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Abstract

By the end of the 1960s, the case for floating exchange rates ‘began to be taken more seriously’ within the Bretton Woods bureaucracy (Volcker and Gyohten 1992, 46). Also, within the IMF there was thought to be a minority ‘team’ in favour of increased flexibility (Halm 1971, 14, 19).1 But after Nixon’s election victory, those who sought to patch up the Bretton Woods system were confronted by powerful adversaries in the US Treasury.

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© 2003 Robert Leeson

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Leeson, R. (2003). US Treasury Secretaries. In: Ideology and the International Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286023_18

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