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Part of the book series: Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies ((ISSIP))

Abstract

By virtue of its leading role in the Arab national movement, Syria’s strategic culture is rooted in its view of itself as the champion of Arab rights against what it perceives to be Western penetration of the Middle East, with Israel as its bridgehead. That perception is derived from Syria’s bitter experience with Western colonial powers, especially Britain, which first fragmented the Middle East, then colonized it, and later supported European Jews in the usurpation of Palestine. It is also derived from Syria’s frustration with the United States, which provides Israel massive military, political, and economic support—even as Israel occupies Arab territories in violation of United Nations Security Council land-for-peace resolutions.

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Notes

  1. British and French diplomats agreed on the division of Greater Syria (contained in the secret Sykes—Picot agreement) as early as 1916. The treaty became publicly known only in 1917 as a result of its leaking by the Bolsheviks. For further reading on this question, see Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab—Israel Conflict, 5th ed. (Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2004), pp. 64–67.

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  2. See, Amy Dockser Marcus, “Growing Dangers: U.S. Drive to Curb Doomsday Weapons in Mideast Is Faltering,” Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1966, p. Al. For a more detailed account of Israel’s nuclear capability, see Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), chapter 7.

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  3. One of the major issues dividing Syria and Turkey is the question of riparian rights over the Euphrates River. Another issue is the territorial dispute over the province of Alexandretta (known as “Hatai” to Turks; “Iskenderun” to Syrians). That province was ceded by France to Turkey in 1939 in order to entice Turkey to not enter into an alliance with Nazi Germany. Syria was then under the French mandate, and Syrians were not consulted. For further reading, see Murhaf Jouejati, “Water Politics As High Politics: The Case of Turkey and Syria,” in Henri J. Barkey, ed. Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 131–46.

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  4. For further reading on the Turkey—Israel alliance, see Gregory A. Burris, “Turkey—Israel: Speed Bumps,” The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 2003), pp. 67–80, available at http://www.meforum.org/article/569.

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  5. For the best account of the Syrian—Iraqi rivalry, see Eberhard Kienle, Ba’th versus Ba’th: The Conflict Between Syria and Iraq, 1968–1989 (St. Martin’s, 1991).

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  12. See Murhaf Jouejati, “Syrian Motives for Its WMD Programs and What to Do about Them,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 52–61

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© 2009 Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner, and Jeffrey A. Larsen

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Jouejati, M. (2009). The Making of Syria’s Strategic Culture. In: Johnson, J.L., Kartchner, K.M., Larsen, J.A. (eds) Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618305_10

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