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EP Elections as Stepping-Stones to Eurosceptic Party Success

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The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament Elections

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

Abstract

European Parliament (EP) elections have been described as “midwives to new parties”, facilitating in many ways the birth of parties that fractionalize party systems and have knock-on effects for government formation. This chapter proposes a previously unmentioned mechanism that would “pump” support from new and previously non-voting individuals toward support for parties they would not have supported at a national election. The mechanism is hypothesized to operate because of the habit-forming process of voting for a party. The chapter establishes that this mechanism does operate as hypothesized, though it does not account for the largest part of continuing support for eurosceptic parties. Ironically this limitation on the pump’s productivity is due to the low turnout among especially young voters at EP elections.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This age is chosen based on findings in Franklin (2004).

  2. 2.

    My criterion omits some parties generally considered eurosceptic, especially in Spain, but I stick to it for fear that conventional assignments may not reflect the judgment of voters. Postcommunist countries were excluded because turnout at these countries is so very low at national elections, which thus appear to be also performing as “second order” elections in practice if not in theory. With less distinction between the two types of election in these countries, expectations for different behavior of voters are not so clear as in countries where the “second-order-ness” of EP elections is more obviously distinct from the “first-order-ness” of national elections.

  3. 3.

    New voters do not actually switch to eurosceptic party support, reason why the word appears between quotation marks in their case.

  4. 4.

    The scale is based on those voting at each election. 95 percent confidence intervals at the boundaries between stacked bars are too narrow to be visible (see Fig. 11.4 for some of the same quantities along with associated confidence intervals).

  5. 5.

    This increase in the length of the column labeled “actual continuing eurosceptic party supporters” at the next national elections comes both from converts to eurosceptic voting at the EP elections who continue to vote for the same party (see Fig. 11.2) and from eurosceptic voters at the previous national election (not shown in Fig. 11.4) who had abstained at the EP elections but anticipated returning to vote eurosceptic at the next national elections.

  6. 6.

    Because turnout at national elections in CEE countries is so relatively low, I do not necessarily expect the same “pump-like” effect at EP elections in those countries (as already explained). Only a separate analysis can settle that question. But the fact that eurosceptic party support in CEE countries is itself quite muted (see Chap. 6 in this volume) means that the extent to which it could be expected to spill over into national elections would also be muted.

  7. 7.

    There is a cost to this limitation, however, as already mentioned. This is that potential first-time voters who fail to vote at an EP election are more likely to also fail to vote at the next national election, despite the greater salience of that election. Not only votes for eurosceptic parties are habit-forming but failure to vote is habit-forming too (Franklin and Hobolt 2011).

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Franklin, M.N. (2017). EP Elections as Stepping-Stones to Eurosceptic Party Success. In: Hassing Nielsen, J., Franklin, M. (eds) The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament Elections. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58696-4_11

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