Maritime Terrorism: Governance and Non-State Actors

Abstract

The terror network Al Qaeda has repeatedly threatened attacks in the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Aden. It also supposedly supports a training program specifically designed to prepare their operatives for carrying out attacks on warships, cargo, and cruise ships as well as to block oil trade routes (AFP 2010, CNA 2010, Reuters 2010, USA Today 2011). In response to these threats Western intelligence agencies have called on Gulf States to increase security measures aboard ships, in particular oil and gas tankers. Given the enormous importance of maritime trade, there are significant concerns as to the ramifications of a possible attack. There are a few well-known examples of maritime terrorism: the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro by the Palestine Liberation Front in 1985; the Al Qaeda attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and the French oil tanker Limburg two years later; and the bomb explosion on the Filipino Superferry 14 in 2004 perpetrated by Abu Sayyaf. One can assume that due to the low frequency of maritime terrorism that it would not be a priority to allocate resources to defend against them. However, the frequency of attacks, which in 1968–2010 numbered in the hundreds (Schneider 2011), does highlight the relevance of this field. On the other hand, in comparison to the total number of terrorist incidents in the same period, instances of maritime terrorism are relatively small and therefore less alarming.