Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Primary Effects of Secondary Rules: Institutions and Multi-level Governance

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Book cover The Rule of Law in Global Governance

  • 521 Accesses

Abstract

Ku and Diehl’s chapter broadens the traditional conception of secondary rules, defining the international legal system as composed of operating and normative subsystems respectively. Three sets of mechanisms by which secondary rules influence primary rules are examined: (1) configuring institutional frameworks, (2) enhancing the credible commitment of new primary rules, and (3) institutions directly or indirectly making normative law. The conclusions are that secondary rules play important roles in each of these areas. A consistent theme is that the operating system can reduce uncertainty and fill gaps in the existing governance structures. There, secondary rules promote efficiency and coherence in the law. There are, however, instances in which such rules complicate matters, as in several cases lawmaking might be stifled and governance not promoted.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  • Alter, K. J., & Helfer, L. R. (2010). Nature or nurture? Judicial lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice. International Organizations, 64(4), 563–692.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alvarez, J. (2002). The new treaty makers. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 25(2), 213–234.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alvarez, J. (2005). International organizations as law-makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aviel, J. F. (2000). Placing human rights and environmental issues on ASEAN agenda: The role of non-governmental organizations. Asian Journal of Political Science, 8(2), 17–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boisson de Chazournes, L. (2000). Policy guidelines and compliance: The World Bank Operational Standards. In D. Shelton (Ed.), Commitment and compliance: The role of non-binding norms in the international legal system (pp. 281–302). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cakmak, C. (2004). The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the norm creation process in the field of human rights. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 3(1), 100–122.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charney, J. I. (1993). Universal international law. American Journal of International Law, 87(4), 529–551.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charnovitz, S. (2006). Nongovernmental organizations and international law. American Journal of International Law, 100(2), 348–372.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cook, R. (2004). Dynamic content: The strategic contingency of international law. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 14(1), 89–123.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crow, M. E. (2004). Smokescreens and state responsibility: Using human rights strategies to promote global tobacco controls. Yale Journal of International Law, 29(1), 209–250.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dai, X. (2007). International institutions and national policies. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Danner, A. M. (2006). When courts make law: How the international criminal tribunal recast the law of war. Vanderbilt Law Review, 59(1), 1–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diehl, P. F., & Ku, C. (2010). The dynamics of international law. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Downs, G., Rocke, D., & Barsoom, P. (1996). Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? International Organization, 50(3), 379–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellickson, R. (1991). Order without law. How neighbors settle disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fearon, J. (1998). Bargaining enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization, 52(2), 269–305.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finlayson, J., & Zacher, M. (1981). The GATT and the regulation of trade barriers: Regime dynamics and functions. International Organization, 35(4), 561–602.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ginsburg, T. (2005). Bounded discretion in international judicial lawmaking. Virginia Journal of International Law, 45(3), 631–673.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gruber, L. (2005). Power politics and the institutionalization of international relations. In M. Barnett & R. Duvall (Eds.), Power in global governance (pp. 102–129). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guzman, A. (2008). How international law works. A rational choice theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Haas, E. (1990). When knowledge is power: Three models of change in international organizations. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). (2007). 38. Convention on the international recovery of child support and other forms of family maintenance. https://www.hcch.net/de/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=131. Accessed 1 April 2016.

  • Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The concept of law (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helfer, L., & Slaughter, A. M. (2005). Why states create international tribunals: A response to professors Posner and Yoo. California Law Review, 93(3), 901–956.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henkin, L. (1968). How nations behave: Law and foreign policy. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henning, W. H. (2011). The Uniform Law Commission and cooperative federalism: Implementing private international law conventions through uniform state law. Elon Law Review, 2(2), 39–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • Higgins, R. (1995). Problems and process: International law and how we use it. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hollis, D. B. (2005). Why states consent still matters – Non-state actors, treaties, and the changing sources of international law. Berkeley Journal of International Law, 23(1), 137–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kellman, B. (2000). Protection of nuclear materials. In D. Shelton (Ed.), Commitment and compliance: The role of non-binding norms in the international legal system (pp. 486–504). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koenig, C. (1991). Observer status for the ICRC at the united nations: A legal viewpoint. International Review of the Red Cross, 280, 37–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kriehbiel, K. (1991). Information and legislative organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ku, C. (2007). Strengthening international law’s capacity to govern through multilayered strategic partnerships. South African Yearbook of International Law, 33, 107–123.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ku, C. (2012). International law, international relations, and global governance. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ku, C. (2013). International organizations as enablers. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System, Lund Sweden.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, L., & Simmons, B. (Eds.). (1998). International institutions. An international organization reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McAdams, R. H. (1997). The origin, development, and regulation of norms. Michigan Law Review, 96(2), 338–433.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raustiala, K. (2005). Form and substance in international agreements. American Journal of International Law, 99(3), 581–614.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rogers, C. A. (2005). The vocation of the international arbitrator. American University International Law Review, 20(5), 957–1020.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenau, J. N. (1990). Turbulence in world politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rutherford, K. R. (2000). The evolving arms control agenda: Implications of the role of NGOs in banning antipersonnel landmines. World Politics, 5(3), 74–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scelle, G. (1932). Droit International Public. Paris: Les Editions Dorat Montchretien.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shaffer, G. (2004). Recognizing public goods in WTO dispute settlement: Who participates? Who decides? The case of TRIPS and pharmaceutical patent protection. Journal of International Economic Law, 7(2), 459–482.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shaffer, G. (2005). Power, governance, and the WTO: A comparative institutional approach. In M. Barnett & R. Duvall (Eds.), Power in global governance (pp. 130–160). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shelton, D. (1994). The participation of nongovernmental organizations in international judicial proceedings. American Journal of International Law, 88, 611–642.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shelton, D. (Ed.). (2000). Commitment and compliance: The role of non-binding norms in the international legal system. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmons, B. (2009). Mobilizing for human rights: International law in domestic politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Stiles, K. W. (2006). The power of procedure and the procedures of the powerful: Anti-terror law in the United States. Journal of Peace Research, 43(1), 37–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • The London Court of International Arbitration. (2016). www.lcia.org. Accessed 1 April 2016.

  • Thelen, K. (2004). How institutions evolve. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Uniform Law Commission (ULC). (2016). About the ULC. http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC. Accessed 1 April 2016.

  • Young, O. (1989a). International cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the environment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, O. (1989b). The politics of international regime formation: Managing natural resources and the environment. International Organization, 43(3), 349–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, Texas A&M University, 1515, Commerce Street, 76102, Fort Worth, TX, USA

    Charlotte Ku

  2. Political Science, University of Texas-Dallas, 800, W. Campbell Rd., 75080, Richardson, TX, USA

    Paul F. Diehl

Authors
  1. Charlotte Ku
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Paul F. Diehl
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Charlotte Ku .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bamberg, Germany

    Monika Heupel

  2. Leiden University, The Netherlands

    Theresa Reinold

Copyright information

© 2016 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ku, C., Diehl, P.F. (2016). The Primary Effects of Secondary Rules: Institutions and Multi-level Governance. In: Heupel, M., Reinold, T. (eds) The Rule of Law in Global Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95053-9_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation