Abstract
This conclusion first discusses the dangers and limits of counter-insurgency theory. It is argued that counterinsurgency theory is too unsophisticated to realistically describe and prescribe for the diverse range of conflict situations likely to be faced by the military. This encourages the use of war as an instrument of policy. Second, four perspectives on British counterinsurgency are reviewed — Conservative Realist, Neoconservative, Liberal Hawks and anti-imperialists — with a particular emphasis on their perspective on counterinsurgency and its impact on democracy. The Conservative Realist perspective is probably most reflective of mainstream British military thinking. The Neoconservatives were influential in the US under President Bush but are also influential in Cameron’s Conservative party. The Liberal Hawk’s most famous spokesperson was the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The anti-imperialist perspective is rarely if ever heard in the military and survives within academia and on the left. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the current debate on withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Bacevich, A. (2005) The New American Militarism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Buzzanco, R. (1997) Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Clarke, M. (2011) ‘The Top Brass and the Politicians: Strained Relations’, July http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4E10D753A41ED/ (downloaded 28 August 2011).
Coates, A. J. (1997) The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
Cohen, E. A. (2002) Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesman and Leadership in Wartime (London: Simon and Schuster).
Cowper-Coles, S. (2011) Cables from Kabul: Britain’s Afghan Envoy 2007–10 (London: HarperPress).
Dixon, P. (2011) ‘Guns First, Talks Later: Neoconservatives and the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39, 4, 649–76.
Dodds, K. and Elden, S. (2008) ‘Thinking Ahead: David Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and British Neo-conservatism’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10, 3.
Finer, S. E. (2002) [1962] The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Transaction Publishers).
Forster, A. (2006) ‘Breaking the Covenant: Governance of the British Army in the Twenty-First Century’, International Affairs, 82, 6.
French, D. (2011) The British Way of Counter-Insurgency, 1945–67 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Gee, D. (2007) Informed Choice? Armed Forces Recruitment Practice in the United Kingdom, www.informedchoice.org.uk.
Holsti, O. R. (1998–99) ‘A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976–1996’, International Security, 3, 23.
Holsti, O. R. (2001) ‘Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of the New Millennium’, in Feaver, P. D. and Kohn, R. H. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Boston: MIT Press).
Joyce, E. (1997) Arms and the Man — Renewing the Armed Services (London: Fabian Society).
Kerr, R. (2008) The Military on Trial: The British Army in Iraq (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers).
Kitson, F. (1971) Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber and Faber).
Ledwidge, F. (2011) Losing Small Wars (London: Yale University Press).
Little, P. (2009) ‘Lessons Unlearned: A Former Officer’s Perspective on the British Army at War’, The RUSI Journal, 154, 3, June.
Mackenzie, J. M. (1986) Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880–1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
Mearsheimer, J. (2011) Why Leaders Lie (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
North, R. (2009) Ministry of Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003–09 (London: Continuum).
Prins, G. and Salisbury, R. (2008) ‘Risk, Threat and Security: The Case of the United Kingdom’, The RUSI Journal, 153, 1.
Robinson, P., Goddard, P. and Parry, K. (2010) Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
Shaw, M. (1991) Post-Military Society (Cambridge: Polity).
Shaw, M. (2005) The New Western Way of Warfare (Cambridge: Polity).
Strachan, H. (1997) The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Strachan, H. (2003) ‘The Civil-Military “Gap” in Britain’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 26, 2.
Strachan, H. (2006) ‘Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq’, Survival, Vol. 48.
Vajello, D. (2010) ‘Revaluing Our COIN: Moving British Counterinsurgency Forward in the Twenty-First Century’, Henry Jackson Society.
Wolfendale, J. (2007) ‘Military Obedience: Rhetoric and Reality’, in Primoratz, I. (ed.) Politics and Morality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Woodward, B. (2010) Obama’s War (London: Simon and Schuster).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2012 Paul Dixon
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dixon, P. (2012). Conclusion: The Military and British Democracy. In: Dixon, P. (eds) The British Approach to Counterinsurgency. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137284686_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137284686_13
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-33297-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-28468-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies Collection