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President G. W. Bush and the Hyper-unitary Approach to Waging the War on Terror

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American Presidential Power and the War on Terror: Does the Constitution Matter?

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Abstract

President G. W. Bush faced the worst American attack in the history of the USA. The attacks of September 11, 2001 were clearly a watershed moment in American history. Similar to the barbaric invasion of Rome, led by Hannibal, the USA would never be the same after the infamous day of September 11, 2001. In this chapter, I examine President G. W. Bush’s response to the attacks and determine whether he supported an implied theory of executive emergency power. I find through thorough research of classified documents that President Bush did invoke a theory of implied executive emergency power and used his own prerogative to determine what powers to use and when to use such powers in waging America’s War on Terror.

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Notes

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Robert Morris University, USA

    Justin DePlato (Assistant Professor of Political Science)

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  1. Justin DePlato
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© 2015 Justin DePlato

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DePlato, J. (2015). President G. W. Bush and the Hyper-unitary Approach to Waging the War on Terror. In: American Presidential Power and the War on Terror: Does the Constitution Matter?. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137539625_3

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