Abstract
When this book was first published in 2002, the Introduction commented on how the major counterinsurgency campaigns that the British state had waged in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen, Dhofar and Northern Ireland since 1945 had produced a largely celebratory literature. The general argument of this literature was that Britain’s campaigns had been conducted with considerable success. This contrasted with the French experience in Indo-China and Algeria, with the Dutch in Indonesia, with the Portuguese in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, with the Americans in Vietnam and with the Russians in Afghanistan. The British, it was argued, knew how to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns and, moreover, conducted them without bringing dishonour on their cause through the use of massacre and torture. This was a distortion of the historical record. First of all, the post-war record included important defeats in Palestine and South Yemen, and included the British failure, despite overwhelming numerical and material superiority, to successfully destroy their opponents in Cyprus and Northern Ireland.
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Notes
David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945–1967, Oxford 2011, p. 65.
David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, London 2005;
Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, London 2005;
Huw Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency, London Cambridge 2013;
Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare, London 2012;
Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire, Basingstoke 2011.
It is also worth noticing a recent attempt to challenge this consensus: Aaron Edwards, Defending the Realm? The Politics of Britain’s Small Wars since 1945, Manchester 2012.
See Deepak Tripathi, Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington DC 2010, pp. 16–17.
See Alasdair Roberts, The Collapse of Fortress Bush, New York 2008, p. 60.
H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York 1997.
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© 2015 John Newsinger
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Newsinger, J. (2015). Introduction to the 2nd Edition. In: British Counterinsurgency. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137316868_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137316868_1
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