Abstract
Since the early 1980s, students of the Egyptian political economy have called for a comparison between Egypt and Mexico and the two regimes’ attempts at reform. John Waterbury noted how under Sadat the Egyptian regime was becoming structurally similar to the dominant-party system in Mexico; Egypt and Mexico, in fact, figure prominently in his four-case study of public sector reform. Nazih Ayubi’s textbook on the Arab state speaks frequently of the “Mexicanization” of the Egyptian state. Historian Roger Owen uses the dominant-party system of Mexico to illuminate attempts at simultaneous economic and political liberalization in Egypt. A conference organized by Egyptian and Mexican scholars in 1996 produced an edited volume that dealt explicitly with Egyptian and Mexican efforts at economic liberalization. Analysts have also traced Egypt’s Islamist violence and Mexico’s Zapatista insurrection in Chiapas to neoliberal policies.1 In the last decade, Egyptian policymakers and academics, critical of their country’s economic reform process, have extolled the virtues of the “Mexican model” and issued studies on how Egypt could expedite its privatization process by replicating the Mexican example.2
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Notes
See John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico and Turke (NewYork: Cambridge UniversityPress,1993); Nazih Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (Ne York: I. B. Tauris, 1995); Roger Owen, “Socio-Economic Change and Political Mobilization: The Case of Egypt,” in Democracy Without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World ed. Ghassan Saleme (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995); Dan Tschirgi, ed., Development in the Age of Liberalization: Egypt and Mexic (American University of Cairo, 1996); Jeffrey A. Nedoroscik et al., “Lessons in Violent Internal Conflict: Egypt and Mexico.” SYLFF Working Papers no. 8, March 1998; and Salama Ahmed Salama, “Egypt and Mexico: Similar, Yet Different,” Al-Ahram Weekly Issue 491, July 20, 2000.
See Mahmoud Mohieddin and Saher Nasr, “On Privatization in Egypt: With Reference to the Experience of the Czech Republic and Mexico,” in Privatization in Egypt: The Debate in the Peopl’s Assembl (Cairo: Cairo University, 1996).
Maria Lorena and Graciela Bensusan, “Political Transition and Labor Revitalization,” Research in the Sociology of Work 1 (2003): 229–67.
Ruth Berns Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin Americ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
See Gosta Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995), 108.
Katrina Burgess, Parties and Unions in the New Global Econom (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004).
See John G. Ikenberry, “The State and Strategies of International Adjustment,” World Politic 39, no. 1 (October 1986), 53–77
Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Er (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 14.
Merilee Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Afric (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 44.
See Niklas Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare Stat (NewYork: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).
See Joan M. Nelson. “Organized Labor, Politics, and Labor Market Flexibility in Developing Countries,” World Bank Research Observe 6, no. 1( January 1991): 37–56.
David Stark and Laslo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europ (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 130.
See Charles Tilly, “The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere,” in Citizenship, Identity, and Social History ed. Charles Tilly (New York: University of Cambridge, 1996).
Max Weber, Economy and Society ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1058.
Charles Tilly, “Why Worry About Citizenship?” in Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States ed. Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 1999), 254.
Jean Pierre Oliver de Sardan, “A propos de la privatisation des etats,” Revue Tiers Mond 41, no. 61 (January–March 2000): 217–21; Beatrice Hibou, “Retrait ou redéploiement de l’Etat?” Critique Internationale no. 1, Autumn 1998, 151–68. Hibou borrows the concept “discharge” from Weber who held that such a mode of governance was preferred in “weakly bureaucratized contexts” and “an underdeveloped administrative apparatus.” Beatrice Hibou, “From Privatizing the Economy to Privatizing the State: An Analysis of the Continual Formation of the State,” in Privatizing the State ed. Beatrice Hibou (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 15. This view of privatization as making way for a new form of indirect rule is associated with French political economists, who in the 1990s were suspicious of Washington Consensus thinking about how privatization would shrink the state and unleash the private sector.
Beatrice Hibou, “From Privatizing the Economy to Privatizing the State: An Analysis of the Continual Formation of the State,” in Privatizing the State ed. Beatrice Hibou (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 11–17.
Michael Walton, “Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad or Incomplete?” Latin American Research Revie 39, no. 3 (2004), 165–83.
Joan Nelson and Samuel Huntington, eds., No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countrie (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 14.
See David Waldner, State-Building and Late Developmen (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century Egypt (Ne York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 78.
Joan M. Nelson, “Organized Labor, Politics and Labor Market Flexibility in Developing Countries” World Bank Research Observe 6, no. 1( January 1991): 42.
Samuel Valenzuela, “Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,” Comparative Politic 21, no. 4( July 1989): 445–47.
Robert Wade, “East Asia’s Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence,” World Politic 44 (1992): 270–320; Ziya Onis, “Privatization and the Logic of Coalition-Building,” Comparative Political Studie 24, no. 2 (1991): 231–53.
David Mares, “State Leadership in Economic Policy: A Collective Action Framework with a Colombian Case,” Comparative Politic 25, no. 4 (July 1993): 455–73.
Karin Aziz Chaudhry, “Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State,” Comparative Politic 27 (October 1994): 9.
Robert R. Kaufman, “Approaches to the Study of State Reform in Latin American and Postsocialist Countries,” Comparative Politic 31, no. 3 (April 1999): 357–75.
Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” Comparative Politic 20, no. 1 (October 1987): 1–18. Decades ago, S. N. Einstadt noted the political consequences of “precocious” bureaucratic expansion in developing countries: “The bureaucracy may tend to fulfill different types of political functions and, like parties, legislatures, and executives, become the center of different types of political activity” (Political Systems of Empire [New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963], 12).
David Hirst, “Egypt Stands on Feet of Clay,” Le Monde Diplomatique October 1999.
Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne, and Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt’s Controversial Constitutional Amendments,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace March 23, 2007.
John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turke (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 191.
See Kenneth S. Mericle, “Corporatist Control of the Working Class: Authoritarian Brazil since 1964,” in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).
John Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism and Democracy,” in Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa ed. John P. Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). See also the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 200 (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Carlos Bazresch and Santiago Levy, “Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico, 1970–1982,” in The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America ed. Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Er (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 7.
See Andres Solimano, “The Chilean Economy in the 1990s: On a‘Golden Age’ and Beyond,” in After Neoliberalism: What Next for Latin America ed. Lance Taylor (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 53–80.
Giacomo Luciani, “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State, and Democratization,” in Democracy Without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World ed. Ghassan Salamé (NewYork: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 130.
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© 2009 Hishaam D. Aidi
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Aidi, H.D. (2009). State Formation, Incorporation, Political Parties. In: Redeploying the State. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230617902_2
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