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Abstract

During the Second World War, the Abwehr and the SD, either jointly or separately, planned to execute at least 19 operations against Persia and Persian Kurdistan between 1941 and 1945: one in 1941, one in 1942, 14 in 1943, one in 1944, and two in 1945. Of these, 12 were cancelled before execution, five ended in capture before operational activity, one ended in total loss at sea, and one was aborted. In fact, these were truly the ‘Keystone Kops’ of the secret world. As their missions repeatedly failed, their captured operatives yielded copious amounts of valuable information about the German intelligence services under interrogation by SIME experts at CSDIC Maadi, near Cairo, and at Camp 020 at Ham, near Richmond-on-Thames — especially about the SD of which the Allies initially knew very little.

The German, or rather the Nazi, intelligence services were defeated in World War II by two separate and distinct forces. One of these forces was internal jealousy and corruption. The other was Allied counterintelligence. (Henry G. Sheen)1

To put it shortly and colloquially, the German Army missed the bus in 1942, and the German agents missed the bus in 1943. (Joe Spencer [DSO Persia])2

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Notes

  1. Henry G. Sheen, ‘The Disintegration of the German Intelligence Services,’ Military Review 29, no. 3 (June 1949): 38. Colonel H. Gordon Sheen was chief of the CIC (1941–42); ACS (Counterintelligence) for G-2, SHAEF; and served in occupied Berlin as head of counterintelligence for the Office of Military Government for Germany.

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  2. See Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (New York: Norton, 1995), 41;

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  3. H.O. Dovey, ‘The Eighth Assignment, 1941–1942,’ Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 4 (1996): 686–7.

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  4. See Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Free Press, 1990), 21–3.

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© 2014 Adrian O’Sullivan

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O’Sullivan, A. (2014). Failure. In: Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran). Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137427915_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137427915_17

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-49127-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-137-42791-5

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