Abstract
So far, we’ve considered the community of enquiry from a normative point of view, via Kuhn, then discussed some social-psychological factors which need to be recognized, and, latterly, identified some broadly motivational facilitators, in the face of these factors, of what is, clearly, normatively appropriate. In disciplinary terms, we have canvassed philosophy, psychology, sociology, and politics as contributors to our understanding of the community of enquiry.
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Notes
Susan Leigh Star and James Griesemer, ‘Institutional Ecology, “Translations,” And Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907–39’, in The Science Studies Reader, ed. Mario Biagioli (New York and London: Routledge, 1998), 505.
For a concurrent judgment, see Robert Nola, ‘Review of Harvey Siegel, Relativism Refuted’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1989): 419–427.
See however D’Agostino, ‘“Demographic” Factors in Revolutionary Science: The Wave Model’, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Kitcher, ‘The Division of Cognitive Labor’,
and Alexander Rueger, ‘Risk and Diversification in Theory Choice’, Synthese 109 (1996): 263–80.
See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986), 86 for an argument to this effect in the case of legal interpretation.
Barry Barnes, ‘Practice as Collective Action’, in The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, ed. Theodore Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (London: Routledge, 2001), 20.
Fred D’Agostino, ‘The Sinews of a Free Society’, in A Passion for Politics: Essays in Honour of Graham Maddox, ed. Tim Battin (Sydney: Pearson Education Australia, 2005).
Christian List and Philip Pettit, ‘Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result’, Economics and Philosophy 18, no. 1 (2002): 89–110.
This is, in effect, an instance of the ‘frame problem’, as it’s called in artificial intelligence, i.e. the problem of specifying, in advance, what is and what isn’t relevant collateral information that bears on a particular problem. See for example Zenon Pylyshyn, ed., The Robot’s Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1987).
In a different context, Friedrich Hayek argued that freedom is better protected in a regime of proscriptive rules. See F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973–6).
Donald Norman, The Design of Everyday Things (London: The MIT Press, 1998), 9ff, 131ff.
W. M. Cohen and D. A. Levinthal, ‘Absorptive Capacity’, Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1990): 128–52.
Fred D’Agostino, ‘Rituals of Impartiality’, Social Theory and Practice 27 (2001): 65–81.
Elizbeth A. Mannix, Terri Griffith, and Margaret A. Neale, ‘The Phenomenology of Conflict in Distributed Work Teams’, in Distributed Work, ed. Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler (2002), 213–14.
The locus classicus is M. Friedman and L. P. Savage, ‘The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk’, Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948): 279–304.
John Payne, ‘The Scarecrow’s Search: A Cognitive Psychologist’s Perspective on Organization Decision Making’, in Organizational Decision Making, ed. Zur Shapira (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 364.
I note that my analysis diverges from the analysis which Kuhn himself provides, especially in recognizing that there need not, as Kuhn seems to have thought, be a tight connection, empirically, between seniority and conservatism. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 147ff. I note too that, although my analysis trades on the observations of March and Shapira, it shows some significant parallels with Philip Kitcher’s analysis of ‘Individual Responses to Innovation’. See Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, in Handbook for Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. J.G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).
See also, for a slightly different version of this story, Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy, 112–13. See also, reporting some ideas of Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992),
Miriam Solomon, ‘Norms of Epistemic Diversity’, Episteme 4 (2006): 25.
Richard Moreland and John Levine, ‘Problem Identification in Groups’, in Group Process and Productivity, ed. Stephen Worchel, Wendy Wood, and Jeffry Simpson (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992), 25.
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4.
For a more sophisticated analysis, using some tools of economics, and with allusions to ‘bandwagon’ and ‘herding’ models, see Jesus Zamora Bonilla, ‘The Elementary Economics of Scientific Consensus’, Theoria 14, no. 3 (1999): 461–88.
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© 2010 Fred D’Agostino
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D’Agostino, F. (2010). A Culture of Enquiry. In: Naturalizing Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230251274_6
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