Abstract
In the previous chapters we examined Schelling’s differing approaches as regards the notions of the Absolute and finitude. In this chapter we will discuss the implications of these accounts for his conception of the self, in particular with regard to the notions of reflection and freedom. These issues will be explored, respectively, through his early work the STI (1800) and the AW (1811).
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© 2002 Kyriaki Goudeli
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Goudeli, K. (2002). Schelling’s Conception of the Self. In: Challenges to German Idealism. Renewing Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230502598_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230502598_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-50758-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-50259-8
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