Steering, but not Dominating: the Impact of the Council Presidency on EU Legislation

Abstract

The rotating Presidency of the European Union’s (EU) Council of Ministers is a fascinating feature of the institutional setting of the decision-making process in the Council. Many accounts of the legislative process mention the role of the Presidency and its potential impact on legislative outcomes. Jonas Tallberg (2003, 2004, 2006, and Chapter 10 above) has provided us with the most comprehensive account of the Presidency so far. He argues that the Presidency has certain powers that allow it to influence the agenda and decision outcomes in the Council, subject to some constraints. First, the Presidency enjoys procedural powers which allow it to ‘shape’ the agenda. Second, the Presidency benefits from an informational asymmetry. According to Tallberg, Council members grant these powers to the Presidency because it is in their collective interest to do so as part of a grand bargain.