Abstract
A moral theory should, as many philosophers claim, offer us an account of obligation and motivation. It should address the following questions: How do we specify the reasons that morally require us to do X? How does the recognition that we are required to do X bring us to do X? The task is to provide an answer to the quite plausible claim that moral reasons should be normative as well as motivating.
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© 2009 Herlinde Pauer-Studer
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Pauer-Studer, H. (2009). Humean Sources of Normativity. In: Pigden, C.R. (eds) Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-30186-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28115-8
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