Abstract
The discussion of ascribing intentionality leads to consideration of Dennett’s (The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987) intentional stance as a means of generating a first approximation of the behavior of an intentional system by treating it in an idealized manner as a utility maximizer that has the intentionality apt to it given its circumstances. This somewhat rough and ready initial analysis needs to be borne out, if it is to count as a useful explanatory approximation, by an empirically substantiated cognitive account of how humans make decisions. In Dennett’s formulation this entails the devising of a sub-personal cognitive psychology: in the Intentional Behaviorist formulation it is a matter of devising both micro- and macro-cognitive psychologies that show how the intentionality assumed in the Intentional Interpretation could have been generated. We thus arrive at a theoretical framework that can be used to interpret and explain consumer choice.
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Foxall, G.R. (2016). Intentional Psychologies. In: Perspectives on Consumer Choice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50121-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50121-9_6
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