Bolzano, Kant, and Leibniz

Abstract

The few decades that extend from the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) to what some consider the ‘high water mark’ of German Idealism, Hegel’s elaboration of his philosophical system in the Encyclopedia of all philosophical sciences (1817), make for a fascinating period in intellectual history. While it has been extensively studied by scholars of post-Kantian Idealism, this scholarly literature has been, in important respects, one-sided. In contrast to what is often assumed, the history of the influence of Kant’s critical philosophy in the German-speaking world is not merely the story of the development of idealism in the works of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.¹ It is also the story of the development of logic at the turn of the nineteenth century. While Kant himself is not usually considered to have made a substantial contribution to logic itself, his work was seminal and his influence — both positive and negative — on the logic of his time considerable. There were, on the one hand, those who attempted to devise logics based on the Critique. There was, on the other hand, Bernard Bolzano.² Bolzano engaged with Kant and the Kantian logicians, sought to determine what is distinctive in their approach and their overall conception of the role of logic in epistemology at large. He also subjected their views to a withering criticism.

This article was realized with the support of a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Our thanks go to Clinton Tolley and Nicholas F. Stang for their comments on previous versions of this essay.