Issues of Accountability and Access: The Select Committees and Intelligence

Abstract

Much of the scrutiny of the work of government departments by Parliament takes place within select committees, particularly in the House of Commons. It is widely recognised that one of the strengths of this system has been that it allows small groups of MPs to develop considerable knowledge of a particular area, and to apply that to scrutiny of government. In addition, while the composition of select committees reflects the balance of the parties in the House, they are generally seen as being less partisan in their approach, seeking consensus on the issues that they consider, rather than narrowly reflecting party interests. While select committees can be criticised on a number of grounds, including, for example, the significant levels of turnover of members, choosing or avoiding particular topics to minimise divisions on party lines, for their reports rarely being debated on the floor of the House, and because governments are not required to respond to reports, let alone to act upon them, they are nevertheless widely portrayed as successful (Norton, 2005; Rogers and Walters, 2006; Bochel and Defty, 2007; Brazier and Fox, 2011; Benton and Russell, 2013). Given the range of topics that the select committees are responsible for covering, and the higher profile of intelligence and security issues in Parliament and in the media in recent years, it would not be unreasonable to expect some to have paid attention to such topics.