Abstract
Over the course of 1971, events on the Indian subcontinent increasingly became the focus of American and British attention. At the beginning of the year a bitter internal struggle unfolded over the future status of East Pakistan. Following a brutal military crackdown by the Pakistani army, a humanitarian disaster ensued as millions of refugees fled into India. By the end of the year India and Pakistan were at war. The regional conflict threatened to turn global when the communist superpowers, through diplomatic and military support, aligned themselves on opposite sides.
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Notes
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© 2011 Andrew Scott
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Scott, A. (2011). The South Asia Crisis. In: Allies Apart. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230348936_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230348936_4
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