Abstract
A chapter of a book is barely sufficient to provide comprehensive and comparative analysis of the place of the subject in the moral philosophy of two of the most important figures in modern philosophy. So, it is important to note from the outset that what is attempted here is only a concise yet explicit analysis. Such a task is however a daunting one. I begin by summarizing the basic difference in Hegel and Bradley’s treatment of the modern subject that necessitates the conclusions reached in this chapter.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Thomas Mautner (1996), A Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.), p. 182.
F.H. Bradley (1927), Ethical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Samuel Enoch Stumpf & James Fieser (2003), Socrates to Sartre and Beyond (Boston, McGraw Hill), p. 320.
Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu (2004), The Blackwell Dictionary of Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.), p. 3.
Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 20.
F.H. Bradley (1914), Appearance and Reality (London, Oxford Clarendon Press), p. viii.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Anthony O. Echekwube
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Echekwube, A.O. (2015). The Moral Agent: Bradley’s Critique of Hegel’s Evolutionary Ethics. In: Imafidon, E. (eds) The Ethics of Subjectivity. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472427_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472427_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-50124-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-47242-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)