Objective Certainty and Objective Certainties

Abstract

In his struggle to uncover the nature of our basic beliefs, Wittgenstein refers to them in many different ways in On Certainty: he thinks of them as propositions (OC 415), as rules (OC 95), as forming a picture (OC 94) and as ways of acting (OC 148). As propositions, they would be of a peculiar sort — hybrid propositions between logical and empirical propositions (OC 136, 309). These are the so-called ‘hinge propositions’ of On Certainty (OC 341). We shall see that Wittgenstein rejects the propositional option; that, for him, ‘the end is not certain “propositions” striking us immediately as true’ (OC 204). Thinking of these beliefs as forming a picture, a World-picture — or Weltbild (OC 167) is a step in the right (nonpropositional) direction, but not the ultimate step. Wittgenstein’s ultimate and crucial account of our basic beliefs is in terms of a know-how. But the way he arrives at this view is not clear cut.

But why am I so certain that this is my hand? Doesn’t the whole language-game rest on this kind of certainty?

(OC 446)