Abstract
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1996) has argued that the financing of entrepreneurship and innovative ideas will facilitate economic growth and the competitive advantage of nations in the twenty-first century. We know that small high-tech companies contribute disproportionately to innovation and economic growth. We also know that the primary source of capital for these small high-tech start-up companies is venture capital (VC), and VC facilitates the success of companies that eventually are listed on stock exchanges. For example, while VC averaged less than 3 percent of corporate research and development (R&D) in the period 1983–1992, it was nevertheless responsible for more than 8 percent of the United States’ industrial innovations in that decade (Gompers and Lerner, 2004).
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© 2012 Darek Klonowski
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Cumming, D., Johan, S. (2012). Venture Capital Contracts: Implications for Emerging Markets. In: Klonowski, D. (eds) Private Equity in Emerging Markets. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137309433_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137309433_7
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