Abstract
The paper's aim is to tackle some significant challenges faced by democratic theory in plurinational societies. Claims to recognition challenge the assumption of a ‘people speaking in one voice’ (namely, the assumption of the constituency as a homogeneous demos) and therefore, some basic tenets of liberal democracy. In a context where one cannot assume anymore a homogeneous demos, it is tempting to believe that there may be an independent, yet democratic, principle that may help us to solve the problem of the ‘constitution of the demos.’ Goodin argues that the all-affected interests principle is in fact the best principle of inclusion in democratic decision-making. Yet I argue that the all-affected interests principle is not really useful, at least as a starting point. But if this is so, and if the picture underlying modern democratic theory (the people as a nation) is seriously undermined by claims to recognition, how are the communities to which self-rule necessarily relates to be bounded?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
A map of the territory concerned by the agreement-in-principle is available on the website of the Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones of Quebec government at http://www.versuntraite.com/documentation/telecharger_en.htm. The general context in which this negotiation must be understood is one in which governments face pressing claims coming from First Nations as to empowerment and self-rule (in order to tackle significant social, political and economic issues), as well as increasing pressures to supersede the burdensome remnants of a colonial relationship.
Except for the Innu Assi of the First Nation of Nutashkuan, where Quebec retains the ownership of hydraulic resources and minerals (with the exception of surface mineral substances) and subsurface rights.
A referee suggested that I was confusing the boundaries issue, which is normally taken to refer to the constitution of the demos, with the constitution of decision units within a demos whose national boundaries are already settled. He/she seemed to assume that the constitution of the demos is an issue of external boundaries. I rather argue that in plurinational societies there can be many (overlapping) demoi, on the one hand, and that minority nations (such as Innu communities) challenge a legal normativity to which they are estranged, on the other. To do so, I build on H. Lindahl's fruitful distinction between two senses of the inside/outside divide; see section ‘The All-Affected Interests Principle’.
For example, in Kymlicka's work, although liberal states and group-differentiated rights within the state are both justified on the same normative ground (societal culture as the context of individual autonomy), the result is very different depending on whether one belongs to the majority or to some minority nation. See Nootens (2006).
This example is used by Näsström (2003, p. 824).
Let us stress that stated as a right to participate in government, the principle seems of little use for issues related to the internationalization of governance (since there is no world government) or to claims of minority nations to self-government (since they want governments of their own).
Let us remark that Goodin speaks sometimes of the protection of people's interests, sometimes of reciprocity of interests, which is not exactly the same thing.
Arrhenius acknowledges that ‘Without knowledge of what interests people have, we cannot determine whether an institutional structure is sufficiently democratic or how it could be improved’ (Arrhenius, 2005, p. 8).
Nemein refers to that space of validity created by all legislation (that is, law as a constitutive feature of political community as such) (Lindahl, 2006).
As will become clear later on, the right to negotiate those representations of unity is equally indispensable. In this paper, this issue is tackled from the point of view of those who challenge the outside/inside divide not as ‘foreigners’ but as ‘strangers’ in Lindahl's sense, namely, those who live on a community's territory but are not ‘in-legal-place.’ This is why the issue tackled in this paper is not merely one of the constitution of decision units within a demos but actually pertains to the constitution of demoi.
See also Lindahl (2003b, p. 103).
Agné also develops a critique of the AAIP, although from a different point of view. He argues, among other things, that democratic autonomy is better captured by a concept ‘according to which people should be free and able to choose the actions by which they themselves are affected’ (Agné, 2006, p. 438). He also insists upon the distinction between the impacts of decisions on individuals and individuals’ capacity to act: ‘The symmetry principle is sometimes confused with a principle of political autonomy according to which the people should be able and free to act upon themselves. These are of course two different principles. That actor A affects actor B does not by itself mean that there are fewer or less important possibilities of action available to B, or that B is prevented from performing any particular action. The effect caused by A may indeed have been to increase B's possibilities to act freely’ (Agné, 2006, p. 441). Accordingly, ‘democracy requires the distribution of the greatest amount of autonomy among the greatest number of people. Accordingly, decisions on who should be included in what political procedures should be taken so as to maximize this criterion …’ (Agné, 2006, p. 445).
I do not intend to argue that nations are not significant and valuable political communities. I agree with M. Keating that ‘Nationality (…) is very much with us and remains one of the structuring principle of modern societies. What we need are new ways of connecting it to political order and a reformulated conception of sovereignty’ (Keating, 2003, p. 207).
Recognition and self-government may take diverse institutional forms. R. Simeon rightly stressed to me that aboriginal communities are rather small and scattered, and could hardly be compared, for example, to Quebec's state, although both the former and the latter claim self-government. Arguing for recognition and self-government does not mean that it must be institutionalized in the same way for every community.
References
Agné, H. (2006) A dogma of democratic theory and globalization: Why politics need not include everyone it affects. European Journal of International Relations 12 (3): 433–458.
Arrhenius, G. (2005) The boundary problem in democratic theory. In: F. Tersman (ed.) Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations, Stockholm Studies in Democratic Theory, 1 (also available on-line at http://people.su.se/∼folke/index.html).
Chambers, S. (2004) Democracy, popular sovereignty, and constitutional legitimacy. Constellations 11 (2): 153–173.
Christodoulidis, E. (2001) The aporia of sovereignty: On the representation of the people in constitutional discourse. King's College Law Journal 12: 111–133.
Dahl, R. (1970) After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, pp. 171.
Dieckhoff, A. (2000) La nation dans tous ses États: Les identités nationales en mouvement. Paris: Flammarion, pp. 354.
Goodin, R. (2007) Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (1): 40–68.
Held, D. (2004) Democratic accountability and political effectiveness from a cosmopolitan perspective. Government and Opposition 39 (2): 364–391.
Hont, I. (1994) The permanent crisis of a divided mankind: ‘Contemporary crisis of the nation state’ in historical perspective. Political Studies XLII: 166–231.
Keating, M. (2003) Sovereignty and plurinational democracy: Problems in political science. In: N. Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 191–208.
Kymlicka, W. and Straehle, C. (1999) Cosmopolitanism, nation-states, and minority nationalism: A critical review of recent literature. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1): 65–88.
Lecours, A. and Nootens, G. (2007) Comprendre le nationalisme majoritaire. In: A.-G. Gagnon, A. Lecours and G. Nootens (eds.) Les nationalismes majoritaires contemporains. Identité, mémoire, pouvoir. Montréal, Canada: Québec Amérique, pp. 19–45.
Leydet, D. (2005) The Right to Aboriginal Self-Government and the Process of Constitutional Change in Canada: Questions of Democratic Legitimacy. Political theory workshop, McGill University, 26pp.
Lindahl, H. (2003a) Acquiring a community: The Acquis and the institution of European legal order. European Law Journal 9 (4): 433–450.
Lindahl, H. (2003b) Sovereignty and representation in the European union. In: N. Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 87–114.
Lindahl, H. (2006) Give and take. Arendt and the nomos of political community. Philosophy and Social Criticism 32 (7): 881–901.
Näsström, S. (2003) What globalization overshadows. Political Theory 31 (6): 808–834.
Nootens, G. (2006) Liberal nationalism and the sovereign territorial ideal. Nations and Nationalism 12 (1): 35–50.
Pogge, T. (1997) Creating supra-national institutions democratically: Reflections on the European Union's ‘democratic deficit’. The Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (2): 163–182.
Tierney, S. (2007) ‘We the peoples’: Constituent power and constitutionalism in plurinational states. In: M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds.) The Paradox of Constitutionalism. Constituent Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 229–245.
Tilly, C. (2004) Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 305.
Tully, J. (1995) Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 253.
Tully, J. (2006) Critical distrust. unpublished.
Walker, N. (2003) Late sovereignty in the European union. In: N. Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 3–32.
Weinstock, D. (2006) The real world of (Global) democracy. Journal Social Philosophy 37 (1): 6–20.
Whelan, F.G. (1983) Democratic theory and the boundary problem. In: J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.) Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy. New York: New York University Press, pp. 13–47.
Yack, B. (2001) Popular sovereignty and nationalism. Political Theory 29 (4): 517–536.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Stephen Tierney, Avigail Eisenberg, Margaret Moore, Michel Seymour, Joseph Carens, Richard Simeon and Zoran Oklopcic for their insightful comments on a previous draft of this paper. I am also grateful to Contemporary Political Theory anonymous referees, whose relevant and challenging comments helped me to state my argument in a more clear and (hopefully) convincing way.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Nootens, G. Democracy and legitimacy in plurinational societies. Contemp Polit Theory 8, 276–294 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2008.29
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2008.29