media, changes in the way party organizations are run and administrative reforms. Each has created new political vulnerabilities, calling for a stronger presence of trusted employees in the public sector to guard the interests of politicians and parties. Consideration for the quality of government, however, may require greater administrative autonomy than is compatible with conventional agency conceptions of administration. The present study uses the Icelandic case to shed light on how such trends and countertrends affect the overall level of politicization. Case selection is justified on the basis that politicization is expected to be present according to established theories in the field. The findings indicate that politicization is a clearly observable part of ongoing tension between political control and bureaucratic autonomy in Iceland. It is more easily observed at the apex of the administrative system than lower levels, and political appointments are but one of a set of tools available to maintain political control. It seems more appropriate to speak of contained politicization of political appointments than a major watershed.