Abstract
This paper examines the nature of the Soviet dictatorship – Stalin and the Politburo – in the 1930s using some of the propositions put forward by Abram Bergson and by other participants in the socialist controversy – Hayek, Mises, and other contributors. Four models of dictatorship are examined using the top level records of the Soviet dictatorship from the Soviet state and party archives to examine how the dictator made decisions and with what results.
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Notes
2 Bergson, The Economics of Soviet Planning, p. 11.
4 The referee model is implied in Peter Boettke and Gary Anderson's (1993) model of the Soviet economy as a mercantilist state in their work. J. Arch Getty has applied the interest-group model to the Soviet 1930s, suggesting that even Stalin had to bow to lobbies in key decisions, such as the Great Purges of the late 1930s (see Getty, 1985). J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov (1999) repeat this claim in a more careful tone in their The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939, Preface.
5 This summary is based on Paul Gregory (2004).
6 This discussion is based upon Gregory (2004, Chapters 4–5).
7 One of the most detailed set of instructions was sent by L Kaganovich to Stalin on 2 September, 1936: ‘We [the Politburo] discussed with the ministers the fourth quarter plan. The volume of production of union and local industry was set at 19.7 billion rubles, which gives a 17.3 percent increase relative to the third quarter. The ministries proposed to establish tasks for each main administration, trust and enterprise for the production of completed production and a detailed assortment of production with a high quality parts and corresponding to established standards. The Council of Labor and Defense is charged with approving this more detailed plan. We set the average daily loading of the rail system at 91,000 cars, the transport of commercial freight at 131 million tons, and the volume of passenger transport at 12 billion passenger kilometers. The volume of water transport is set at 12 billion tons and of sea transport at 7.8 billion tons. We set the volume of capital work at 7909 million rubles and financing at 7048 million rubles, taking into account the lowering of construction costs. Retail trade of state and cooperative stores is set at 28 million rubles. The market fund for grain is set at 3100 thousand tons, for grits at 230 thousand tons and for sugar at 360 thousand tons, for vodka at 20,300 thousand deciliters. We ask you to send your opinion’ (Gregory, 2004, pp. 111–119).
8 No where in the records could we find investment in constant prices. Therefore, we had to turn to Western recalculations to figure this out.
9 Consider Stalin's self-proclaimed disciple, Kaganovich, writing long after Stalin died: ‘When we worked together in the Central Committee, we [Molotov and Kaganovich] worked in a friendly manner, but when he became Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and I minister of transport we argued… I demanded more rails, investment, Gosplan did not give and Molotov supported them’ (F Chuev, 1992, p. 61).
10 On this, see the paper by Markevich in this volume.
11 A letter from Kaganovich to Stalin describes two of his routine days (30 and 31 August 1931). On the 30th day, Kaganovich attended a Politburo meeting on the export-import plan, oil transportation, and state purchases of potatoes, vegetables, beef, and chicken. During this meeting, Mikoian lobbied to lower his plan, it was decided to buy an oil tanker, the poor financial results of the third quarter were analysed, and the foreign minister's granting of an interview without permission of the Politburo was discussed. The next day, Kaganovich first attended a meeting on railroad ties with the main administration of forestry products, in which a ministry official was accused of manipulating figures, and a special commission was formed to solve the problem of deficient ties. Kaganovich then arranged a transfer of tractors from the agricultural ministry to the timber industry subject to Stalin's approval. Later that day, Kaganovich oversaw the formation of a three-person Politburo special commission to prepare directives for regional Party authorities on grain shipments to ports with a detailed calendar of shipments. This schedule, broken down into 34 grain-producing regions, constituted a major planning task involving intense lobbying from each region. Kaganovich concluded his day with a report to the absent Stalin on these activities plus notes on a speech held by Bukharin that failed to praise the Party. This list of activities includes only those events important enough to bring to Stalin's attention. The time in between was spent on the telephone, meeting petitioners, and working on other commissions, such as the transportation commission, for which Kaganovich was responsible (Stalin i Kaganoivch Perepiska, pp. 73–75).
12 Consider Kuibyshev's (Chairman of Gosplan) complaint of 10 August 1832: ‘The commission which was selected by the Politburo [to deal with the 1932 plan] effectively fell apart with the departure of Comrades Stalin and Molotov. The exchange of opinions in the first meeting of the commission and the failure of the sub commission (representatives of the most important economic institutions did not show up) force me to make the following recommendations [Kuibyshev then requests a series of delays and a reduction of tasks]. I ask you to authorize a leave of absence from August 20 to October 5 on account of my illness… . In light of the fact that I clearly cannot handle the responsibilities of the chairman of Gosplan, I ask you to free me from this work and give me work that is within my powers (preferably in the regions)’ (Ibid. p. 710).
13 Stalin's calendar is reproduced in Oleg Khlevnyuk (1996).
14 Notes from a Comrade Malyshev of a December 1947 Politburo meeting quoted in Oleg Khlevnyuk (2000).
15 Statement of deputy chairman of military industrial complex about the interference by the central committee (Ellman and Kontorovich, 1998, p. 47).
16 See for example the letter from Kaganovich to Ordzhonikidze in Khlevnyuk et al. (1995, pp. 146–147).
17 ‘But in a society which for its functioning depends on central planning this control cannot be made dependent on a majority being able to agree; it will often be necessary that the will of a small minority be imposed on the people because this minority will be the largest group able to agree among themselves on the question at issue’ (FA Hayek (1994) The Road to Serfdom, 50th anniversary ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 74–75).
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†I thank the Hoover Institution and its archives department for its support of this research.
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Gregory, P. The Political Economy of Stalinism: A Bergson Retrospective. Comp Econ Stud 47, 402–417 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100096
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100096