Abstract
Consider the following scenario. I am in a crowded café awaiting my food-order. Walking past me on his way to a table is a man carrying a tray with several drinks on it. Just as he is about to sit down, my order is called. As I stand and move towards the counter (to collect my food), I knock the tray out of the man’s hands with my hand. Did I do this intentionally? What is required for an action to be intentional?
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Further reading
Davidson, D. (1980). Actions, reasons and causes. In Essays on actions and events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3–20.
Jeannerod, M. (2006). Motor cognition: what actions tell the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnson-Frey, S.H. (2003). Taking action: cognitive neuroscience perspectives on intentional acts. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
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© 2013 Garry Young
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Young, G. (2013). Philosophical Issue 2: What Makes an Action Intentional?. In: Philosophical Psychopathology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329325_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137329325_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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