Skip to main content

Part of the book series: European Administrative Governance ((EAGOV))

  • 213 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter sets out the main questions that the book will deal with: why are competition agencies created independent? And what do our societies gain from their independence? It starts by explaining why competition policy is important and why, being a policy in which enforcement is crucial, it cannot be understood without studying its enforcers. The chapter also illustrates how the book seeks to contribute to the literature on EU competition policy, to the literature on regulatory agencies and to the literature on “varieties of capitalism”. After explaining the main theoretical argument and the methodological approach followed in the book, the chapter concludes by offering an outline of the rest of the work.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Akman, P., and H. Kassim. 2010. Myths and Myth-Making in the European Union: The Institutionalization and Interpretation of EU Competition Policy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48(1): 111–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bates, R.H., A. Greif, M. Levi, J.-L. Rosenthal, and B.R. Weingast. 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165–176.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buch-Hansen, H., and A. Wigger. 2010. Revisiting 50 Years of Market-Making: The Neoliberal Transformation of European Competition Policy. Review of International Political Economy 17(1): 20–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buch-Hansen, H., and A. Wigger. 2011. The Politics of European Competition Regulation: A Critical Political Economy Perspective. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Budzinski, O., and A. Christiansen. 2005. Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy System as an Interest-Driven Process. Journal of Public Policy 25(3): 313–337.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christensen, J.G., and V.L. Nielsen. 2010. Administrative Capacity, Structural Choice and the Creation of EU Agencies. Journal of European Public Policy 17(2): 176–204.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cini, M., and L. McGowan. 2008. Competition Policy in the European Union, European Union Series, 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clough, M., and D. Slater. 2007. Current Developments in Member States. European Competition Journal 3(2): 537–600.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cseres, K.J., M.-P. Schinkel, and F.O.W. Vogelaar (eds.). 2006. Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for the EU Member States. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Damro, C. 2006. The New Trade Politics and EU Competition Policy: Shopping for Convergence and Co-operation. Journal of European Public Policy 13(6): 867–886.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, R., and I. McMenamin. 2005. Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainty or Policy Complexity? Explaining Variations in the Independence of Non-majoritarian Institutions in France. British Journal of Political Science 35(3): 531–548.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. 2014. Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives. COM 2014: 453.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerber, D.J. 1998. Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giavazzi, F., and M. Pagano. 1988. The Advantage of Tying One’s Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility. European Economic Review 32(5): 1055–1075.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilardi, F. 2002. Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. Journal of European Public Policy 9(6): 873–893.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilardi, F. 2005. The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors. Swiss Political Science Review 11(4): 139–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilardi, F. 2008. Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guardiancich, I., and M. Guidi. 2015. Formal Independence of Regulatory Agencies and Varieties of Capitalism: A Case of Institutional Complementarity? Regulation & Governance. doi:10.1111/rego.12080.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guidi, M. 2015. The Relationship between Independence and Accountability. In Accountability and Regulatory Governance: Audiences, Controls and Responsibilities in the Politics of Regulation, ed. A. Bianculli, X. Fernández i Marín, and J. Jordana, 105–122. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P.A., and D. Soskice. 2001a. An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism. In Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, ed. P.A. Hall and D. Soskice, 1–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P.A., and D. Soskice (eds.). 2001b. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P.A., and D. Soskice. 2003. Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities. In Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities, ed. R. Franzese, P. Mooslechner, and M. Schürz, 43–76. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hancké, B., M. Rhodes, and M. Thatcher (eds.). 2007. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradiction, and Complementarities in the European Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanretty, C., and C. Koop. 2012. Measuring the Formal Independence of Regulatory Agencies. Journal of European Public Policy 19(2): 198–216.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanretty, C., and C. Koop. 2013. Shall the Law Set Them Free? The Formal and Actual Independence of Regulatory Agencies. Regulation & Governance 7(2): 195–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harker, M. 2007. Cross-Border Mergers in the EU: The Commission V the Member States. European Competition Journal 3(2): 503–535.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jordana, J., D. Levi-Faur, and X.F. i Marín. 2011. The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion. Comparative Political Studies 44(10): 1343–1369.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karagiannis, Y. 2007. Preference Heterogeneity and Equilibrium Institutions: The Case of European Competition Policy, PhD Thesis. Florence: European University Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karagiannis, Y. 2010a. Collegiality and the Politics of European Competition Policy. European Union Politics 11(1): 143–164.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karagiannis, Y. 2010b. Political Analyses of European Competition Policy. Journal of European Public Policy 17(4): 599–611.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karagiannis, Y. 2013a. The Causes and Consequences of the Collegial Implementation of European Competition Law. European Law Journal 19(5): 682–704.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karagiannis, Y. 2013b. The Origins of European Competition Policy: Redistributive Versus Ideational Explanations. Journal of European Public Policy 20(5): 777–794.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kassim, H., and K. Wright. 2009. Bringing Regulatory Processes Back In: The Reform of EU Antitrust and Merger Control. West European Politics 32(4): 738–755.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi-Faur, D. 2005. The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598(1): 12–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi-Faur, D. 2006. Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism: Getting the Most Out of the Comparative Method. Governance 19(3): 367–382.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levy, B., and P.T. Spiller. 1994. The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 10(2): 201–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maggetti, M. 2012. Regulation in Practice: The De Facto Independence of Regulatory Agencies. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majone, G. 1996. Introduction. In Regulating Europe, ed. G. Majone, 1–8. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majone, G. 1997. From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance. Journal of Public Policy 17(2): 139–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majone, G. 1999. The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems. West European Politics 22(1): 1–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGowan, L. 2005. Europeanization Unleashed and Rebounding: Assessing the Modernization of EU Cartel Policy. Journal of European Public Policy 12(6): 986–1004.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGowan, L., and M. Cini. 1999. Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. Governance 12(2): 175–200.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGowan, L., and S. Wilks. 1995. The First Supranational Policy in the European Union: Competition Policy. European Journal of Political Research 28(2): 141–169.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thatcher, M. 2002. Regulation after Delegation: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 9(6): 954–972.

    Google Scholar 

  • Visser, J. 2011. ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 Countries between 1960 and 2007. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (http://www.uva-aias.net/208).

  • Vogel, S.K. 1996. Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallsten, S.J. 2001. An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in Africa and Latin America. The Journal of Industrial Economics 49(1): 1–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Warlouzet, L., and T. Witschke. 2012. The Difficult Path to an Economic Rule of Law: European Competition Policy, 1950–91. Contemporary European History 21(Special Issue 03): 437–455.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wigger, A., and A. Nölke. 2007. Enhanced Roles of Private Actors in EU Business Regulation and the Erosion of Rhenish Capitalism: the Case of Antitrust Enforcement. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45(2): 487–513.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilks, S. 2005. Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy? Governance 18(3): 431–452.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilks, S. 2007. Agencies, Networks, Discourses and the Trajectory of European Competition Enforcement. European Competition Journal 3(2): 437–464.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilks, S., and I. Bartle. 2002. The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition Agencies. West European Politics 25(1): 148–172.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wonka, A., and B. Rittberger. 2010. Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies. West European Politics 33(4): 730–752.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 2016 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Guidi, M. (2016). Introduction. In: Competition Policy Enforcement in EU Member States. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58814-2_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics