3 Derrida: Life and Death at the Same Time

Foran, Lisa

doi:10.1057/978-1-137-57758-0_4

Lisa Foran²

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Abstract

In Derrida the thinking of difference found in both Heidegger and Levinas becomes even more dynamic and volatile. Every possibility of founding or defining an approach to the other (text/person)—even as a groundless ground (Heidegger) or as a rupture (Levinas)—is discovered to be impossible or rather (im)possible. Translation becomes in Derrida an absolutely limitless operation which reveals not simply the difference between Being and being, or that between same and Other. Rather it reveals both of these, and another difference: the difference of différance. For Derrida, what remains as yet unthought in the work of both Heidegger and Levinas is the manner in which any determination, limitation or definition remains haunted by what it excludes:

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Notes

1.
1. Points p. 298 /trans. pp. 283–4.
2.
2. This is stated in an interview with Henri Ronse, first published in Lettres françaises no. 1211, December 1967. Later published in 1972 in Pos. p. 13 /trans. p. 5.
3.
3. Patrick O’Connor, Derrida: Profanations (London, New York: Continuum, 2010) p. 28.
4.
4. Pos. p. 13 /trans. p. 5.
5.
5. See VP p. 5 /trans. p. 6 where Derrida describes phenomenology as ‘tormented from within’ as a result of this account of temporality which destabilizes the account of meaning; see also VP pp. 67–77 /trans. pp. 60–70 & passim.
6.
6. Husserl, Ideas I, op.cit. p. 288 /trans. p. 297.
7.
7. VP p. 84 /trans. p. 75.
8.
8. VP p. 15 /trans. p. 16.
9.
9. VP pp. 14–15 /trans. pp. 15–16.
10.
10. Intro., see in particular pp. 56–69 /trans. pp. 66–76.
11.
11. VP p. 85 /trans. p. 76.
12.
12. VP p. 85 /trans. p. 76.
13.
13. VP p.87 /trans. p. 78.
14.
14. VP p. 87 /trans. pp. 77–8.
15.
15. Intro. p. 71 /trans. p. 77.
16.
16. As in touching oneself or seeing oneself.
17.
17. As in feeling the inwardness of one’s bodily movements.
18.
18. Heidegger, SZ p. 169 /trans. p. 212.
19.
19. VP p. 91 /trans. p. 81.
20.
20. Intro. p. 84 /trans. p. 87.
21.
21. VP p. 91 /trans. p. 81.
22.
22. ‘This body proper to words expresses something only if it is animated (sinnbelebt) by an act of meaning (bedeuten) which transforms it into a spiritual flesh (geistige Leiblichkeit). But only the Geistigkeit or Lebendigkeit is independent and primordial. As such, it needs no signifier to be present to itself. Indeed, it is as much in spite of its signifiers as thanks to them that it is awakened or maintained in life.’ (VP p. 91 /trans. p. 81). This was explored in detail in the Introduction; Derrida’s point there being that Husserl, while recognizing the necessity of writing, nonetheless privileges ‘life-giving spirit’ as that which guarantees truth’s ideality. In this way, argues Derrida, Husserl ends up effacing the body or Körper of writing in favour of its Leib. This is a theme throughout the Introduction though of particular note (and Derrida references it himself in this section of VP) are pp. 83–100 /trans. pp. 87–99 where Derrida argues: ‘If writing is both a factual event and the upsurging of sense, if it is both Körper and Leib, how would writing preserve its Leiblichkeit from corporeal disaster? Husserl […] is going to track down the intention of writing (or of reading) in itself and in its purity; in a new reduction he is going to isolate the intentional act which constitutes Körper as Leib and maintain this act in its Leiblichkeit, in its living truth-sense. Such an analysis no longer has any need of Körper as such.’ (Intro. pp. 97–8 /trans. p. 97).
23.
23. VP p. 93 /trans. p. 82.
24.
24. VP p. 92 /trans. p. 82.
25.
25. VP p. 92 /trans. p. 82.
26.
26. Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917), (HUA X) trans. by John Barnett Brough, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991) [hereafter Husserl PZ] p. 40 /trans. p. 41 [my italics].
27.
27. Husserl PZ pp. 127–8 /trans. p. 131.
28.
28. VP p. 95 /trans. p. 85.
29.
29. VP pp. 95–6 /trans.(modified) p. 85.
30.
30. VP p. 96 /trans. p. 86.
31.
31. Intro. p. 87 /trans. p. 90.
32.
32. Husserl, Ideas I p. 288 /trans. p. 297.
33.
33. VP p. 97 /trans. p. 87.
34.
34. VP p. 97 /trans. p. 87.
35.
35. DG p. 224 /trans. p. 155.
36.
36. DG p. 223 /trans. p. 154.
37.
37. Pos. p. 31 /trans. p. 20.
38.
38. VP p. 98 /trans. p. 88.
39.
39. VP p. 98 /trans. p. 88.
40.
40. DG pp. 220–6 /trans. pp. 153–7.
41.
41. VP p. 99 /trans. p. 89.
42.
42. VP p. 100 /trans. p. 89.
43.
43. VP p. 102 /trans. p. 91.
44.
44. VP p. 102 /trans. pp. 91–2.
45.
45. VP p. 102 /trans.(modified) pp. 91–2.
46.
46. VP p. 102–3 /trans. p. 92 Derrida is here referring to Husserl, LI, 1, §9.
47.
47. VP p. 104 /trans. p. 93.
48.
48. VP p. 104 /trans. p. 93.
49.
49. Husserl, LI, 1, §26 cited in Derrida, VP p. 105 /trans. p. 94.
50.
50. VP p. 105 /trans. p. 94.
51.
51. Husserl, LI, 1. §26 cited in Derrida, VP p. 106 /trans. p. 95.
52.
52. Husserl, LI, 1. §26 cited in Derrida, VP p. 107 /trans. p. 96.
53.
53. VP p. 107 /trans. pp. 95–6.
54.
54. VP p. 108 /trans. p. 96.
55.
55. Joseph Claude Evans Strategies of Deconstruction Derrida and the Myth of the Voice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) [Hereafter Evans] p. 136.
56.
56. Evans pp. 136–7.
57.
57. For his reading of the last chapter of VP see Evans, pp. 129–43 where he carefully picks apart Derrida’s discriminative reading of Husserl. However, while critical here, Evans is complimentary elsewhere and as a whole admirably succeeds in his own aim of navigating between simply ‘nailing’ Derrida on misreadings of Husserl and on the other hand blindly accepting the deconstructive project (as he explains in his introduction, see in particular pp. xiv–xix).
58.
58. Evans p. 137.
59.
59. Derrida, VP p. 8 /trans. p. 10.
60.
60. VP p. 108 /trans. p. 97.
61.
61. VP p. 109 /trans. p. 97.
62.
62. Husserl, LI, 1,§11 Cited in Derrida VP p. 109 /trans. p. 97.
63.
63. VP p. 109 /trans. p. 98.
64.
64. For more on this see Timothy Mooney, ‘Derrida’s Empirical Realism’ in Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol. 25 No. 5, Sage, 1999 pp. 33–56) [hereafter Mooney 1999] p. 36.
65.
65. VP p. 111 /trans. p. 99.
66.
66. VP p. 112 /trans. p. 100.
67.
67. Husserl, LI, 1, §28.
68.
68. VP p. 113 /trans. p. 101.
69.
69. VP p. 114 /trans. p. 102.
70.
70. VP p. 114 /trans. p. 102; see also VP p. 111 /trans. p. 99.
71.
71. VP p. 117 /trans. p. 104 Derrida’s malleable reading of Husserl here must again be noted. Mooney nicely sums up the point: ‘It is Husserl who says that the thing itself is an Idea in the Kantian sense which no one experiences as really seen. It is Husserl who, in Logical Investigations, already takes all fulfilment as provisional. And it is Husserl, finally, who argues that my experiential outlook is affected by an ultimate genesis or psychophysical origin which cannot be accessed, since I can reach no first moment of awareness which would not be preceded by retentions and sedimented memories’ (Mooney 1999 p. 50).
72.
72. VP p. 115 /trans. p. 102.
73.
73. VP p. 115 /trans. p. 103.
74.
74. VP p. 116 /trans. p. 103.
75.
75. See note 23 in the Introduction on the translation of this term.
76.
76. Intro. p. 85 /trans. p. 88.
77.
77. VP p. 2 /trans. p. 4.
78.
78. SZ pp. 175–80 /trans. pp. 219–24 & passim.
79.
79. Survivre, pp. 147–9 /trans. p. 82–3.
80.
80. Survivre p. 126 /trans. p. 67.
81.
81. The term récit is difficult to translate into English; most generally it means ‘narrative’ or ‘account’ told by an author; as a remembering or accounting for herself. André Gide demonstrates the genre in Straight is the Gate (La Porte Étroite); an author recounts a series of events and in so doing reveals a moral tale. It could be understood as a ‘fiction’ in the sense in which Borges uses the term (ficción). However, Blanchot’s work problematized and embraced this term as part of a strategy of genre disruption. Noting the difficulty of the term in an address to the translator, Derrida advises: ‘Perhaps it will be better to leave the French word récit. It is already has enough to understand, in Blanchot’s text, in French.’ (Survivre p. 130/trans. p. 70) I will thus take Derrida’s cue and retain the French word in my own reading above.
82.
82. Survivre p. 124 /trans. p. 65.
83.
83. As I just illustrated with the reading of Husserl, or one could cite the question of the pharmakon as the death and/or life of memory or writing as the life and/or death of meaning (see ‘La Pharmacie de Platon’ in Diss. in particular pp. 78–84, pp. 102–111 /trans. pp. 75–80; 94–100) although one could of course here refer to a myriad of other texts.
84.
84. Survivre p. 121 /trans. p. 63.
85.
85. Survivre p. 122 /trans.p. 63 Here, as elsewhere, Derrida translates the Heideggerian Ent-ferung as é-loignement. The Heideggerian term is generally translated in English as de-severance, in order to capture the idea of a distance that is also a proximity [SZ §23 (pp. 104–113 /trans. pp. 138–148) see also the translator’s note to this term SZ trans. n.2 pp. 138–9].
86.
86. Survivre pp. 134–5 /trans. pp. 71–2.
87.
87. Survivre p. 137 /trans. p. 74.
88.
88. Survivre p. 136 /trans. p. 73.
89.
89. Intro. pp. 104–106 /trans. pp. 102–104.
90.
90. Percy Bysshe Shelley The Triumph of Life, line 544: ‘ ‘‘Then, what is Life?” I said’.
91.
91. On the influence of the French language on Middle English see for example Albert C Baugh & Thomas Cable A History of the English Language 4th ed. (Routledge: London 1994) [hereafter Baugh & Cable] pp. 105–123, and in particular pp. 163–181 which notes that the Latin influence on the English language was often via the French borrowing of Latin terms rather than a direct adoption of Latin by English.
92.
92. Survivre p. 119 /trans. p. 62.
93.
93. Survivre p. 121 /trans. p. 62.
94.
94. Maurice Blanchot, Le pas au-delà, (Paris: Gallimard 1973). This text was translated by Lycette Nelson as The Step Not Beyond (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992). However, the references in Derrida’s text here obviously precede this translation and are directly translated by Hulbert.
95.
95. Blanchot’s L’ arrêt de mort is translated as Death Sentence by Lydia Davis (New York: Station Hill Press, 1998).
96.
96. Survivre p. 159 /trans. p. 94.
97.
97. Survivre p. 160 /trans. p. 95 ‘l’instance de la décision impossible’ where ‘instance’ is both ‘moment’ or ‘instance’, but also as Hulbert notes ‘lawsuit’ or ‘tribunal’.
98.
98. VP p. 115 /trans. p. 102.
99.
99. Diss. pp. 71–197 /trans. pp. 71–168.
100.
100. OA p. 160/trans. p. 120.
101.
101. Survivre pp. 160–1 /trans. p. 95.
102.
102. Survivre pp. 160–1 /trans. p. 95.
103.
103. This ‘doubling’ of course is a strategy employed in Derrida’s own reading of the story; the top section of the pages telling one ‘story’ so to speak and the bottom half another, although they stand alone they do call to each other.
104.
104. Survivre, pp. 146–148 /trans. pp. 83–5.
105.
105. Survivre, p. 176 /trans. p. 108.
106.
106. Survivre, p. 178 /trans. p. 109.
107.
107. Survivre, p. 178 /trans. pp. 109–10.
108.
108. Survivre, pp. 178–9 /trans. p. 110 italics and capitalization in original. In the French there is a play on the word procés which can also mean ‘trial’.
109.
109. Jacques Derrida, ‘Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility, A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida’, in Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (eds.), Questioning Ethics, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, (London, New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 65–83. [hereafter HJR] p. 68.
110.
110. Blanchot, L’arrêt de mort, cited in Derrida, Survivre p. 179 /trans. p. 110.
111.
111. Survivre p. 151 /trans. p. 85 Derrida cites Nietzsche, Opinions et sentence mêlées a translation he describes as ‘quite inadequate, precisely in its triumph.’
112.
112. Survivre p. 169 /trans. p. 98.
113.
113. Survivre p. 169 /trans. p. 99 Derrida here cites Nietzsche in terms of the feminine & masculine: ‘I am my father who is dead and my mother who is alive, announces Nietzsche at the midpoint of his life’ (Survivre p. 137 /trans. p. 75). A point he often returns to, for example in OA where, in a discussion on Nietzsche and the (im)possibility of autobiography he notes: ‘Inasmuch as I am and follow after my father, I am the dead man and I am death. Inasmuch as I am and follow after my mother, I am life that preserves, I am life that preserves [...] The mother is living on, and this living on is the name of the mother. This survival is my life whose shores she overflows.’ (OA pp. 28–9 /trans. p. 16).
114.
114. Survivre p.169/trans. (modified) p.98 See also Derrida’s commentary on Blanchot’s claim that writing (in particular writing an autobiography) is a manner by which one seeks to survive but only through a type of suicide in Demeure [(Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1998) trans. by Elizabeth Rottenberg, Demeure Fiction and Testimony (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000)] pp. 50–7 /trans. pp. 43–51.
115.
115. Survivre p. 155 /trans. p. 87.
116.
116. In this regard, it is important to highlight that the collection in which this text by Derrida was first published centred on the role of (literary) criticism within and beyond academic institutions (see the preface to Deconstruction and Criticism by Geoffrey Hartman, op.cit. pp. vi–viii).
117.
117. Survivre pp. 190–1 /trans. pp. 116–7.
118.
118. See also DTB p. 220 /trans. p. 176.
119.
119. Emmanuel Levinas, Dieu, la mort et le temps, (Paris: Biblio essais, 1995) trans. by Bettina Bergo, God Death and Time, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), trans. p. 105.
120.
120. Walter Benjamin ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, first published in 1923 reprinted in Illuminationen: ausgewählte Schriften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969) pp. 56–69. Trans. by Harry Zorn [recte Zohn] ‘The Task of the Translator’ in Illuminations (New York: Shocken Books, 1969) pp. 70–82 [hereafter Benjamin]. I will continue to cite here the until recently standard translation by Harry Zohn for ease of reference. However, it should be noted that there are a number of issues with Zohn’s translation including the omission of key sentences (such as that referring to messianism). For more on these problems see Steven Rendall, ‘Notes on Zohn’s Translation of Benjamin’s “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers”’ (TTR: traduction, terminologie, redaction Vol.10 No.2, 1997, pp. 191–206). For a number of years Zohn’s translation was protected by copyright, however, a new translation by Steven Rendall has recently been published in The Translation Studies Reader 3rd Edition (London & New York: Routledge, 2012) pp. 75–83, which seeks to overcome some of these issues.
121.
121. Survivre p. 149 /trans. p. 83.
122.
122. OA p. 161 /trans. p. 122.
123.
123. Benjamin pp. 56–60 /trans. pp. 71–3.
124.
124. DTB pp. 223–224 /trans. pp. 179–180, See also Benjamin pp. 56–9 /trans. pp. 70–2.
125.
125. DTB p. 221 /trans. p. 178.
126.
126. Benjamin p. 58 /trans. p. 72.
127.
127. DTB p. 222 /trans. p. 178.
128.
128. Benjamin, p. 58 /trans. pp. 71–2.
129.
129. DTB p. 222 /trans. pp. 178–179.
130.
130. DTB p. 223 /trans. p. 179 See also OA pp. 161–2 /trans. p. 122.
131.
131. DTB p. 223 /trans. p. 179.
132.
132. DTB p. 223 /trans. p. 179.
133.
133. DTB pp. 219–20 /trans. pp. 175–6.
134.
134. DTB p. 225 /trans. p. 181.
135.
135. DTB p. 225 /trans. p. 181 In the English translation by Harry Zohn ‘form’ is translated as ‘mode’.
136.
136. DTB p. 225 /trans. p. 181 Benjamin p. 57 /trans. p. 70.
137.
137. DTB p. 225 /trans. p. 182.
138.
138. DTB pp. 225–6/trans. p. 182 As Benjamin notes: ‘One might, for example, speak of an unforgettable life or moment even if all men had forgotten it.’ (Benjamin p. 57 /trans. p. 71).
139.
139. DTB p. 226 /trans. p. 182.
140.
140. DTB p. 225 /trans. p. 182.
141.
141. DTB pp. 228–9 /trans. p. 185.
142.
142. DTB p. 216 /trans. p. 172.
143.
143. DTB p. 216 /trans. pp. 172–3.
144.
144. DTB p. 229 /trans. p. 185.
145.
145. DTB p. 230 /trans. p. 186.
146.
146. Benjamin p. 61 /trans. p. 75 & p. 66 /trans. p. 79.
147.
147. Benjamin pp. 62–3 /trans. p. 76 See also p. 62 /trans. p. 75 where Benjamin distinguishes translation from art on the basis of the fact that art has ‘permanence’ whereas a translation does not.
148.
148. See also OA p. 152 /trans. pp. 115–6 where Derrida discusses an ‘untouchable kernel’ in relation to Heidegger and to Nicholas Abraham and marks that the desire for this ‘kernel’ or ‘origin’ of ‘forgotten source’ may be unavoidable, but that none of these things in fact exist as such.
149.
149. DTB p. 239 /trans. p. 196.
150.
150. DTB p. 239 /trans. p. 196.
151.
151. DTB p. 242 /trans. p. 199.
152.
152. DTB p. 246 /trans. p. 202.
153.
153. DTB p. 215 /trans. p. 171.
154.
154. DTB p. 246 /trans. p. 203.
155.
155. Survivre pp. 147–8 /trans. pp. 82–3.

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Foran, L. (2016). 3 Derrida: Life and Death at the Same Time. In: Derrida, the Subject and the Other. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57758-0_4

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