What Kind of Virtue Theorist is Hume?

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to elaborate and defend a claim that the status of a trait as a virtue for Hume is grounded in a plurality of features. Not only are virtues approved as such because of their utility but also because of their immediate impact on our sentiment or taste. This latter general ground of virtue status spawns an interesting plurality of features which make a trait a virtue. To take this latter ground of virtue status seriously, we need to show how traits having this effect can properly be seen as admirable or good. That is the main task of this essay.

I wish to thank Maria Merritt for her helpful comments on an earlier draft, members of the audience at The International Hume Conference, Dunedin, New Zealand January 2003, the Ethics Circle UNC Chapel Hill, the colloquia at the University of Texas at Austin, and University of Reading; and, especially, Charles Pigden for his extremely useful suggestions.