Islands Surrounded by Advice

Abstract

Engagement and Deterrence

The rupturing of diplomatic relations and attack on the Shackleton produced two major consequences for British policy. Firstly, it convinced the foreign secretary and Cabinet ministers that sovereignty talks, however tentative or protracted, had to be rekindled. Secondly, the increased Argentine militancy spurred Callaghan to reassess the threat to the Falklands and seek reinforcements from the Ministry of Defence. These measures, though appearing somewhat contradictory, were entirely in keeping with the British government’s approach. As always the priority would be to avoid conflict by demonstrating a willingness to negotiate, while at the same time making preparations for the islands’ defence. The defence secretary Roy Mason wrote to Callaghan in response to Rowlands’ request to retain Endurance for a further year. The Shackleton incident highlighted Callaghan’s previous concerns and underlined the importance of a naval presence in the South Atlantic. Mason replied within hours of the fiasco: ‘The fear expressed in your minute about the harassment of RRS Shackleton has already been realised and we are fortunate that the incident passed off as it did.’ But Mason, anxious to scale back overseas commitments, still saw no military justification for keeping the ship in service and maintained that Endurance would have been ill-suited to intervening against an Argentine destroyer.¹