Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A theoretical foundation for assessing principal-agent problems in lobbying ethics and an empirical test

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Interest Groups & Advocacy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The lobbying industry is frequently held out as the most unethical part of the American political system, corrupting the governing system for the benefit of special interests at the expense of the public interest and thus in need of stern regulation, if lobbying is permitted at all. But what does it mean for a lobbyist to be “unethical,” or “ethical” for that matter? Is there such a thing as ethical lobbying? In this paper, I argue that theoretical models of how lobbying works and constitutional protections of the profession, taken together, provide a foundation for determining what kinds of lobbying might be considered ethical, and why lobbyists frequently slide into ethical gray areas. I then use data from interviews conducted with lobbyists working on six issues over a period of four years to empirically test explanations as to why lobbyists might behave in ways that are arguably unethical. Finally, I end the paper by speculating on what might be done to constrain lobbyists into behaving ethically.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. More precisely, Abramoff and his firm were hired by the Louisiana Coushatta Indian nation, which operated a casino in Louisiana, to lobby against alleged efforts by the state of Texas to allow another Indian nation to open a casino in Texas near the border dividing the two states, thus creating competition for the Louisiana Coushatta’s casino. Abramoff actually ended up lobbying for casino gambling in Texas to simultaneously be paid by another Indian nation (Continetti 2006).

  2. Both the American League of Lobbyists and the American Society of Association Executives tried to create cannon of ethics, but neither caught on (Dwoskin 2012).

  3. I make no explicit assumptions regarding the shape of the distribution of group member of employer preferences for policy outcomes. I use the normal distribution in Fig. 1 simply because it is familiar and thus the easiest way to make my point.

  4. The three policy domains conform to Lowi’s (1964) classic typology. Agriculture policy often matches Lowi’s description of a distributive policy arena, while environmental policy often is redistributive and banking often is regulatory.

  5. Of these eighty-three lobbyists, five were hired from private lobbying firms to represent the interest group on the particular issue. The other lobbyists were all permanent employees of the organization.

  6. This would be 332 observations, but several unclear answers to questions about what lobbyists actually did on some policy proposals required me to delete 51 observations, so N = 281.

  7. This was either sponsorship or co-sponsorship of the observed bill or, in the case of an administrative rule, a bill supporting or attacking it.

  8. These data are square-rooted because a few budgets were very large, skewing the overall data.

  9. This simple probit model was not my first choice. Elsewhere I have argued that lobbyists are embedded in larger environments with many cross-pressures (Holyoke 2015b). Consequently, while my observations are individual lobbyists, pressures at higher levels of analysis also ought to be considered. I therefore estimated my data using a hierarchical model incorporating both fixed and random effects. However, the likelihood ratio test to reject the null hypothesis that the simpler model was inadequate failed to be significant. So I use the simple probit model.

References

  • Ainsworth, S.H. 1997. The role of legislators in the determination of interest group influence. Legislative Studies Quarterly 22 (4): 517–533.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ainsworth, S.H., and I. Sened. 1993. The role of lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with two audiences. American Journal of Political Science 37 (3): 834–866.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allard, N.W. 2008. Lobbying is an honorable profession: The right to petition and the competition to be right. Stanford Law and Policy Review 19 (1): 23–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • American Bar Association. 2011. Lobbying law in the spotlight: Challenges and proposed improvements. Report of the task force on federal lobbying laws. Washington, DC: American Bar Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith, D. 1993. Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes. American Journal of Political Science 37 (3): 799–833.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F.R., J.M. Berry, M. Hojnacki, D.C. Kimball, and B.L. Leech. 2009. Lobbying and policy change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brasher, H. 2006. Listening to hearings: Legislative hearings and legislative outcomes. American Politics Research 34 (5): 583–604.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Continetti, Matthew. 2006. The friends of Jack Abramoff. The Weekly Standard, January 16.  http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/7749. Accessed on 27 June 2017.

  • Dodd, L.C. 1977. Congress and the quest for power. In Congress reconsidered, ed. L.C. Dodd, and B.I. Oppenheimer. New York: Praeger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drutman, L. 2015. The business of America is lobbying. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dwoskin, E. 2012. Lobbyist on incremental mission to restore lobbying’s good name. Bloomberg News, July 7: 78.

  • Fernandes, A.N. 2009. Ethical considerations of the public sector lobbyist. McGeorge Law Review 41 (1): 183–202.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerken, H.K., and A. Tausanovitch. 2014. A public finance model for lobbying: Lobbying, campaign finance, and the privatization of democracy. Election Law Journal 13 (1): 75–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenwood, J., and J. Dreger. 2013. The transparency register: A European vanguard of strong lobby regulation. Interest Groups & Advocacy 2 (2): 139–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grenzke, J.M. 1989. PACs and the congressional supermarket: The currency is complex. American Journal of Political Science 33 (1): 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, J.M. 1991. Gaining access: Congress and the farm lobby, 1919–1981. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartnett, K. 2015. Would more lobbying improve America? Politico, August 24. http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/08/would-more-lobbying-improve-america-000206. Accessed on 27 June 2017.

  • Heaney, M.T. 2006. Brokering health policy: Coalitions, parties, and interest group influence. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 31 (4): 887–944.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Higginson, S.A. 1986. A short history of the right to petition government for a redress of grievances. Yale Law Journal 96 (1): 142–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hojnacki, M. 1997. Interest groups’ decisions to join alliances or work alone. American Journal of Political Science 41 (1): 61–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holt, J.C. 1992. Magna carta, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Holyoke, T.T. 2009. Interest group competition and coalition formation. American Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 360–375.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holyoke, T.T. 2011. Competitive interests: Competition and compromise in American interest group politics. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holyoke, T.T. 2015a. The ethical lobbyist: Reforming Washington’s influence industry. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holyoke, T.T. 2015b. Challenges of integrating levels of analysis in interest group research. In Organizational ecology of interest communities, ed. V. Gray, D. Halpin, and D. Lowery, 79–97. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jankowsky, J. 2006. Lobbying and lobby reform: A practitioner’s viewpoint. Extensions 14 (3): 20–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaiser, R.G. 2009. So damn much money: The triumph of lobbying and the corruption of the American government. New York: Vintage Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kenen, J. 2003. Angry and wet, AARP members try to burn cards. Reuters News Service, November 19. http://www.newsmine.org/content.php?ol=cabal-elite/w-administration/big-money/drug-bill/aarpmembers-burn-cards.txt. Accessed on 27 June 2017.

  • Kersh, R. 2000. State autonomy and civil society: The lobbyist connection. Critical Review 14 (2–3): 237–258.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kersh, R. 2002. Corporate lobbyists as political actors: A view from the field. In Interest group politics, 6th ed, ed. A.J. Cigler, and B.A. Loomis, 225–248. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kingdon, J.W. 1973. Congressmen’s voting decisions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krishnakumar, A.S. 2007. Towards a Madisonian, interest-group-based approach to lobbying regulation. Alabama Law Review 58 (3): 513–528.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaPira, T.M., and H.F. Thomas III. 2014. Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation. Interest Groups & Advocacy 3 (1): 4–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lawson, G., and G. Seidman. 1999. Downsizing the right to petition. Northwestern University Law Review 93 (3): 739–766.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazarus, J., A.M. McKay, and L. Herbel. 2016. Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress. Interest Groups & Advocacy 5 (1): 82–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lohmann, S. 2003. Representative government and special interest politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (2): 299–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowery, D., and K. Marschetti. 2012. You don’t know Jack: Principals, agents and lobbying. Interest Groups & Advocacy 1 (2): 139–170.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowi, T.J. 1964. American business, public policy, case-studies, and political theory. World Politics 16 (2): 677–715.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luneburg, W.V. 2009. The evolution of federal lobbying regulation: Where we are now and where we should be going. McGeorge Law Review 41 (1): 85–130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mahoney, C., and L. Drutman. 2017. On the advantages of a well-constructed lobbying system: toward a more democratic, modern lobbying process. Interest Groups & Advocacy. doi:10.1057/s41309-017-0020-2.

  • Mansbridge, J.J. 1992. A deliberative theory of interest representation. In The politics of interests: Interest groups transformed, ed. M.P. Petracca. Boulder: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayhew, D.R. 1974. Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGrath, C. 2008. The development and regulation of lobbying in the new member states of the European Union. Journal of Public Affairs 8 (1): 15–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rehr, D.K. 2012. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act: Five years later. Washington, DC: Lobbyists.info.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salisbury, R.H. 1969. An exchange theory of interest groups. Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (1): 1–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schiff, E.L., K. Seufer, A. Whitesell, and D. Lowery. 2015. Agency problems and interest representation: An empirical analysis of the cost of lobbying. Interest Groups & Advocacy 4 (3): 225–248.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stephenson, M., and H.E. Jackson. 2010. Lobbyists as imperfect agents: Implications for public policy in a pluralist system. Harvard Journal on Legislation 47 (4): 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Susman, T.M. 2006. Lobbying in the 21st Century: Reciprocity and the need for reform. Administrative Law Review 58 (3): 737–752.

    Google Scholar 

  • Susman, T.M. 2008. Private ethics, public conduct: An essay on ethical lobbying, campaign contributions, reciprocity, and the public good. Stanford Law and Policy Review 19 (1): 10–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomas, H.F., and T.M. LaPira. 2017. How many lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow lobbying and the political economy of policy advocacy. Interest Groups & Advocacy. doi:10.1057/s41309-017-0024-y.

    Google Scholar 

  • Travis, H.A. 2015. 3 organizations that use Facebook private groups for advocacy. Connectivity. http://connectivity.cqrollcall.com/3-organizations-that-use-facebook-private-groups-for-advocacy/. Accessed on 27 June 2017.

  • Weil, D., A. Fung, M. Graham, and E. Fagotta. 2006. The effectiveness of regulatory disclosure policies. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 25 (4): 155–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodstock Theological Center. 2002. The ethics of lobbying: Organized interests, political power, and the common good. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, J.R. 1996. Interest groups and congress. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yackee, S.W. 2015. Invisible (and visible) lobbying: The case of state regulatory policymaking. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 15 (3): 322–344.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, California State University, Fresno, 2225 East San Ramon, M/S MF19, Fresno, CA, 93740-8029, USA

    Thomas T. Holyoke

Authors
  1. Thomas T. Holyoke
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas T. Holyoke.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Holyoke, T.T. A theoretical foundation for assessing principal-agent problems in lobbying ethics and an empirical test. Int Groups Adv 6, 272–289 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-017-0022-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-017-0022-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation