The Remnants of Wilsonism

Abstract

The Allies and Turkey signed the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920, nearly two years after the signing of the Mudros Armistice in October 1918 at the conclusion of the war. Discussion of the peace treaty with Turkey had not commenced until the conferences at London in February and March 1920 and at San Remo in April. According to M.S. Anderson, several factors contributed to this delay: preoccupation with the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles; the redrawing of the Balkan boundaries; the debate in the United States concerning the mandate issue; the complexity of the geopolitical situation in the Russian and Ottoman empires; the rivalry and mutual suspicions among the Allied Powers with respect to their spheres of influence in the Middle East; and Turkish nationalism and the ability of Turkey to reinforce its military. “Above all,” however, Anderson writes, “The long delay must be attributed … to the delusive hope that the United States might accept a mandate under the newly-created League of Nations for the Armenian state…. Wilson refused … to send American troops to help in the occupation of Turkey…. [and] never made it clear to the European allies how deeply American opinion was opposed to the acceptance of any responsibilities in the Near East.”¹