Abstract
In After Hegemony, a groundbreaking contribution to our understanding of international cooperation, Keohane brings in the institutional context of state action to explain the continuation of existing international institutions even after the conditions that facilitated their creation have disappeared. Institutions are created as a result of the distribution of power, shared interests, and prevailing practices; they persist, however, because they are valuable for states. And they are valuable, according to Keohane, “because they perform important functions and because they are difficult to create or reconstruct.”1 Hence an international institution that states have created generates an incentive structure that promotes its persistence. Applying Keohane’s theory to the NATO institution that persisted after the end of the Cold War, Duffield and Wallander advance a functionalist explanation.2
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Notes
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.14.
John S. Duffield, “NATO’s Functions after the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 5 (1994–1995): 763–787;
Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–735.
Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 156–179.
Ku Sang-Hoe, Han’gukŭi pangwisanŏp: chŏnmanggwa taech’aek [Korea’s Defense Industry: Prospects and Suggestions] (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1998);
William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).
Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991), particularly pp. 105–122.
Kwang-Il Baek, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Chung-In Moon, The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries: Supplier Control or Recipient Autonomy? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 160–161; John D. Morrocco, “South Korea Drives toward Greater Military Autonomy,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 12, 1989, pp. 176–179;
Janne E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986);
Young-Sun Ha, “South Korea,” in Arms Production in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making, ed. James Everett Katz (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 225–233.
Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 51–52.
John A. C. Conybeare, “Arms versus Alliances: The Capital Structure of Military Enterprise,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 215–235;
Gerald L. Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries,” International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994): 421–446.
The ranking is from SIPRI Yearbook, 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 368. See also U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999–2000 (2002), p. 157, and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998 (2000), p. 168.
O Kwan-Ch’i, Ch’a Yŏng-Ku, and Hwang Tong-Jun, Hanmi kunsahyŏmnyŏkŭi palchŏn’gwa chŏnmang [Development and Prospect of Korea-U.S. Military Cooperation] (Seoul: Segyŏngsa, 1990), p. 66.
For Korea’s defense industry, see Kim Hyŏng-Gyun, Kunsusanŏbŭi sahoehak [Sociology of Weapons Industry] (Seoul: Sejongch’ulp’ansa, 1997).
See, for example, O, Ch’a, and Hwang, Hanmi kunsahyŏmnyŏkŭi; and Wookhee Shin, Security, Economic Growth and the State: Dynamics of Patron-Client State Relations in Northeast Asia, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1992.
Chi Man-Wŏn, Kunch’uksidaeŭi han’gukkun ŏttŏtke talajyŏya hana [How Must Korean Military Change in the Disarmament Age], rev. ed., vol. 2 (Seoul: Chinwŏn, 1992), p. 83.
Dong Joon Hwang, “ROK-U.S. Defense Industrial Cooperation: A New Step in Security Enhancement,” in The Future of South Korean-U.S. Security Relations, ed. William J. Taylor, Jr., Young Koo Cha, John Q. Blodgett, and Michael Mazarr (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 197.
Chi Man-Wŏn, Kunch’uksidaeŭi han’gukkun ŏttŏtke talajyŏya hana [How Must Korean Military Change in the Disarmament Age], rev. ed., vol. 1 (Seoul: Chinwŏn, 1992), pp. 162–164 and p. 207.
Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1995–1996 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1996), p. 93.
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Han Yong-Wŏn, “Kunpuŭi chedojŏk sŏngjanggwa chŏngch’ijŏk haengdongjuŭi [Military’s Systemic Growth and Political Behaviorism],” in Han’gukhyŏndaejŏngch’iron I: chelkonghwakukŭi kukkahyŏngsŏng, chŏngch’igwajŏng, chŏngch’aek [Modern Politics of Korea I: State Formation, Political Process, and Policies of the First Republic], ed. Han Pae-Ho (Seoul: Nanam, 1990), pp. 253–275; and
I Sŏn-Ho, Han’gukkun muŏsi munjein’ga [Korean Military, What Is the Problem?] (Seoul: P’albokwŏn, 1992), pp. 106–107.
O, Ch’a, and Hwang, Hanmi kunsahyŏmnyŏkŭi, p. 204; and Sŏul Sinmunsa, Chuhanmigun 30nyŏn [Thirty Years History of U.S. Forces in Korea] (Seoul: Sŏul Sinmunsa, 1979), pp. 322–324.
Lee Suk Bok, an ROKA officer, argues that the commander of the CFA, who has ROKA combat units under him, affects Korean officers’ doctrinal thinking. Lee Suk Bok, The Impact of US Forces in Korea (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), p. 71.
Ko Kang-Sŏk, “Han’gukchŏk ipch’egidongjŏn’gyoriŭi palchŏnbanghyang [Development Direction for Korean Three-Dimensional Maneuver War Doctrine]” (master’s thesis, Korea Defense University, November 1995), p. 104. I Yŏng-Wan et al., Kunsagibon’gyoriyŏn’gu (1) [Study in Military Basic Doctrines, vol. 1] (Seoul: National Defense Institute, 1990), p. 25.
Chung Min Lee, “Holding the ‘Hollingsworth Line’: Conventional Deterrence in the Korean Peninsula,” in The U.S.-Korean Security Relationship: Prospects and Challenges for the 1990s, Harold C. Hinton et al. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), p. 71.
John J. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), pp. 3–4.
For a discussion on FOFA, see General Bernard W. Rogers, “Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities,” NATO Review 32, no. 6 (December 1984): 1–8.
For the AirLand Battle Doctrine, see John L. Romjue, “The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept,” Air University Review 35, no. 4 (May–June 1984): 4–15.;
Lt. Colonel John S. Doerfel, “The Operational Art of the AirLand Battle,” Military Review 62, no. 5 (May 1982): 3–10; and FM 100–5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Army, May 1986).
I Yŏng-Wan et al., Kunsagibon’gyoriyŏn’gu (1) [Study in Military Basic Doctrines, vol. 1] (Seoul: National Defense Institute, 1990), p. 25, cited in Ko Kang-Sŏk, “Han’gukchŏk,” p. 105.
Michael Klare, American Arms Supermarket (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1984), pp. 54–76.
Sheryl D. Joyner, Pre and Post Marital Chaplain Ministry to Military Personnel and Korean Nations (Washington, DC: Triton, 1983), cited in Lee Suk Bok, Impact of US Forces, p. 83. For the most reliable and comprehensive data, see
Daniel B. Lee, “Korean Women Married to Servicemen,” in Korean American Women Living in Two Cultures, ed. Young In Song and Ailee Moon (Los Angeles: Academia Koreana, Keimyung-Baylo University Press, 1997), pp. 94–123. See also
Ji-Yeon Yuh, Beyond the Shadow of Camptown: Korean Military Brides in America, Nation of Newcomers (New York: New York University Press, 2002).
Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), pp. 60–66.
I Sŏk-U, Hanmihaengjŏnghyŏpchŏngyŏn’gu [A Study on the Status of Forces Agreement] (Seoul: Min, 1995), p. 83.
For the bureaucratic politics model, see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
John S. Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 838.
Katharine H. S. Moon, “Prostitute Bodies and Gendered States in U.S.-Korea Relations,” in Dangerous Women: Gender & Korean Nationalism, ed. Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 151. For a more thorough treatment, see
Katharine Moon, Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
Bruce Cumings, “Chinatown: Foreign Policy and Elite Realignment,” in The Hidden Election, ed. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 210.
Michael Zürn, “Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About the Domestic Sources of Regime Formation,” in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 282–311.
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© 2007 Jae-Jung Suh
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Suh, JJ. (2007). Interests and Alliance Persistence. In: Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230605015_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230605015_3
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