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The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: ‘Hearts and Minds’ from Malaya to Afghanistan?

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The British Approach to Counterinsurgency

Abstract

The British approach to counterinsurgency was widely credited with rare successes against insurgencies in Malaya (1948–60) and Northern Ireland (1969–2007) (Van Creveld 2007). British counterinsurgency theory has also informed the British army’s widely admired approach to peacekeeping. The classic model of British counterinsurgency suggested that it was above all a political activity designed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population to the government side. This involved the use of ‘minimum force’, the primacy of the police and a coordinated effort across all fronts. On the basis of Britain’s apparently successful experience in Malaya, the British military attempted to persuade the Americans to adopt their ‘hearts and minds’ approach in Vietnam (1961–65). The peace process in Northern Ireland bolstered Britain’s claims to be able to successfully fight counterinsurgencies. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the British again offered their approach to counterinsurgency as a successful model to the Americans. The US General David Petreaus and his COINdinistas were receptive to the British ‘hearts and minds’ approach. They championed the British approach to counterinsurgency against the advocates of a more violent, ‘Conventional Warfare’ approach which deploys overwhelming force against the enemy and is more willing to accept civilian casualties.

Grab ’em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow.

(Anonymous US Officer in Vietnam)

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  1. Paul Dixon
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kingston University, UK

    Paul Dixon (Reader in Politics and International Studies) (Reader in Politics and International Studies)

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© 2012 Paul Dixon

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Dixon, P. (2012). The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: ‘Hearts and Minds’ from Malaya to Afghanistan?. In: Dixon, P. (eds) The British Approach to Counterinsurgency. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137284686_1

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