Britain, de Gaulle and Algeria, 1958–62

Abstract

For the die-hard supporters of Algérie française, de Gaulle’s progress towards dialogue with the FLN leadership amounted to treachery. In their eyes, the general was invested as premier on 1 June 1958 with an obligation to protect Algeria’s settlers and to revitalise the army’s campaign against FLN terror. The revolt of General Salan’s Algiers command against Pierre Pflimlin’s newly installed government on 13 May, Salan’s declaration of support for de Gaulle to the delight of the Algiers settlers two days later, and the obvious inability of the Paris authorities to bring Algeria back under control underlined the bonds between the final collapse of the Fourth Republic, the creation of a new Gaullist administration and prosecution of the Algerian war. The glaring divisions over Algeria within the leading parties of the old regime also suggested that an entirely new governmental structure was necessary to deal with the war. The Socialist leadership was by now implacably imposed to its erstwhile appointee as Resident, Robert Lacoste. The gulf within the MRP between Bidault’s extremist support for Algérie française and Pflimlin’s willingness to explore terms for a ceasefire could hardly have been wider. And divining a coherent Radical Party policy from politicians as individualistic as, for example, Edgar Faure, Mendès France and André Morice was near impossible.