Reflectivist Opposition to the Scientific Approach

Abstract

The previous chapter laid out some of the basic features of the natural sciences and some of the principles of methodology and some criteria for theory choice that have allowed scientists to develop better theories over time. Because these principles have led the natural sciences, like astronomy, chemistry, or physics, to such great successes, it seemed reasonable to many people to try to use these methods in an analogous way to guide the social sciences as well. Chapter 3 showed how they have been adapted for use in the social sciences. This chapter considers three important ways in which philosophers of social science and IR theorists have argued that the natural science analogy does not apply and why IR, in their view, should be regarded as something radically different from any of the natural sciences. The three are interpretive constructivism, post-structuralism, and Frankfurt School Critical Theory. Each is distinct from the others, but there are some points of overlap in the principles they espouse and, in some instances, in the sources of intellectual inspiration.