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Synthetic Biology, Biosecurity, and Biosafety

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Ethics and Emerging Technologies

Chapter Summary

The primary extrinsic concerns regarding synthetic organisms are to do with their human health and environmental risks. One reason for this is that they are (for now, at least) microorganisms, and many microorganisms cause illnesses in humans (and nonhumans) and are ecological disruptive. Another reason is the growth of “DIY (do-it-yourself) biotech” and “garage biotech” — i.e. people who are exploring synthetic biology on their own or outside of institutional structures such as academic, government, and corporate labs. In this chapter, Michele Garfinkle and Lori Knowles present and evaluate governance strategies, both hard law and soft law, for managing the risks associated with synthetic genomics, while also fostering innovation and realizing its potential benefits. They believe that it is possible to develop synthetic biology in biosecure and biosafe ways.

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© 2014 Michele Garfinkle and Lori Knowles

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Garfinkle, M., Knowles, L. (2014). Synthetic Biology, Biosecurity, and Biosafety. In: Sandler, R.L. (eds) Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137349088_35

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