Abstract
The possibilities for biological warfare are chilling. But these possibilities should not lure us into the oversimplified notion that the threat from biowarfare grew linearly with the growth of scientific research. I have argued throughout this book that the role of experts and the construction of threat was not such a straightforward matter. Once advice was formalized, the imperative grew for experts to feed their knowledge about germ warfare into the flow of decision-making. But this knowledge was always fragile and constantly slipping from the grasp of the advisors, researchers and their patrons. As circumstances changed over time, the nature of the threat altered as a complex mixture of technical, economic, political and legal considerations combined to provide for successive changes in outlook. And even at any one time, the palpability of the threat often varied between the different groups in the policy arena.
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Notes
See discussion in Chapter 1. The links between knowledge and power have also been explored by Foucault who argues that the discourse of experts defines the limits of what it is possible and impossible to think and do — hence the link with power. See Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester);
Rouse, J. (1987) Knowledge and Power: Towards a Political Philosophy of Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
Carter and Pearson record that Fildes had objected to information about his wartime activities being revealed at an open day at Porton. See Carter, G.B. and Pearson, G.S. (1999) ‘British Biological Warfare and Biological Defence, 1925–45’ in Geissler, E. and van Courtland Moon, J.E. (eds) Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Article I of the Treaty prohibits development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of weapons and of biological agents with ‘no justification for prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes’. Use is not included but subsumed under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Research is permitted to allow for defensive science. See Wright, S. (ed.) (1990) Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
Carter, G. and Balmer, B. (1999) ‘Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence, 1945–1990’ in Bud, R. and Gummett, G. (eds) Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain’s Defence Laboratories 1945–1990 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers).
In 1994, CAMR ceased to be the responsibility of the PHLS and became a separate Special Health Authority answerable to the Microbiological Research Authority and the Department of Health. See Carter, G. (2000) Chemical and Biological Defence at Porton Down 1916–2000 (London: The Stationery Office).
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© 2001 Brian Balmer
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Balmer, B. (2001). Making Threats. In: Britain and Biological Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230508095_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230508095_9
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