Abstract
IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
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© 2009 Michael A. Genovese
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Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J. (2009). Federalist No. 48. In: The Federalist Papers. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230102019_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230102019_17
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
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