Between the American Scylla and Chinese Charybdis: Hong Kong, 1950–54

Abstract

The British government confirmed its defense priorities in the Far East when it chose to reinforce Malaya with troops from Hong Kong. Although the Defence Committee clearly intended the Hong Kong garrison to put up a vigorous defense of the colony against a Chinese attack, by 1951 it was clear to officials in both London and Singapore that improvements in Chinese military efficiency had made a successful defense of Hong Kong impractical. The decision to send a British con- tingent to Korea proved to be the high water mark of British military deployments to the Far East, and it was firmly tied to wider strategic reasons. The government’s subsequent refusal to send any more troops to Asia led to a secret decision to abandon Hong Kong in the event of an all-out Chinese attack. Nonetheless, it saw no reason to drop the pretense that Britain intended to put up a resolute defense, and so resorted to strategic and tactical deception as a means of deterring a Chinese attack. The Australians agreed to assist in a theater-wide deception effort, and it appears the Americans did too.