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Asymmetric Patterns in the Civil Society’s Access to the European Commission: The Cases of DG FISMA and DG TRADE

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Partnerships in International Policy-Making

Part of the book series: International Series on Public Policy ((ISPP))

Abstract

This chapter investigates the various factors that enable competing corporate and non-corporate organized interests to gain access to the European Commission’s policy-definition venues. It hypothesizes that, while economic relevance and lobbying resources ensure privileged access for business representatives at large, and in particular for the large European associations and firms, non-corporate organized groups improve their chances of access when the policy issues they address—together with the objectives they strive for—gain a sufficient degree of public and political salience. In order to test this hypothesis, the chapter focuses on the expert groups, stakeholders’ consultations, and grant programmemes for civil society organizations in the DGs Fisma and Trade, addressing two policy areas that came to the fore between 2008 and 2015.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, LUISS, Rome, Italy

    Giuseppe Montalbano

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  1. Giuseppe Montalbano
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. LUISS, Roma, Italy

    Raffaele Marchetti

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Montalbano, G. (2017). Asymmetric Patterns in the Civil Society’s Access to the European Commission: The Cases of DG FISMA and DG TRADE. In: Marchetti, R. (eds) Partnerships in International Policy-Making. International Series on Public Policy . Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94938-0_8

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